State Tax Commission of Missouri

2. Discrimination Issue Abandoned. Complainant presented no evidence addressing the claim of discrimination; therefore the ground of discrimination was deemed abandoned.

3. Assessor and Board Assessment. The Assessor valued the Complainant’s property at $9,392,600 – residential and $1,939,600 – commercial, for a total true value in money of $11,332,200. The Board of Equalization reduced the residential value to $9,300,000 and sustained the commercial value for a total true value in money of $11,239,600.[1]

4. Property Description. The subject property is located at 13001 Gary Player Drive, Sunset Hills, Missouri. The property is identified by parcel number 27N140041. The property is a 27 hole golf course with clubhouse and supporting amenities, otherwise known as the Tapawingo National Golf Club.[2]

5. Complainant’s Evidence. Complainant presented the Appraisal Report[3] and testimony[4] of Thomas H. Slack, MAI, Missouri State Certified General Real Estate Appraiser. Mr. Slack’s appraisal included his analysis of the National Golf Market,[5] his Highest and Best Use analysis,[6] Valuation under the Cost Approach,[7] Sales Comparison Approach,[8] and Income Approach,[9] his Reconciliation and Final Value Opinion,[10] Value Allocation,[11] and supporting documentation.[12]

6. Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent filed the following Exhibits:[13]

EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION	DISPOSITION
1	Sale/real estate documents for Lakeside Golf Course	Excluded 6/16/09
2	Sale/real estate documents for Meadowbrook Country Club	Excluded 6/16/09
3	Sale/real estate documents for Taylor-Morley	Excluded 6/16/09
4	Sale/real estate documents for Paradise Valley Golf Course	Excluded 6/16/09
5	Written Direct Testimony of Jeffrey Hall	Q & A 18 Stricken

Respondent did not present an appraisal of the subject property, but rested upon the presumption of correct assessment by the Board. Exhibit 5 was received into evidence, with Question and Answer stricken as per Order dated 6/16/09.

7. No New Construction and Improvement. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2007, to January 1, 2008, therefore the value set for 2007 remains the value for the 2008 tax year.[14]

8. Highest and Best Use. The highest and best use of the subject tract of land if vacant would be development as a golf course. The highest and best use of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, as improved is its current use, as it generates a value in excess of the underlying land value. There are no alternative uses that could be expected to provide a higher present value than the current use.[15]

8. Complainant’s Indicated and Reconciled Values. The indicated value under the cost approach was $4,140,000.[16] The indicated value under the sales comparison approach was $3,700,000.[17] The indicated value under the income capitalization approach was $3,540,000.[18] Relying upon the Income Approach, supported by the Sales Comparison Approach, the final reconciled value of $3,600,000 was established by Complainant’s appraisal.[19]

9. Complainant Established Value. Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2007, to be $3,600,000, $3,240,000 – residential allocation and $360,000 – commercial allocation.[20]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[21]

Presumptions In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[22] The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[23] Complainant presented substantial and persuasive evidence that both rebutted the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and established the fair market value that should have been placed on the property for the 2007-2008 assessment cycle.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[24] True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[25] It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[26] Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[29]

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[30] The testimony and appraisal report of Mr. Slack[31] when viewed in light of all evidence on the record is accorded weight and credit sufficient to meet the burden of proof for Complainant to prevail. No evidence was presented in response to Complainant’s case in chief which rebutted any of the essential facts, conclusions and opinions advanced by Mr. Slack. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer has no reasonable basis to not accept the Complainant’s evidence of value as substantial and persuasive.

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[32] Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[33] Mr. Slack developed each of these approaches to value. The approaches to value were developed in accordance with recognized and accepted standards for a valuation of this nature.[34] Each approach was presented in a narrative form with detailed analysis and appropriate grids and charts to explain the development of the methodologies.[35]

The income approach to valuation is the most commonly utilized approach for the valuation of golf courses. It typically will provide the most accurate indicator of value for a golf course. “It reduces the differences between golf courses to the least common denominator – i.e. net income or cash flow – which is quantified in the market and converted into value using a capitalization rate derived from market data and/or investment surveys. A golf facility is typically acquired for its income producing capacity, and the income capitalization approach directly measures this important attribute.”[36] Mr. Slack properly placed greatest reliance on this approach with support from the Sales Comparison Approach.

Opinion Testimony by Experts

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto. The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.[37] The appraisal of Mr. Slack, his written direct testimony and testimony at hearing were founded upon the appropriate elements and foundation for the rendering of an expert opinion on the value of the subject golf course. The facts and data relied upon and the methodologies employed were of the types reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of appraisal for the appraisal of golf courses.

Complainant Met Its Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.[38] There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief. Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[39] The evidence established an overvaluation of Complainant’s property. Overvaluation of property is an unlawful, unfair and improper assessment.

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[40] Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[41]

The opinion of value tendered by Mr. Slack developed from his appraisal of the subject property constituted substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment and establish the fair market value of the property under appeal.

Points Raised by Respondent’s Brief Not Persuasive

Respondent’s Brief presented the following points:

1. Highest and Best Use Not Adequately Addressed.

2. Improper Flood Plain Information.

3. Cost To Construct Clubhouse.

4. Utilization of Inappropriate Comparables.

None of the points presented are persuasive to reject the valuation developed by the Slack appraisal.

Highest and Best Use

Respondent asserts that Complainant’s appraiser should have given consideration to alternate uses of the property. This argument is not based on any market data presented as rebuttal evidence. Nor was any evidence presented in Respondent’s case in chief that even addressed highest and best use, much less, opined the highest and best use of the property was for residential development of single-family homes. The claim rests solely on general cross-examination by Counsel for Respondent regarding residential development in the area around the golf course.[42] Questions and suggestions by counsel during cross-examination do not constitute evidence.

In this particular instance, the interrogation relative to residential development of single family homes in areas around the Complainant’s property does nothing to establish that a possible alternative use of the subject land as a residential subdivision constituted its highest and best use on January 1, 2007. The line of questioning was mere speculation at best as it relates to highest and best use as vacant or as improved for the subject property. Given no market data was presented to rebut Mr. Slack’s highest and best use analysis, the only evidence on the record from which a conclusion of highest and best use can be made is the Slack analysis. For the Hearing Officer to conclude that the highest and best use of the property as improved or as unimproved was for residential development would be nothing but conjecture, based only upon the musings of Counsel on the subject.

The point raised and argument presented has no basis in fact on this record. Therefore, it is without merit and can be given no weight.

Flood Plain Information

This point like Respondent’s Highest and Best Use Point finds no basis in fact in the record. Respondent argues that the information to estimate the percentage of flood plain on the golf course was improper and that proper flood plain information should have been obtained. The fatal defect in Respondent’s argument is that no rebuttal exhibits or exhibits in Respondent’s direct case were filed to establish what, if any, error in the calculation of flood plain area was possibly committed in the Slack analysis.

The Appendix of Exhibit A does provide flood plain maps and information. The conclusion of Mr. Slack was that approximately 65% of the golf course is in the Meramec River floodplain.[43] The evidence established that the appraiser examined “available flood plain maps that are provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (or other data) …”[44] The appraiser concluded that one of the nine hole courses and the first hole of another course are located outside the floodplain, but the remaining 27 holes are in the flood plain.[45]

This is the evidence on the record relative to the issue of the portion of the golf course in the floodplain. There is no basis for the Hearing Officer to conclude as Respondent urges that there is some defect in the appraiser’s conclusions. The Hearing Officer is at a loss to understand how that information from some source other then FEMA on the floodplain that impacts this golf course would be superior to address this matter. If the conclusions presented by Mr. Slack on the matter of the floodplain were in error, Respondent had more than ample time to secure documents and information to rebut the conclusions. Simply asking questions on cross-examination and arguments in a post-hearing brief do not present evidence to establish any error on the part of the appraiser. The Hearing Officer has no basis to so conclude any error. In the absence of evidence to substantiate the Respondent’s assertion the Hearing Officer can only draw the negative inference that no such evidence existed or it would have been presented to establish an error by Mr. Slack in this regard.

Cost to Construct Clubhouse

Respondent next argues that the conclusion of value of $3,600,000 barely covers the cost to construct the 2001 clubhouse.[46] This Respondent suggest this is “incredulous” and asserts the appraisal is a valuation in use, and does not show the highest and best use of the subject property. There is no benefit of going back over highest and best use. The valuation performed by Mr. Slack is not a value in use. It is a value in exchange. That is what a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property purchasing the property as an investment property for its continued use as a golf course. No evidence exists to establish a higher price would be paid for some alternative use. Nor is there any evidence upon which it can be concluded that a knowledgeable purchaser would pay more than the amount concluded by Mr. Slack.

As to the cost for the 2001 construction of the clubhouse and parking lot being over 85% of the final conclusion of value, it is irrelevant to what an investor purchaser would have paid for the subject golf course on January 1, 2007. It only illustrates that cost to construct does not necessarily equate to value. The value of the subject property is driven by the number of rounds of golf that can expected to be played in a given year, not by the amount of money that went into building a clubhouse for the property or the replacement cost now less depreciation. The value opined by Mr. Slack covers all of the real estate components of Complainant’s property. It is derived from the actual income stream of Tapawingo supported by sales of seven comparable golf courses. The values determined under the income and sales comparison approaches, as well as, the cost approach establish that the clubhouse does not contribute value equivalent to its cost to construct in 2001 or 2007. This does not negate the conclusion of value. It only recognizes the economic realities attendant to the operation of the golf course. The cost approach is seldom used by investors purchasing golf courses or sellers of golf courses.[47] “Investors rarely use the cost approach to estimate an acquisition price; sellers of these properties rarely apply the approach either

The point is not persuasive. It possesses no weight to support rejection of the conclusion of value grounded in sound appraisal methodologies and practice for this valuation problem.

Utilization of Inappropriate Comparables

Respondent’s final line of attack on the Slack appraisal is that the comparable properties relied upon in the sales comparison approach were not appropriate comparables. In developing this argument, Respondent’s made various assertions with regard to three land sale comps and one of the seven golf course comps. The Riverside, South County and Grandview properties were not used in the sales comparison approach, but were used as land sale comps in the cost approach. Therefore, criticism that Riverside did not have a clubhouse and that South County and Grandview were not golf courses fail to present any substantive basis for a rejection of the sales comparison methodology developed by Mr. Slack. No argument was presented that these sales were not appropriate for a determination of land value for the cost approach.

The single reference to one of the seven golf course sales relied on by Mr. Slack is to the Sunset Lakes course. The criticism of the use of this comparable relates to the difference in the subject’s clubhouse and the Sunset Lake clubhouse which is of lesser quality than the subject. The fact is that this sale is located across the street from the subject and therefore is an appropriate comparable for use in the sales comparison approach simply because of its location. Differences between Sunset and Tapawingo were properly accounted for by the appraiser’s adjustments.[48]

Respondent set forth various factors relative to the improvements at the subject property and also referenced the slope rating for the subject as differences between the subject and other golf courses. No two golf courses will be exactly the same. Identical comparables is not what is required. Comparables are to be sufficiently comparable that reasonable adjustments can be made for differences to arrive at an indicated value for the property being appraised.

The notations in Respondent’s Brief notwithstanding, no substantive argument or evidence was presented to challenge the conclusion of value relying on sales of seven different golf courses. Mr. Slack properly adjusted for the various differences between each sale property and the subject.[49] The sales used were of comparable golf courses. They were appropriate for development of the market approach for this appraisal problem.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent submitted four exhibits on purported sales of properties and written direct testimony of Jeffery Hall. Timely objections were made to Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Question and Answer 18 of Exhibit 5. By Order issued June 16, 2009, the Hearing Officer ruled on the objections, sustaining same and excluding Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, and Question and Answer 18 of Exhibit 5. No purpose would be served by reiterating the rulings on the objections. Order, dtd June 16, 2009 is maintained in the case file and is incorporated by reference as if set out in full in this Decision.

Summary and Conclusion

Complainant’s appraiser arrived at a conclusion of value relying on the actual income and expense data of the subject property. This analysis reflected what the subject property has actually been doing in recent years with regard to the stream of income which it produces. The Slack appraisal demonstrated what a prospective investor purchaser of the property would consider in arriving at a determination of what would be a purchase price on January 1, 2007. The income analysis found solid support in the sales data on seven comparable golf courses. None of the arguments, claims and assertions advanced at hearing or by Respondent’s post-hearing brief provide any basis upon which the Hearing Officer can reasonably reject the conclusion of valued found in Complainant’s Exhibit A.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2007 and 2008 is set at $730,800 – residential assessed value of $615,600 and commercial assessed value of $115,200.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service. The application shall contain specific facts or law as grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [50]

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending the possible filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 11, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

_____________________________________

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed postage prepaid on this 11^th day of February, 2010, to: Cathy Steele, 225 S. Meramec, Suite 511, Clayton, MO 63105, Attorney for Complainant; Carl Becker, Assistant County Counselor, Attorney for Respondent, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; Michael Brooks, Acting Assessor, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105; John Friganza, Collector, County Government Center, 41 South Central Avenue, Clayton, MO 63105.

___________________________

Barbara Heller

Legal Coordinator

[1] Exhibit A, p. 15; BOE Decision Letter dated 8/21/07

[2] A detailed description of the property under appeal is provided in Exhibit A, p. 15 – History of the Property; pp. 18-19 – Property Description

[3] Exhibit A

[4] Exhibit B – Written Direct Testimony; Tr. 4:10 – 54:1 – Testimony at Hearing

[5] Exhibit A, pp. 12-14

[6] Exhibit A, pp. 17-19

[7] Exhibit A, pp. 20-27

[8] Exhibit A, pp. 28-30

[9] Exhibit A, pp. 31-39

[10] Exhibit A, p. 40

[11] Exhibit A, p. 40

[12] Exhibit A, Addenda A, B, C, D, E & F

[13] Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 were excluded by Order dated June 16, 2009 upon objections of Complainant; Exhibit 5 was admitted, with Q & A 18 Stricken as per Order of 6/16/09.

[14] Section 137.115, RSMo

[15] Exhibit A, pp. 17-18; Exhibit B, Q & A 31-33.

[16] Exhibit A, p. 27

[17] Exhibit A, p. 30

[18] Exhibit A, p. 39

[19] Exhibit A, p. 40

[20] Id.

[21] Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo

[22] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)

[23] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)

[24] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993)

[25] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973)

[26] Hermel, supra

[27] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

[28] Exhibit B, Q & A 18-20

[29] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968)

[30] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981)

[31] Exhibits A & B; Testimony at Hearing – Tr. 4:9 – 54:1

[32] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975)

[33] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974)

[34] Exhibit A – Transmittal letter & Certification, p. 1. Appraisal was a summary appraisal in compliance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).

[35] Exhibit A, pp 20 – 27: Cost Approach; Exhibit A, pp. 28 – 33: Sales Comparison Approach; Exhibit A, pp. 33 – 39: Income Approach

[36] Analysis and Valuation of Golf Courses and Country Clubs, Arthur E. Gimmy, MAI and Buddie A. Johnson, Appraisal Institute, 2003, p. 119

[37] Section 490.065, RSMo; State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. SC. 2004); Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992)

[38] Hermel, supra

[39] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

[40] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

[41] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

[42] Tr. 8:2 – 12:17

[43] Exhibit A, p. 17

[44] Exhibit A, p. 4, Item 17

[45] Exhibit B, A 27, p. 5

[46] Mr. Slack’s estimate of value for the clubhouse and parking lot real estate under his cost approach was $3,118,292. Exhibit A, p. 24.

[47] Analysis and Valuation of Golf Courses and Country Clubs, p. 99

[48] Exhibit A, pp. 28 – 32

[49] Exhibit A, pp. 28 – 30

[50] Section 138.432, RSMo.