State Tax Commission of Missouri

DELMAR AND JOYCE SUTHERLAND, )

)

Complainants, )

)

v. ) Appeal Number 09-45006

)

SCOT VANMETER, ASSESSOR, )

BUCHANAN COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER

UPON REMAND OF APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT

REMAND OF APPEAL

By Judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri, the Order of the Commission Affirming Hearing Officer Decision Upon Application for Review of July 26, 2010, was reversed and the appeal was remanded to the Commission for reconsideration of the valuation of the subject property in light of the Judgment of the Court.

HOLDING

Decision of the Buchanan County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE. True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $50,000, residential assessed value of $9,500.

ISSUE

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the Buchanan County Board of Equalization, which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009. The Commission, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record in light of the Judgment of the Circuit Court, enters the following Decision and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Buchanan County Board of Equalization.

2. Assessment. The Assessor appraised the property at $262,410, a residential assessment of $49,860.[1] The Board reduced the value to $214,580, an assessed value of $40,770.

3. Subject Property. The subject property is located at 319 S. 10^th Street, St. Joseph, Missouri. The property is identified by map parcel number 06-3-8-4-4-116. The property is further described in Complainant’s Exhibit 1.

4. Complainant’s Evidence. Complainant offered the following exhibits which were received into evidence:

EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION
1	Appraisal Report – Jeffrey King
2	List of Needed Repairs
3	Photographs of surrounding views

Witnesses Jeffrey King, Larry Jones (Chief Appraiser – Buchanan County), Susie Danner (Deputy Assessor – Buchanan County), and Joyce Sutherland testified on behalf of Complainant.

There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2010, therefore the assessed value for 2009 remains the assessed value for 2010.[2]

Complainant’s evidence was substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2009, to be $50,000, as proposed.

5. Respondent’s Evidence. Respondent offered the following exhibits which were received into evidence:

EXHIBIT	DESCRIPTION
A	Minutes of BOE Hearing
B	Packet of Comparable Sales
C	Qualifications of Larry Jones
D	Exterior Picture of Subject
E	Aerial Photograph of the Subject
F	1988 Property Record Card for Subject
G	2008 Property Record Card for Subject
H	2009/2010 Property Record Card for Subject
I	Qualifications of Susie Danner

Mr. Jones and Ms. Danner also testified on behalf of Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.[3]

Basis of Assessment

The Constitution mandates that real property and tangible personal property be assessed at its value or such percentage of its value as may be fixed by law for each class and for each subclass.[4] The constitutional mandate is to find the true value in money for the property under appeal. By statute real and tangible personal property is assessed at set percentages of true value in money.[5] In an overvaluation appeal, true value in money for the property being appealed must be determined based upon the evidence on the record that is probative on the issue of the fair market value of the property under appeal.

Presumption In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[6] This presumption is a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption. It places the burden of going forward with some substantial evidence on the taxpayer - Complainant. When some substantial evidence is produced by the Complainant, “however slight,” the presumption disappears and the Commission, as trier of facts, receives the issue free of the presumption.[7] The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property.[8] Upon presentation of the Complainant’s evidence[9] the presumption in this appeal disappeared. The case is decided free of the presumption.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so.[10] True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use.[11] It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date.[12] Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.[xvi] There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief. Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.”[xvii]

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[xviii] Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief.[xix]

The appraisal of Mr. King (Exhibit 1) met the standard of substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment and establish value at $50,000.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for Buchanan County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2009 and 2010 is set at $9,500.

Judicial Review

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the mailing date set forth in the Certificate of Service for this Order.

If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031.8, RSMo.

If no judicial review is made within thirty days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Buchanan County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.

SO ORDERED July 21, 2011.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Randy B. Holman, Commissioner

ORDER

AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION

UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On January 29, 2010, Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson entered her Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessment by the Buchanan County Board of Equalization.

Complainants filed their Application for Review of the Decision (3/1/10). Transcript received March 17, 2010, and sent to parties on March 25, 2010. Complainants filed Supplemental Brief (4/30/10). Respondent filed Response Brief (6/1/10). Complainants filed Motion to Strike and Suggestions in Support (6/22/10) and Reply Brief (6/22/10).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard Upon Review

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.[23]

The Hearing Officer was not persuaded by the appraisal presented on behalf of Complainants. None of the points raised by Complainants in their Application for Review establish an error on the part of the Hearing Officer in applying the law to the relevant facts in the appeal. Complainants failed to meet their burden of proof and accordingly the presumption of correct assessment by the Board was not rebutted.

Motion to Strike

Complainant’s Motion to Strike is granted. Copies of documents from Case.net submitted by Respondent with the Response Brief are stricken along with all references to same contained in the Response Brief.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed. The Decision and Order of the hearing officer, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, is incorporated by reference, as if set out in full, in this final decision of the Commission.

SO ORDERED July 26, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Jeff W. Schaeperkoetter, Commissioner

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the Buchanan County Board of Equalization setting value at $214,580 is AFFIRMED.

Complainant appeared by counsel, Charles T. Frahm.

Respondent appeared by counsel, George Murray.

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer Luann Johnson.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2009, and January 1, 2010.

SUMMARY

2. The subject property is located at 319 South 10^th Street, St. Joseph, Missouri. The property is identified by parcel number 06-3.0-08-004-116.000. The property consists of a 19,600 square foot lot improved by a two and one-half story limestone over brick, single-family structure. The house was built in 1871 as a residence and is in above average condition for its age. Historically, the property had been used for a residence, a funeral home and later for an Elks Lodge. Since 1989, the property is again being used as a residence. The structure has an adjusted area of 12,756 square feet. Complainants purchased the home out of foreclosure for $20,000 to $24,000 in 1989 and subsequently put an additional $150,000 into repairs.

Portions of the property are in “absolutely gorgeous” condition while other portions may be in “utter disrepair.” The entire house is being used by the couple owning the home. Pictures of the alleged disrepair presented by Complainants’ appraiser are unidentified as to location and are difficult to view being merely black and white photocopies. Some of the pictures of disrepair appear to be pictures of the basement area while others may be of the area above the garage. It is just impossible to tell the extent of the “disrepair” from the quality of Complainants’ pictures.

The home has three levels of living room/ball room, sitting one on top of the next. In addition to the ball room on the first floor, the first floor has three rooms used as bedrooms, a dining room and a kitchen. In keeping with the age of the house, the bedrooms have no closets. Complainant testified that the bedrooms had no closets because they were originally built as offices; but Complainant testified that the property was originally built as a single family residence and Respondent’s witness, Susie Danner, testified that homes of this age typically had no closets in bedrooms. The kitchen does not have built in cabinets, but does use free standing cabinets. The first floor also houses a 6,000 volume library. This floor is used when Complainants host lots of company. It is also used for family reunions, wedding rehearsals, wedding receptions, organizational meeting places, the museum’s Christmas party, and for hosting a breakfast for neighborhood cleanup.

The second floor houses the homeowners’ bedroom, a kitchenette, a dining room, a living room, and a dressing room. This floor has two working toilets and one working shower. A second shower no longer works.

The third floor houses a computer room, a sewing room, a bedroom without a closet, the husband’s office (living room area) and a bathroom that doubles as a laundry room because the homeowners drain the washing machine into the bathroom drain. The bathroom has a toilet but no shower.

In addition to the primary improvement, the property also contains a garage with a living area above the garage. The living area is in disrepair. The carriage house/garage has an adjusted area of 1,666 square feet.

3. The property suffers from the following deficiencies (identified in Complainants’ Exhibit 2): Exterior stone needs to be waterproofed; the garage needs electricity and the hole in the second floor of the garage needs to be fixed; cupboard doors are warped; many floors still need to be refinished; the basement needs safer access; the dining room carpet needs to be replaced; there are still many areas without heat and air conditioning; two floors need to be reinforced where they rotted due to previous leaks. Complainant testified that the property was originally heated with radiators but that sometime in the past the furnace had been replaced and

there were still rooms which did not have heat vents. Further, the copper tubing on the air conditioner had been broken.

4. For the period of 1989 through 2008, Complainants paid no taxes on the residential structure because it had been dropped from the property record card. In 2009, Respondent’s agents discovered that the large structure was no longer on the tax rolls, as evidenced by the square footage of the improvements listed on the property record cards, and steps were taken to add the large structure back to the tax rolls. Initially, value was set at $380,000 based upon an exterior inspection of the condition and size of the improvements, as determined by GIS. An interior inspection was conducted on May 20, 2009, at which time value was lowered to $262,000 because of the condition of the garage. Complainants appealed this value and the Board of Equalization reduced value to $214,850 based upon Complainants’ testimony of the amount paid for the property and the subsequent improvements made to the property. Complainants assert an opinion of value of $50,000 based upon their appraiser’s appraisal report.

5. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2010.

6. Complainant’s appraiser presented three proposed comparable sales located within 1.18 miles of the subject property. Those properties contained 4,788 square feet; 3,048 square feet; and 3,630 square feet; well below the 12,756 square feet of the subject property. The properties sold for $217,000 in January, 2009; $25,000 in October, 2008; and $69,600 in March, 2009. After adjustments, the properties indicated a range of value between $41,500 and $61,000. The properties required gross adjustments of 86.2%, 214.0% and 68.7%. The larger the adjustments, the less accuracy that can be attributed to the comparable properties.[24] The extent of the disparity between the subject property and the proposed comparable sales indicate that the sales are not comparable and are not useful in determining value for the subject property. Complainants’ sales comparison approach is not a reliable indicator of value for the subject property and fails to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization.

7. Complainants’ cost approach failed to explain why the correct square footage cost should be $32.59 and $14.21 rather than $58.69 as proposed by the County. Both the County and Complainants’ appraiser purportedly took their costing numbers from recognized industry manuals. Because this Hearing Officer has some questions as to the correct square foot value for improvements, Complainants’ cost approach is not substantial and persuasive enough to rebut the presumption in favor of the Board of Equalization.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious.[25]

Official and Judicial Notice

Agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take judicial notice.[26]

Courts will take judicial notice of their own records in the same cases.[27] In addition, courts may take judicial notice of records in earlier cases when justice requires[28] or when it is necessary for a full understanding of the instant appeal.[29] Courts may take judicial notice of their own records in prior proceedings involving the same parties and basically the same facts.[30]

Presumptions In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization.[31]

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[37]

Trier of Fact

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[38]

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case.[39]

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value.[40]

Opinion Testimony by Experts

An expert’s opinion must be founded upon substantial information, not mere conjecture or speculation, and there must be a rational basis for the opinion.[41] The state tax commission cannot ignore a lack of support in the evidence for adjustments made by the expert witnesses in the application of a particular valuation approach.[42]

The testimony of an expert is to be considered like any other testimony, is to be tried by the same test, and receives just so much weight and credit as the trier of fact may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The hearing officer, as the trier of fact, has the authority to weigh the evidence and is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and may accept it in part or reject it in part.[43]

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.[44]

Complainants’ Burden of Proof

Complainants Fail to Present Substantial and Persuasive Evidence

Complainants have failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence tending to demonstrate that their property has been overvalued and that the correct value for the property on January 1, 2009, was $50,000.

It is not enough to merely present an appraisal report. Complainants must present a well reasoned appraisal report which arrives at a conclusion of market value based upon market derived evidence of sufficient reliability as to lead the Hearing Officer to determine that a mistake has been made by the Board of Equalization. Having placed principle reliance upon the sales comparison approach, it was incumbent upon Complainants’ appraiser to utilize properties that were, in fact, comparable. Complainants’ appraiser testified that the percentage of adjustments can be “out of whack” because only Fannie Mae cares about the amount each property is adjusted. Complainants’ appraiser further testified that what really mattered was that all of the comparable properties ended up at about the same value after the adjustments. Perhaps comparability is genuinely not important for some this appraiser’s endeavors, but when the reliability of evidence is being measured, comparability will be tested. Being familiar with the many ways that numbers can be manipulated, this Hearing Officer is not impressed that this appraiser could get all of his adjusted values to come out in a tight range. Having been unable to find comparable properties, it would have been better to abandon the sales comparison approach and find another approach which was not so obviously flawed.

Mr. King’s cost approach was touched upon briefly above, but it is worth noting that Mr. King testified that his cost approach was not a reliable indicator of value.

An owner’s opinion of value is not probative if it is not based upon a proper foundation. Complainants’ opinion is based upon the appraisal report. As demonstrated above, Mr. King’s appraisal report is significantly flawed. Therefore, this owner’s opinion of value is not probative.

Undoubtedly, after having not paid taxes on this large improvement for 20 years, it is a shock for Complainants to see a large tax bill at this time. However, while the County estimates replacement cost for this improvement at $797,168, it is only showing the improvements at 24% good (76% depreciation). There are probably many things that may need repair but, by Complainants’ own admission, this property is nice enough to host social events such as wedding receptions. The value determined by the Board of Equalization represents something less than “absolutely gorgeous” as characterized by Respondent’s Deputy Appraiser and something more than “utter disrepair” as suggested by Complainants’ attorney. The Board of Equalization’s value is the best evidence of value before this Commission.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for Buchanan County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing date shown in the Certificate of Service. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. [53]

The Collector of Buchanan County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of 139.031.8 RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED January 29, 2010.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson

Senior Hearing Officer

[1] Residential property is assessed at 19% of true value in money (fair market value), Section 137.115.5(1), RSMo

[2] Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

[3] Article X, Section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

[4] Article X, Sections 4(a) and 4(b), Mo. Const. of 1945

[5] Section 137.115.5, RSMo

[6] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958)

[7] United Missouri Bank of Kansas City v. March, 650 S.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Mo. App. 1983), citing to State ex rel. Christian v. Lawry, 405 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. App. 1966) and cases therein cited.

[8] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959)

[9] Exhibit 1 and Testimony of Complainant’s Expert Witness at hearing

[10] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

[11] Daly v. P. D. George Company, et al, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App E.D. 2002), citing, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. STC, 852 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. App. 1993); citing, Stephen & Stephen Properties, Inc. v. STC, 499 S.W.2d 798, 801-803 (Mo. 1973).

[12] Hermel, supra.

[13] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

[14] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

[15] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

[xvi] Hermel, supra.

[xvii] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

[xviii] See, Cupples-Hesse, supra.

[xix] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

[20] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

[21] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

[22] Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

[23] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

[24]. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 12^th Edition, 2001, pg. 447.

[25] Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, 138.431.4, RSMo.

[26] Section 536.070(6), RSMo.

[27] State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 129 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1939); Barth v. Kansas City Elevated Railway Company, 44 S.W. 788, 781 (1898).

[28] Burton v. Moulder, 245 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. 1952); Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889, 894 (1943); Bushman v. Barlow, 15 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 1929)

[29] State ex rel St. Louis Public Service Company v. Public Service Commission, 291 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. banc 1956).

[30] In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Keeble, 399 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Mo. 1966).

[31] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

[32] Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

[33] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).

[34] Hermel, supra.

[35] Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

[36] Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

[37] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

[38] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

[39] See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975).

[40] St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

[41] Missouri Pipeline Co. v. Wilmes, 898 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995).

[42] Drey v. State Tax Commission, 345 S.W.2d 228, 234-236 (Mo. 1961), Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d, 341, 348 (Mo. 2005).

[43] Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. 1981); Scanlon v. Kansas City, 28 S.W.2d 84, 95 (Mo. 1930).

[44] Section 490.065, RSMo; State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. SC. 2004); Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

[45] Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897.

[46] See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

[47] See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

[48] Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

[49] Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970).

[50] Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo. App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

[51] Carmel Energy at 783.

[52] See, Rossman v. G.F.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980).

[53] Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.