State Tax Commission of Missouri

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.[4]

Grounds for Review

Complainant asserts a variety of claims in his Application for Review. The Commission will address each of the arguments advanced by Complainant.

Change of Hearing Officers

Complainant first asserts error in having Hearing Officer Tichenor conduct the evidentiary hearing. The Commission has fully authority and discretion with regard to the assignment of any given appeal to any given hearing officer.[5] Cases are set for hearing on various days and before different hearing officers. Therefore, any given case may have had orders issued by one hearing officer; however, the docket for evidentiary hearing in that case may be before a different hearing officer.

Mr. Vires’ assertion that Hearing Officer Tichenor “took complete charge of the proceedings and failed to address specific orders issued by his predecessor” does not establish any abuse of discretion by the Hearing Officer. Indeed, it is expected that Hearing Officers are to take charge of the proceedings and conduct them in a manner to insure that a fair hearing is conducted consistent with applicable rules of procedure and evidence. There is nothing in this record to establish that the conduct of the evidentiary hearing in this case by Hearing Officer Tichenor was not in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence.

As to the charge of failure to address orders issued by Hearing Officer Monaghan, it has no merit. Hearing Officer Tichenor was under no obligation to revisit the orders and rulings made by Hearing Officer Monaghan. The responsibility of Hearing Officer Tichenor was to preside over the evidentiary hearing and to insure due process to both parties. The record establishes that both parties were given full opportunity to present evidence relevant to the issues before the Commission. The Commission finds no basis to conclude that Hearing Officer Tichenor erred in his conduct of the evidentiary hearing.

Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment

Complainant seeks review and reversal of the decision of Hearing Officer Maureen Monaghan denying his Motion for Summary Judgment. Complainant’s allegations of errors are nothing more than his disagreement with the conclusions reached by Hearing Officer Monaghan. There were no errors of law in Hearing Officer Monaghan’s Order of May 16, 2008. Hearing Officer Monaghan did not err in her determinations as challenged by Complainant.

Complainant’s first point argued for overturning the Decision of Hearing Officer Tichenor is nothing more than a rearguing of the matters addressed in the ruling denying Summary Judgment. Hearing Officer Tichenor did not err in deferring to the ruling of Hearing Officer Monaghan.

Issuance of Subpoenas

Complainant requested the issuance of subpoenas for Respondent and the members of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization to attend the evidentiary hearing. Hearing Officer Monaghan denied said requests. There was no proper basis for issuance of the subpoenas. The individuals sought to be subpoenaed were not shown to have any relevant testimony on the issues of overvaluation, discrimination or inspection. Hearing Officer Monaghan did not err in her denial of the requested subpoenas. Hearing Officer Tichenor did not err in his conduct of the evidentiary hearing or in his Decision with regard to this matter.

Presumption of Correct Assessment

Complainant’s next point is that the Hearing Officer erred in his Decision with regard to the presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the Board. The Hearing Officer properly cited to and applied the law with regard to the presumption in the appeal.[6] There is no need for the Commission to reiterate the Conclusion of Law and Findings of Fact on this point.

Exclusion of Exhibit 27

Complainant next asserts error on the part of the Hearing Officer in the exclusion of Exhibit 27. The Hearing Officer properly reviewed Exhibit 27 when it was offered into evidence.[7] His determination that the document presented by Mr. Vires was not in fact a correct and accurate copy of the Field Review Form signed by William A. Jarrett and was not relevant was not an abuse of the Hearing Officer’s discretion. A review of the exhibit provides no information to establish the value proposed by Complainant.

Respondent’s appraiser properly concluded on a condition of fair for the subject. Exhibit 27 only addresses that issue and would only be cumulative information to a fact not in dispute, i.e. the subject’s inferior condition due to various items of deferred maintenance. This point was not disputed by Respondent. Mr. Jarrett was present at the hearing. He could have laid a proper foundation for the exhibit. Complainant declined to call him as a witness. The Hearing Officer had an adequate basis for excluding Exhibit 27. He did not err on this point as argued by Mr. Vires.

Responding to Exhibit 1

Complainant next argues that he was “put in the impossible position of having to respond to an entirely different appraisal than the one which was the basis of his appeal.” Complainant’s burden of proof was to present substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the true value in money he was proposing of $125,000. A party is not required to “respond” to the other party’s appraisal.

The Hearing Officer’s decision was not based upon any lack of response to the Godar appraisal.[8] Complainant failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the fair market value of his property was the value he proposed. The record shows that Mr. Vires presented no recognized and acceptable valuation data. Complainant erroneously focused on actions of the Board and the Assessor’s staff; this provided no relevant information on the issue of fair market value. Complainant’s argument under this point addresses irrelevant matters that occurred prior to the evidentiary hearing.

Appeals on overvaluation are based on the value set by the Board, not on any given appraisal. Once a taxpayer files an appeal with the Commission, both parties are free to present such evidence on the issue of the true value in money as they deem appropriate and necessary. There is no statute or rule requiring the Assessor to present only the mass valuation data, or the data upon which the Board established value. The Assessor has every right to present a new appraisal, if deemed necessary. The Hearing Officer did not err in receiving into evidence the appraisal report of Mr. Godar.

Comparables Undervalued – Discrimination Claim

Complainant next asserts that evidence was presented demonstrating that the comparables used in appraising the subject property were substantially undervalued in respect to their sales prices. This was essentially Complainant’s discrimination claim. The Hearing Officer addressed the discrimination claim at length.[9] The Commission would serve no purpose restating what the Hearing Officer determined. It is sufficient to say that the Hearing Officer properly applied the controlling law with regard to a claim of discrimination to the facts presented by Complainant. Complainant failed to prove his claim of discrimination.

Exclusion of Exhibits 22 & 23

Complainant argues that the Hearing Officer erred in his exclusion of Exhibits 22 and 23. These documents contained tax histories on property owned by Barbara J. Vires (mother of Complainant) and the property under appeal. The Hearing Officer did not abuse his discretion in determining that they exhibits were irrelevant to the issues in this appeal. The tax histories did not establish any relevant fact regarding the true value in money of the property being appeal for the 2007 – 2008 assessment cycle. Nor did the histories provide any relevant information as to a claim of discrimination.

Exclusion of Exhibit 26

The Hearing Officer excluded from evidence Exhibit 26 – Information on property at 5178 Olde Silver Place. Complainant desired to use this property as a comparable. There was no evidence that this property had sold in a time frame relevant to the assessment date of January 1, 2007. Complainant alleged errors in the Assessor’s record with regard to this property and that this was the only house in the subject subdivision to have its appraised value lowered in the 2007 – 2008 assessment cycle. The Hearing Officer correctly determined that information regarding a single property in the subdivision was not relevant to the claims of overvaluation or discrimination.

Respondent’s Burden of Proof

Complainant’s final argument is that the Respondent had the burden to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain the valuation made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. Complainant further asserts that Respondent did not meet this burden of proof at any time during the appeal process. Mr. Vires apparently did not understand that the Assessor was under no burden to offer evidence to sustain the original computer assisted valuation of $237,900. The Board of Equalization rejected that valuation.

The Board determined the value to be $191,700. This was based upon the Assessor’s evidence and utilization of the cost approach due to the condition of the subject property.[10] Therefore, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence did not apply. In appeals before the Commission, the Respondent is not required to offer evidence to sustain the computer generated valuation. It is only when Respondent does seek to sustain a computer generated valuation that the clear and convincing standard is operative.[11]

The evidence tendered by Respondent was that the value for Complainant’s property was $190,000. The Hearing Officer property concluded that Respondent’s burden of proof to establish the value of $190,000 was to present substantial and persuasive evidence.[12] Finally, the Hearing Officer’s determination that Respondent’s evidence constituted substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and to establish true value in money was not in error.[13]

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts unless disbursed pursuant to section 139.031.8, RSMo.

If no judicial review is made within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal.

SO ORDERED November 25, 2008.

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation and discrimination, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $237,900, assessed value of $45,200, as residential property. The Board reduced the value to $191,700, assessed value of $36,420. Complainant proposed a value of $125,000, assessed value of $23,750. A hearing was conducted on July 10, 2008, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant’s Evidence

Mr. Vires testified and gave his opinion of the fair market value of his property as of January 1, 2007 to be $125,000. This opinion of value was based on the value set by the Board after a hearing in the 2005-06 assessment cycle. The gist of Mr. Vires’ argument goes to the general process before the Board of Equalization and the fact that even after a field inspection that the value recommended to the Board and adopted by the Board was the value ($191,700) determined by a cost analysis under the Assessor’s mass valuation.

Complainant tendered the exhibits set out below into evidence. Counsel for Respondent objected to a number of the exhibits on various grounds, including hearsay, lack of foundation and relevance.

Exhibit	Description	Ruling
1	Copy of St. Louis County Ordinance 20,820, adopted 3/5/02	Received
2	Assessor’s Office Inspection Notice, 3/9/07, postmarked 5/11/07	Received
3	Property Record Card on Subject Property	Received
4	Enlargement of a part of the PRC (Exhibit 3)	Received
5	Change of Assessment Notice, 3/15/07	Received
6	Change of Assessment Notice, 5/30/07	Received
7	Assessment Comparison	Received
8	List of Properties in Subject Subdivision	Received
9	Percentage Increase for Property in Subject Subdivision for 2007	Received
10	BOE Notice of Hearing	Excluded
11	BOE Hearing officer notes – 2007 BOE hearing	Excluded
12	Assessor Field Review Reminder & business card of William A. Jarrett	Received
13	Letter dated 7/19/07 to BOE from Barbara Vires	Excluded
14	BOE Hearing Officer Recommendation	Excluded
15	BOE Decision Letter, 8/21/07	Received
16	BOE Decision, 8/3/07	Received
17	Letter dated 10/1/07 to BOE from Barbara Vires	Excluded
18	Letters to BOE from Barbara Vires	Excluded
19	Copy of Newspaper Article, dated 4/1/07	Excluded
20	Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy	Excluded
21	Appeal History on Complainant’s Property and his mother’s property	Excluded
22	Tax History on property of Barbara J. Vires	Excluded
23	Tax History on Complainant’s property	Excluded
24	Copy of 2007 Tax Bill	Received
25	Photographs of properties in subdivision	Excluded
26	Information on property at 5178 Olde Silver Place	Excluded
27	Field Review of William A. Jarrett – group of photographs of subject	Excluded
28	Copy of Assessor’s Mass Valuation Cost and Comparable Sales Analysis	Excluded
29	Complainant’s Summary Statement	Received

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. David F. Godar, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report (Exhibit A – Hearing Officer changed designation of exhibit from number 1 to letter A after hearing), of Mr. Godar was received into evidence. Mr. Godar arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $190,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of six properties deemed comparable to the subject property.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 5163 Olde Silver Place, St. Louis County, Missouri. The property is identified by parcel number 29L140353. The property consists of an 11,566 square foot (.27 of an acre) lot improved by a two story brick veneer and frame, single-family structure of average quality construction. The house was built in 1981 and appears to be in fair condition. The residence has a total of eight rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two full and one half baths, and contains 2,368 square feet of living area. There is a full unfinished basement and an attached two-car garage. Exhibit A.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2007, to January 1, 2008.

4. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2007, to be $125,000, as proposed.

5. The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The six properties were located within .20 of a mile to 1.66 miles of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2007 (8/04 – 6/06). The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.

6. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments were appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem. The major adjustment that was required to be made was for the subject’s inferior condition due to various items of deferred maintenance.

7. The net adjustments ranged from -9.8% to -32.1% of the sales prices. The range and size of the net adjustments resulted from the appraiser properly accounting for the subject home being in only fair condition compared to average, good and very good conditions for the sale properties.

8. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $188,600, $196,000, $191,000, $181,200, $207,000 and $188,500, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $190,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $80.24 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $106.69, $107.27, $117.60, $102.00, $129.84 and $107.95. The comparison of the value per square foot provides a validation check for the appraisal, to demonstrate that the indicated value is consistent with the market for properties such as the subject. The fact that the value concluded by the appraiser on a per square foot of living area basis is approximately 28% below the average per square foot sale values is reflective of the assessor addressing the factor of the subject’s inferior condition.

9. Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2007, to be $190,000.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECISION

Jurisdiction

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

Presumption In Appeals

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958). The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer, or respondent when advocating a value different than that determined by the Board, presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Hermel, supra; Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Complainant’s opinion of value of $125,000, based upon the value set by the Board in 2005 is not substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board in 2007. Respondent’s appraisal report constituted substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment as establish the fair market value of $190,000.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra.

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit A.

Methods of Valuation

Proper methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the Commission. It is within the purview of the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a given case. See, Nance v. STC, 18 S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. banc 1975). Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

The methodology presented by Complainant of simply asserting the same value as set by the Board in 2005 is not an accepted approach for the valuing of property for ad valorem tax appeals. It is neither recognized by the Commission nor the Courts of Missouri.

Respondent’s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the sales comparison or market approach. The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single-family residences.

Complainant Failed To Meet Burden of Proof

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2007. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. There is no presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking affirmative relief. Therefore, the Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e., the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” See, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App. 1991).

Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Rigali v. Kensington Place Homeowners’ Ass’n, 103 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Cohen v. Bushmeyer, 251 S.W.3d 345, (Mo.App. E.D., March 25, 2008); Carmel Energy, Inc. v. Fritter, 827 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992); State, ex rel. Missouri Hwy & Transp. Com’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965). The owner’s opinion in this case was based upon the 2005 valuation of the property by the Board of Equalization. Even the Board in 2007 rejected that value. An opinion of value based upon the value set for the 2005 assessment cycle by the Board does not constitute substantial and persuasive evidence of fair market value of the property on January 1, 2007. The opinion given by Mr. Vires was not based upon proper elements or a proper foundation. Therefore, no probative weight can be given to the owner’s opinion.

Mr. Vires’ claims and arguments related to the overall appeal process before the Board and the fact that the Board settled on the cost value established by the Assessor’s mass valuation analysis are irrelevant to the claim of overvaluation. There is no basis for the Hearing Officer to arbitrarily set a value because the taxpayer didn’t like the fact that the Board ordered an inspection of the property and then set the value at the cost value. The value for the property is to be determined from market data. Complainant provided none. Respondent, as addressed below, presented a sound appraisal to establish fair market value for the property.

Finally, the multitude of irrelevant exhibits presented by Mr. Vires demonstrates, as is often the case in pro se appeals, that taxpayers fail to focus on the central issue in the appeal. In an overvaluation appeal, percentages of increase, average increases, valuations of neighboring properties by the assessor, newspaper articles, etc., are not probative of fair market value. Such documents are by and large totally irrelevant, as was the case in this appeal. Copies of correspondence to the assessor and/or the Board have no probative value in attempting to determine fair market value. The true value in money of any property is not based upon how a taxpayer feels they were treated or mistreated by the process of informal conferences and appeal to the Board. Value must be determined by recognized and accepted appraisal methods – market derived data. When taxpayers fail to grasp that fundamental fact and head off on a variety of tangents concerning the appeal process, they are doomed to failure.

Complainant Fails To Prove Discrimination

In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, Mr. Vires must show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of the property under appeal at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within St. Louis County for the 2007 assessment cycle. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 695. Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. Substantial evidence must show that all other residential property in St. Louis County is generally undervalued. State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964). The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property and the average assessment ratio for St. Louis County residential property for 2007 must be shown to be grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986). No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1958).

In order to prove the average level of assessment for residential property in St. Louis County for 2007, Mr. Vires was required to (a) independently determine the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County; (b) determine the assessed value placed on the property by the assessor’s office for the relevant year; (c) divide the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample; and (d) determine the mean and median of the results. The difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. Louis County must demonstrate a disparity that is grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986).

Complainant provided a comparison between the subject and five other properties. Exhibit 7. This does not constitute a representative sample of residential property in St. Louis County. Mr. Vires’ discrimination claim fails because he failed to prove that a statistically significant number of other residential properties within St. Louis County are being assessed at a lower ratio of market value than his property. The evidence in this record establishes that the Assessor originally assessed the property at 19% of the mass valuation sales analysis value. The Board of Equalization reduced the true value in money to the indicate cost analysis value and assessed the property at 19%. There is no evidence to indicate that residential property in general in St. Louis County is being assessed at a ratio less than 19% of fair market value. Therefore, there was no plan by either the Assessor or the Board to assess the subject property at a ratio greater than that established by law, i.e. 19% of true value in money.

Complainant’s other claims and assertions regarding the overall assessment, inspection and Board appeal processes do not establish a claim of discrimination.

Respondent Proves Value

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra. Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2007, to be $190,000 for the residential portion of the subject. The adjustments made were consistent with generally accepted guidelines for the appraisal of property of the subject’s type. The adjustments properly accounted for the various differences between the subject and each comparable.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2007 and 2008 is set at $36,100.

Complainant may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed to the State Tax Commission of Missouri, P.O. Box 146, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0146, and a copy of said application must be sent to each person at the address listed below in the certificate of service.

Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of 139.031.8 RSMo.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED August 4, 2008.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Senior Hearing Officer

[1] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

[2] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

[3] Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

[4] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

[5] Section 138.431.2 & 4 RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.080.

[6] DECISION, Presumption in Appeals, p. 6.

[7] Tr. 34:18 – 39:7.

[8] DECISION, Complainant Filed To Meet Burden of Proof, pp. 8-10.

[9] DECISION, Complainant Fails To Prove Discrimination, pp. 11-12.

[10] Exhibit 16.

[11] Section 137.115.1, RSMo – “In the event a valuation of subclass (1) real property … is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program, the burden of proof, supported by clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain such valuation, shall be on the assessor at any hearing or appeal.” Emphasis added.

[12] DECISION, Respondent Proves Value, p. 12.

[13] DECISION, Respondent’s Evidence, p. 3; FINDINGS OF FACT, 5 – 9, pp. 4-5; Presumption in Appeals, p. 6; Methods of Valuation, p. 8; Respondent Proves Value, p. 12.