State Tax Commission of Missouri
SURJIT & KAVAL SETHI, )
)
Complainants, )
)
v. ) Appeal Number 07-10492
)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR, )
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER
AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION
UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
On July 8, 2008, Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessment by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization and reducing the valuation on Complainants property.
Complainants timely filed (7/23/08) their Application for Review of the Decision. Respondent elected to not file a Response by the date set for same (8/25/08).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Standard Upon Review
The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide.[1] The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part.[2] The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact.[3]
DECISION
A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal.[4]
Complainants’ Ground for Review
Complainants set forth one ground for review of the Hearing Officer Decision. Complainant asserts Respondent’s appraisal upon which the Hearing Officer based his reduction in value was incomplete and flawed in that it failed to take into account that the Sethi property is located in a flood plain and the comparables were not so located. A review of the record does show that Mr. Sethi at hearing asserted that his property was located in a flood plain. However, he provided no documentation to support this claim. Each of the documents contained in Complainants’ Exhibit A have been reviewed. None of them address the issue of the property being in a flood plain.
The Hearing Officer did not err on this point. Respondent’s appraiser, Lela Tulley, did address the flood plain issue. The Tulley appraisal report (Exhibit 1) contains on the first page the following notation under Site Comments: “No readily apparent adverse conditions were noted. FEMA Flood Zone X. FEMA Map # 29189C0276H, dated August 23, 2000. The subject does not appear to be located within the FEMA identified 100 year flood plain.” It was not necessary for the Hearing Officer to make any specific finding on the flood plain issue, Mr. Sethi presented no documentation on the matter, and the evidence from Exhibit 1 provided a basis for finding the subject was not impacted by being in a flood plain.
Mr. Sethi filed with his Application for Review a two page document – Letter of Map Revision Based on Fill Determination Document. Since this document was not introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer committed no error in not finding that Mr. Sethi’s claim of the property being in a flood plain was correct based upon this document. Parties are not permitted to supplement the record after the close of hearing. Therefore, in ordinary circumstances no consideration could be given to the document submitted by Mr. Sethi. However, the Commission notes that the actual determination of the Letter of Map Revision is that the structure (i.e. the Sethi house at 13031 Pingry Place) was removed from the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA). The document states the following:
“This document provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s determination regarding a request for a Letter of Map Revision based on Fill for the property described above. Using the information submitted and the effective National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) map, we have determined that the structure(s) on the property (ies) is/are not located in the SFHA, an area inundated by the flood having a 1-percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year (base flood). This document revises the effective NFIP map to remove the subject property from the SFHA located on the effective NFIP map; therefore, the Federal mandatory flood insurance requirement does not apply.” (Emphasis added)
Complainants’ document does not establish that the subject property is in a flood plain. It establishes that the property is not in the Special Flood Hazard Area. Nor does the document refute the finding of Ms. Tully that the property is not located in the 100 year flood plain. Therefore, the Tully appraisal was neither incomplete nor flawed.
Complainant, Mr. Sethi raised the claim that the subject property was in a flood plain at the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the burden of proof on this point was on Complainants to offer documentation to substantiate the claim. However, he failed to offer into evidence either the document submitted with the Application for Review or to provide the applicable flood plain map to support his assertion. Ms. Tully had reviewed the flood plain map and concluded the property was not in the 100 year flood plain. The document now provided only reinforces the conclusion drawn by Ms. Tully.
The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations as challenged by Complainants.
ORDER
The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.
Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.
The Collector of St. Louis County shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending an Order from the Commission as to whether a Petition for Judicial Review of the Order has been filed.
SO ORDERED September 23, 2008.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI
Bruce E. Davis, Chairman
Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner
Charles Nordwald, Commissioner
DECISION AND ORDER
HOLDING
Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor is SET ASIDE. Hearing Officer finds presumption of correct assessment rebutted. True value in money for the subject property for tax years 2007 and 2008 is set at $870,000, residential assessed value of $165,300.
Complainant, Surjit Sethi, appeared pro se.
Respondent appeared by Associate County Counselor, Robert Fox
Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.
ISSUE
The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2007; and whether there was an intentional plan by the assessing officials to assess the property under appeal at a ratio greater than 19% of true value in money or at a ratio greater than the average 2007 residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County
SUMMARY
Complainants
appeal, on the ground of overvaluation and discrimination, the decision of the
St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the
subject property. The Assessor determined
an appraised value of $898,600, assessed value of $170,730, as residential
property. Complainants proposed a value
of $700,000, assessed value of $133,000.
A hearing was conducted on June 17, 2008, at the
The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.
Complainants' Evidence
Mr. Sethi testified on behalf of Complainants. Exhibit A was received into evidence on behalf of Complainants. Exhibit A consisted of the following documents: (1) Letter dated
June 17, 2008, to the Commission setting forth the basis for Complainants’ appeal; (2) Letter dated September 8, 2007, to the St. Louis County Director of Revenue on the matter of Complainants’ appeal of their assessment; (3) Undated later to the St. Louis County Director of Revenue on the matter of Complainants’ challenge to the assessment of their property; and (4) listing of sale dates and prices on six properties and listing of the 2007 assessed values on five other properties on Pingry Place (subject street).
Mr. Sethi stated
his opinion of value to be $700,000 based on the arguments made in Exhibit
A. Essentially, Complainant asserted
that the increase of 28% over the 2005 assessment was not supported by current
market conditions. He also relied on a
representation from his meeting with the appraiser at his Board of Equalization
hearing that the value was to be lowered to $813,000. His final point related to the property at
Respondent’s Evidence
Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Ms. Lela Tulley, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser. The appraiser testified as to her appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report (Exhibit 1) of Ms. Tulley was received into evidence. Ms. Tulley arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $870,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing her sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of four properties which she deemed to be comparable to the subject property.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.
2. The subject property is located at
3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2007, to January 1, 2008.
4. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2007, to be $700,000.
5. The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser were comparable to the subject property for the appraisal problem. The four properties were located within less than a mile of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2007, in a range from September, 2004 to August 2006. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.
6. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments were appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem. The net adjustments ranged from -0.3% to 6.8% of sale prices. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $860,000, $875,900, $857,500 and $920,300, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a value of $870,000 which calculated to a value per square foot of $185.94 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $175.01, $184.23, $229.39 and $252.42.
7. Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment and establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2007, to be $870,000.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND DECISION
Jurisdiction
The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.
Presumption In Appeals
There is a
presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the
Standard for Valuation
Section 137.115,
RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money
which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by
one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to
purchase but who is not compelled to do so.
St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526,
529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax
Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (
Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.
Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.
2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and both acting in what they consider their own best interests.
3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.
4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.
5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.
6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.
Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1.
Methods
of Valuation
Proper
methods of valuation and assessment of property are delegated to the
Commission. It is within the purview of
the Hearing Officer to determine the method of valuation to be adopted in a
given case. See, Nance v. STC, 18
S.W.3d 611, at 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000); Hermel, supra; Xerox Corp. v. STC, 529 S.W.2d 413 (
Respondent’s Burden of Proof
Respondent, when
advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or
a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of
proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as
required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra. The Tulley appraisal has met the required
burden of proof and established the true value in money for the subject
property as of January 1, 2007, to be $870,000.
The sales comparison approach to value is generally considered to be the
strongest of the three approaches utilized in appraisal of owner occupied
residences. It provides a sound basis to
reflect the actions of buyers and sellers in the open market when there is
sufficient market data, as there was in this instance.
Complainants’ Burden of Proof
In order to
prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial
and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market
value of the subject property on January 1, 2007. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564
S.W.2d 888, at 897. There is no
presumption that the taxpayer’s opinion is correct. The taxpayer in a
Commission appeal still bears the burden of proof. The taxpayer is the moving party seeking
affirmative relief. Therefore, the
Complainant bears the burden of proving the vital elements of the case, i.e.,
the assessment was “unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious.” The
taxpayer must prove the fair market value asserted. See, Westwood Partnership v.
Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (
Substantial evidence can be defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission,
329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (
The owner of
property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market
value. Rigali v.
Complainants failed to meet their burden of proof and establish the fair market value of their property as of January 1, 2007.
Complainants Fail to Prove Discrimination
Where there is a
claim of discrimination based upon a lack of valuation consistency,
Complainants must prove the average level of assessment for residential
property in
ORDER
The assessed
valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained
by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis
The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2007 and 2008 is set at $165,300.
Complainants may
file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within
thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific
grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Said application must be in writing addressed
to the State Tax Commission of Missouri,
Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.
The Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall continue to hold the disputed taxes pending a filing of an Application for Review, unless said taxes have been disbursed pursuant to a court order under the provisions of 139.031.8 RSMo. If no Application for Review is filed, the Collector is ordered to disburse the disputed taxes in accordance with the assessment set by this Decision and Order.
Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.
SO ORDERED July 8, 2008.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
W. B. Tichenor
Senior Hearing Officer
[1] St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis
County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).
[2] St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent
by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d
400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc
1981).
[3] Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957
S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial
Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical
Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v.
Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St.
Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC,
406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).
[4] Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970
S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v.
Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).