State Tax Commission of Missouri

PAMELA & GERALD KERR, )

)

Complainants, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 05-10758

)

PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR, )

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION

UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On July 6, 2006, Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessment by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

Complainants timely filed their Application for Review of the Decision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard Upon Review

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Complainants’ letter setting forth the Application for Review, with a copy of Exhibit A, which was received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, was simply a rearguing of the points presented at the evidentiary hearing. Complainants failed to set forth any legal claim or basis as a ground to find the Hearing Officer had abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Complainants simply had an opinion as to the fair market value of the property different from that determined by the Hearing Officer. In other words, Complainants failed to state specific grounds upon which it was claimed the decision was erroneous. In the absence of specific facts of error or specific errors in applying the law, the Application for Review must be summarily denied.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations as challenged by Complainants.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

If judicial review of this decision is made, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the courts. If no judicial review is made within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

SO ORDERED August 30, 2006.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner

Charles Nordwald, Commissioner

DECISION AND ORDER

HOLDING

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED. Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2005 and 2006 to be $717,500, assessed value of $136,330.

Complainant, Gerald Kerr, appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Senior Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor.

ISSUE

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2005.

SUMMARY

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $717,500, assessed value of $136,330, as residential property. Complainant proposed a value of $615,000, assessed value of $116,850. A hearing was conducted on June 8, 2006, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainants’ Evidence

Complainant, Gerald Kerr testified on behalf of Complainants. Mr. Kerr explained Exhibit A. Exhibit A is a valuation analysis prepared by Mr. Kerr. It was received into evidence. Exhibit A consists of a narrative explanation of Mr. Kerr’s analysis. The exhibit also has the following supporting documents:

(1) Table for per square foot values taken from the assessor’s 2005 assessment for twelve properties on Fox Ridge Road, with the average per square foot values for land and improvements.

(2) Spreadsheet with a tax history analysis from 1999 through 2005 for the twelve Fox Ridge Road properties.

(3) Property information from the Assessor’s data on the twelve Fox Ridge Road properties.

(4) A chart showing the sales comparables used by the Assessor’s mass appraisal of nine of the Fox Ridge Road properties.

(5) Photographs, current Assessor Appraisal and basic information on the twelve Fox Ridge Road properties.

(6) Closing Data Sampling Support on six properties which sold in 2005, arriving at an average per square foot sales price.

(7) MLS Sale Sheets on the six properties relied upon in the Closing Data Sampling Support document.

Mr. Kerr developed three conclusions of value from his analysis. For his first conclusion of value, Complainant removed the values (as determined by the Assessor for 2005) for properties at 500 (subject) and 506 Fox Ridge Road because these properties were valued at more than 20% and 25% respectively above the average of all residences on Fox Ridge and more than 24% and 29% respectively above the median and then calculated the average values for lot and dwelling values. From these averages he calculated a value for the subject property of $592,818.30.

Mr. Kerr than calculated the lot and dwelling averages leaving the 500 and 506 properties in the calculation. This produced a value for the subject property of $612,837. For his final calculation of a value, Mr. Kerr used the median lot and dwelling values for all twelve Fox Ridge properties and arrived at a value for the subject of $614,849.31. These various calculations led the Complainant to conclude “the correct valuation for 500 Fox Ridge Road lies somewhere between $593,000 and $615,000. Mr. Kerr’s opinion of value as “value relates to other homes” on Fox Ridge was testified to at hearing as $615,000.

Respondent’s Evidence

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. John D. Rebsamen, State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Rebsamen was received into evidence. Mr. Rebsamen arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $765,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of four properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 500 Fox Ridge Road, Frontenac, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 21N640132. The property consists of a 1.15 acre lot improved by a one and one half-story brick house with a two-car attached side entry masonry garage, porch, patio, paved walkway and paved driveway leading to the garage. The improvements are considered to be average quality construction. The home was built in 1965 and the improvements appear to conform to typical style, condition and quality of construction for the subject’s market area. There were no apparent deferred maintenance items noted by Respondent’s appraiser or by Mr. Kerr. The home has a total of eight rooms, including three bedrooms, two full and one half bath. It contains 3,393 square feet of living area. There is a walkout basement with partial finish and a full bath. There is a functional pool, in need of some repairs. Exhibit 1, Testimony of Mr. Kerr and Mr. Rebsamen.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2005, to January 1, 2006.

4. Complainants purchased the property in 2001 for $750,000. Ms. Kerr is a licensed real estate agent and was at the time of the 2001 purchase. Offer for purchase was made before property was exposed to market in normal manner. Original mortgage on the property was for $750,000. The property was appraised for refinance, and came in at an appraised value in excess of $750,000 for a refinance in the amount of $710,000 to $715,000. Testimony of Mr. Kerr.

5. Complainant’s analysis and methodology is not recognized by the Commission, the Courts or the appraisal field as an appropriate and accepted methodology for arriving at fair market value (true value in money) of property for ad valorem tax purposes.

6. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Assessor and the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2005, to be $615,000, as proposed.

7. The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The four properties were located within three-quarters of a mile of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2005. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability. Respondent’s appraiser properly adjusted for differences in amenities between the subject and the comparables. The gross and net adjustments fell well within the acceptable range for an appraisal problem of this nature.

The Supreme Court of Missouri has held, “A tax assessor’s valuation is presumed correct.” Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. 2005). Citing to Hermel, supra; and Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the assessor’s or Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Snider, Hermel & Cupples Hesse, supra.

Standard for Valuation

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, supra.

Complainants’ theory of value failed to address the valuation of the property under the required statutory standard, i.e. true value in money. Instead Mr. Kerr offered an opinion of value in relation to other properties on the subject street. There is no basis in any recognized text or treatise on appraisal of property that provides for valuation of property under the theory advanced by Mr. Kerr. Nor does the type of valuation performed by Mr. Kerr address a claim of lack of uniformity in assessment under the applicable case law, as will be addressed infra.

Market Value

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition are the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2005. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

Complainants Failed To Present Opinion As To Market Value

Complainants have failed to meet the standard required in appeals before the Commission on two accounts. First, no opinion of fair market value was tendered at the evidentiary hearing by Mr. Kerr. The opinion of value was a value that relates to the other properties on Fox Ridge Road. More particularly, the opinion of value opined by Mr. Kerr was an opinion as to a median value in relation to other Fox Ridge properties. This opinion does not satisfy the required legal standard of true value in money.

Complainants’ Evidence Failed To Address Market Value

Secondly, the evidence presented by Mr. Kerr (Exhibit A) is not substantial and persuasive evidence addressing the critical issue of fair market value. The question for the Hearing Officer to decide is not what the median or mean values on a given street may be from the appraised values determined by the Assessor. The question is what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the sale price for a property on January 1, 2005. Exhibit A simply does not address that question.

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965). The owner’s opinion in this appeal is one that is based upon improper elements and an improper foundation. Therefore, no weight or probative value can be given to Mr. Kerr’s opinion. Furthermore, a multitude of factors in the history of the subject property refute any claim that $615,000 represented the fair market value of the subject property as of January 1, 2005.

Factors Weighing Against Fair Market Value of $615,000

2001 Purchase Price - $750,000

The 2001 purchase at $750,000 is a sound indicator of the true value in money as of 2001. The fact that the property was purchased upon an offer by Complainants because Ms. Kerr knew the property was coming on the market before it was given public exposure does not negate that this was an arms length transaction. A price agreed to between a willing buyer and seller creates a presumption that the transaction was a market transaction. Phoenix Redevelopment Corporation v. Walker, 812 S.W.2d, 881, 883-4 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). This presumption is not rebutted by Mr. Kerr’s testimony that the property was not exposed to the market.

There is no evidence to indicate any sort of depreciation, beyond ordinary wear and tear, to the subject home or any other factor that would result in a reduction in value of $135,000 or 18% from the 2001 sale price. Therefore, while the 2001 transaction is somewhat dated, its slight remoteness in time to the tax date does not render that sales data as irrelevant. Evidence of the actual sales price of property is admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence involves a voluntary purchase not too remote in time. The actual sale price is a method that may be considered for estimating true value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526 (App. E.D. 1993). The 2001 purchase price weighs against the opinion of value tendered by Mr. Kerr.

2001 Mortgage - $750,000

The fact that when purchased in 2001 Complainants were able to obtain a mortgage for the full purchase price of $750,000 goes to refute the assertion that in 2005 the property would only bring $615,000 when exposed to the market. A knowledgeable seller, acting in his own best interest, would not offer the property for sale at that amount. The amount of a mortgage does not establish a property’s fair market value. However, the amount of the mortgage at purchase provides an indicator as to fair market value. Given that lending institutions generally do not make 100% of value loans, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn that the 2001 purchase price of the subject was at somewhat below what the property appraised for when the bank made the loan to Complainants. The 2001 mortgage is a factor which refutes the opinion of value offered by Mr. Kerr.

2005 Refinance of Mortgage

According to Mr. Kerr’s testimony there was a refinancing of the mortgage on the subject property in 2005. The property appraised for a value in excess of $750,000, although Mr. Kerr did not recall or did not know the exact amount of the indicated value on the refinance appraisal. The amount to be refinanced was between $710,000 and $715,000. The refinance appraisal is another factor which serves to rebut the claim of a value of only $615,000.

Methodology to Support Opinion of Value Not Appropriate

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974). The method of arriving at a value developed by Mr. Kerr is not one of the three recognized appraisal approaches. It is, in fact, not a methodology which is appraising the property. The methodology is only deriving the average or median of lot values and improvement values for a set number of homes on a given street and then valuing one out of twelve homes based upon the averages or medians calculated.

The Hearing Officer finds no fault in the taxpayer’s calculations. His math appears to be correct. The problem is simply that the calculations are not relevant to establishing the value mandated by the applicable statute – true value in money (fair market value). Therefore, all is for naught if the math is correct when the method is wrong, as is the case with Mr. Kerr’s theory.

Uniformity in Valuation – Discrimination Claim

Complainants’ claim in this appeal is actually not a claim of overvaluation. At no point in the hearing in this case did Mr. Kerr actually advance a position with regard to what a willing and well-informed buyer and willing and well-informed seller would have agreed to as a purchase price for the subject on January 1, 2005. Furthermore, Mr. Kerr did not actually challenge and did not present any relevant evidence that refuted that the subject property as of January 1, 2005, had a true value in money of at least $717,500, or more likely $765,000 as shown by Exhibit 1.

Mr. Kerr’s theory and Exhibit A advances an argument of lack of uniformity in valuation of homes on Fox Ridge Road. To put the Complainants’ argument in the proper legal format, the issue is a claim of discrimination or unequal assessment, although this was not the ground put forth for this appeal. Complainants sought to establish that within the limited and very constrained confines of a single street containing twelve properties that the assessments for 2005 were not uniform and equitable. Just as Complainants’ overvaluation theory failed to meet the required statutory and case law mandates, their claim of lack of uniformity and equality in assessment likewise misses the statutory and case law mark.

Elements to Establish Lack of Uniformity - Discrimination

In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainants must prove two fundamental elements. They must prove the assessment ratio for their own property and the average assessment ratio for property of the same class in the taxing jurisdiction. Evidence as to the valuation and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. There must be substantial evidence to show that all other property in the same class generally is undervalued. The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property and the average assessment ratio in the subject county must be shown to be grossly excessive. No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1959); State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964); Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986); Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1958).

Assessment Ratio for Subject Property

The assessment ratio for the property under appeal is determined by establishing the true value in money of the property and dividing the assessed value by the true value in money to arrive at the assessment ratio. In the present appeal, the assessor established the appraised value (true value in money) of the subject to be $717,500. The residential assessment ratio of 19% (Section 137.115.5(1), RSMo 2004 Cum. Supp.) was then applied to arrive at the assessed value of $136,330. From Respondent’s evidence it can be concluded that the true value in money of the subject property was $765,000 as of January 1, 2005. Assuming this to be true, the assessment ratio for the subject is not 19%, but 17.8% ($136,330 ÷ $765,000 = .1783, rounded to 17.8%)

Average Assessment Ratio for Residential Property in St. Louis County

The next factor which Complainants were required to prove to establish a lack of uniformity in residential assessment in St. Louis County was the average level of assessment for residential property in St. Louis County for 2005. This is done by (a) independently determining the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County; (b) determining the assessed value placed on the properties by the assessor’s office for the relevant year; (c) dividing the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample; and (d) determining the mean and median of the results.

The difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. Louis County must demonstrate a disparity that is grossly excessive. Savage, supra.

A review of the four elements to establish the average residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County for 2005 against Complainants’ evidence (Exhibit A) fails to satisfy the legal requirement to establish a discrimination – lack of uniformity – case. Exhibit A fails on all four of the required elements.

Market Values of Representative Sample

Exhibit A provides only appraised values from the Assessor’s records on eleven properties other than the subject. There is no evidence which establishes the true value in money from a recognized appraisal methodology or from actual sales data for the eleven properties. Furthermore, all eleven properties are from a single street. This does not constitute a representative sample of residential properties throughout the county of St. Louis. The sample is too small and is not representative for purposes of a ratio analysis.

Assessed Values of Representative Sample

Exhibit A does not provide the assessed values for any of the eleven homes. While the Hearing Officer could apply the 19% factor to each of the appraised values, it is not the responsibility of the Hearing Officer to make such calculations and arrive at the assessed values for the taxpayers. As stated above the sample of eleven properties is both too small and not representative, so the calculation of each of the eleven assessed values would have no probative value.

Establishing the Assessment Ratios

The next step of dividing the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample cannot be performed. Even ignoring that the sample does not meet the requirement of being a statistically representative sample for St. Louis County, the calculation cannot be made because it has not been established what the true value in money for each of the eleven properties was on January 1, 2005. The record does not establish the market values to be divided into the assessed values.

Determining Mean and Median

The final step of arriving at the mean and median likewise cannot be performed. Since no assessment ratios can be established on a sample that is not sufficient in size or as a representative sample there is no way to calculate either the average assessment ratio or the median assessment ratio. Therefore, there is no way in which to determine if the assessment ratio of the subject property of 19% (under the Assessor’s original appraisal) or 17.8% (under the Rebsamen Appraisal) demonstrates a disparity that is grossly excessive. Since no showing of a grossly excessive disparity between the subject’s assessment ratio and the average or median residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County can be established, the lack of uniformity claim – discrimination – fails.

Summary

Complainants’ discrimination claim is without merit because they failed to establish the market value of their property and the average residential assessment ratio for St. Louis County. Having failed to establish a prima facie case of overvaluation or discrimination, the presumptions of correct assessment stand and the value of $717,500, assessed value of $136,330 must be affirmed.

Evidence of Increase in Value

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor’s or board’s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal. Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

In accordance with the Commission rule, the evidence presented by Respondent’s appraiser was only received in support of the Assessor’s and Board’s value and not to increase the value above that amount. Mr. Rebsamen’s appraisal report constituted clear and convincing evidence to establish the true value in money for the subject property to be at least $717,500 as originally determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board.

ORDER

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2005 and 2006 is set at $136,330.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.