Nike IHM v. Shipman

Respondent objected to Complainant’s Rebuttal Exhibits A and B arguing that there was an inadequate foundation for the documents and that they contained hearsay. Respondent’s objections were taken under advisement at the hearing and are sustained in this decision.

In addition to the referenced exhibits, Respondent offered the testimony of Cheryl Renne and Bret Liebeno, employees of Complainant, pursuant to Section 536.070(3), RSMo.

1. Jurisdiction over the 2002 assessment is proper. Complainant filed a Complaint for Review of Assessment with the State Tax Commission on July 18, 2002. The appeal was initially accepted by the Commission and ultimately dismissed as premature on the basis that the St. Charles County Board of Equalization still had the assessment under consideration. On October 25, 2002, the St. Charles County Board of Equalization issued a decision affirming the Assessor’s appraised valuation of $22,170,664 for the subject property. On November 5, 2002, Complainant filed a copy of the Board’s decision and moved that the Commission reinstate its 2002 assessment appeal. The Commission reinstated Complainant’s appeal on November 14, 2002.

Jurisdiction over the 2003 assessment is proper. On July 17, 2003, the St. Charles County Board of Equalization issued a decision affirming the Assessor’s appraised valuation of $19,456,186 for the subject property. On August 14, 2003, Complainant filed its Complaint for Review of Assessment with the State Tax Commission.

2. The property under review in these appeals consists of the tangible personal property owned by Complainant which is located at Complainant’s manufacturing facility at 8 Missouri Research Park Drive, St. Charles, Missouri. This property is identified by the assessor’s office as account no. P9602049. The facility is engaged in manufacturing plastics.

3. Both appraisal experts premised their appraisals on the concept of fair market value in exchange. Complainant’s Exhibit C-02, and C-03, at 7-8; Respondent’s 2-0,2 and 2-03, at 3, and 1-02, and 1-03, at 10. This is the appropriate concept of value to be applied in the valuation of the subject property. Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).

4. Cheryl Renne, Controller for Complainant, was called as a witness for Respondent pursuant to Section 536.070(3), RSMo and the Commission’s subpoena authority. Her testimony established that her expertise as Controller includes financial reporting, analysis, and tracking the cost of equipment for generally accepted accounting principles. Tr. 110, lines 18-19; Deposition of Cheryl Renne, September 9, 2003, at 6. Upon inquiry addressing the market value of Complainant’s personal property for 2002 and 2003, she indicated that she was not qualified to opine on the adequacy of appraisals, or identify the fair market value of the subject property. Tr. 100, lines 20 – 22, Deposition of Cheryl Renne, September 9, 2003, at 82 - 88.

5. Bret Liebeno, Technical Director for Complainant, testified that he had experience with purchasing manufacturing equipment. Tr. 130. He testified that in considering the purchase of used equipment, he would typically not pay more than 10 percent of what that equipment would cost new due to the extensive costs associated with removal, transporting, and reinstalling the equipment. Tr. 137.

6. A market value appraisal inherently requires a highest and best use analysis. A highest and best use analysis is the mechanism in an appraisal that zeros in on (1) the lawful, feasible use of the property that will produce the highest return in an exchange, and (2) whether there is sufficient demand to make such an exchange probable. This analysis shows the appraiser what to appraise the property as, and therefore, how to approach the cost, sales comparison, and income approaches.

Both appraisal experts performed a highest and best use analysis and concluded that the most reasonably probable exchange would be the exchange of the subject machinery and equipment on an piece-by-piece basis. Complainant’s Exhibits C-02 and C-03, at 8, and 10 – 11; Respondent’s Exhibits 1-02, and 1-03, at 10.

7. The principle of substitution is that a prudent buyer will not pay more for a property than the cost of acquiring a substitute property of equivalent utility. This can be applied to either an individual asset or to an entire facility. The principle applies in a cost, sales comparison, or income approach. Valuing Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Technical Specialties Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, 2000, pp. 45, 115; Appraising Machinery and Equipment, Machinery and Equipment Textbook Committee of the American Society of Appraisers, John Alico, Editor, 1989, p. 81.

8. Complainant’s appraiser identified the subject property by performing an inventory and inspection. Complainant’s Exhibit C-02, and C-03, at 7 & 9; A-02, and A-03, at 7 – 8. He indicates in his appraisal that he made inquiries to account for new acquisitions and transfers of equipment between the tax dates and the inspection dates. Complainant’s Exhibit A-02 and A-03, at 8. As part of his inventory, he evaluated the condition of each item of property based upon his observation of the property and inquiring of engineers and operating personnel at the subject facility. Complainant’s Exhibit C-02 and C-03, at 7, & 9.

9. Respondent’s appraiser identified the subject property by reference to and reliance upon the fixed assed listing provided by the Sansone Group to the Assessor’s office for 2002 and 2003. Respondent’s Exhibits 2-02 and 2-03, at 2; see also, Tr. 181. He conducted site visits, inspected property, and made judgments as to the condition of the property. Respondent’s Exhibits 2-02 and 2-03, at 5. Such judgments were based upon his observation and discussions with plant personnel. Id.

10. Complainant’s appraisals primarily rely upon sales and sales offerings of personal property that were the same or comparable to the subject property. The data is typically obtained from the monitoring of auction sales; from direct confirmation with buyers, sellers, or dealers; or from reference to catalog or advertisement asking prices, and commercial publications that track used equipment sales. Complainant’s appraiser’s sources are generally accepted by the appraisal community as reliable and his appraisals utilizing such sources have been accepted by tax tribunals and courts. Complainant’s Exhibits C-02 and C-03, at 23 – 24. Complainant’s appraiser’s staff attempts to verify the reliability of the data by contacting active participants to the sale. Id., at 20. Where sales data is insufficient, Complainant’s appraiser relied upon the indicated value under the cost approach. The condition codes, appraisal approaches, and data sources utilized in the appraisals were those generally accepted by the appraisal community as being reliable. Id., at 10, 12, 23. Complainant’s evidence produced the best indication of the value of the subject property in the open market.

11. The cumulative market value of Complainant’s personal property located at 8 Missouri Research Park Drive, St. Charles, Missouri was $6,900,445 (assessed value of $2,299,920) as of January 1, 2002.

The cumulative market value of Complainant’s personal property located at 8 Missouri Research Park Drive, St. Charles, Missouri was $7,115,230 (assessed value of $2,371,510) as of January 1, 2003.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear timely appeals and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary, or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith, and correctness of assessment by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

Section 137.115 requires that tangible personal property be assessed for tax purposes based upon its true value in money. True value is the fair market value of the property, or the price that the property would bring when offered for sale by a willing seller who is not obligated to sell, and purchased by a willing buyer who is not compelled to buy. St. Joe Minerals Corporation v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 854 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Mo. App. 1993). True value in money is defined in terms of value in exchange and not value in use. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 852 S.W.2d at 830. Daly v. P.D. George Company, 77 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).

"Value in exchange" or "exchange value" is defined as "[t]he value of a commodity in terms of money to persons generally, as distinguished from use value to a specific person." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Third Edition, Appraisal Institute, 1993, at 125. "Value in use" or "use value" is defined as "the value a specific property has for a specific use" (Id., at 383) and "the value of property which reflects a value to a specific user, recognizing the extent to which the property contributes to the personal requirements of the owner." The Appraisal of Personal Property, American Society of Appraisers, 1994 at 2.

An exchange value is an objective value determined by transactions between buyers and sellers in the open market. A use value is a subjective value of an owner, user, or potential owner based solely upon his or her personal needs for the property. By definition then, market value is the value determined by the exchange of property between an informed seller and an informed buyer after exposure in the open market and not a subjective opinion of some individual or entity. However, there is a distinction between a value in use to a specific user and a value recognized by a group of informed potential buyers that a property has for a specific use. The latter should be fully considered under a market value appraisal. Further, if there is sufficient demand for the property for the use to which it is being put by the owner, exchange value can be equivalent to the use value to the owner. The market value standard does not require appraisers to discard transactions or market demand for assembled machinery and equipment just because the market finds the property valuable for the same use that it is being put to by the owner. Such evidence should be fully considered in a market value appraisal. Conversely, if there is no evidence that there is demand for machinery and equipment assembled and in place, it would be inappropriate to value the property as assembled and in place since such valuation would not be indicative of a market value in exchange. See, Daly, 77 S.W.3d 649.

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property as of January 1 of the tax year in question. Hermel, supra, at 897. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1956). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of the evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975)." Daly, 77 S.W.3d at 651.

"…Missouri case law has recognized that a managing officer of a corporation is competent to testify as to the value of property held by the corporation he or she manages. This is true even though the managing officer is not an expert so long as ‘he is in fact familiar with the value of the [property]’ ." Warren Davis Properties V, L.L.C. v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 4 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999) (citations omitted).

The trier of fact has the duty to evaluate the evidence presented to determine its sufficiency and persuasiveness in establishing market value. Complainant offered the appraisal reports and testimony of Mr. Allen Bealmear, a machinery and equipment appraiser. Respondent offered the appraisal reports and testimony of Mr. Matt Brown, Special Assessments Manager for the St. Charles County Assessor’s Office. Mr. Bealmear identified the subject property by performing an inventory and inspection. He indicates in his appraisal that he made inquiries to account for new acquisitions and transfers of equipment between the tax dates and the inspection dates. He evaluated the condition of each item of property based upon his observation of the property and inquiring of engineers and operating personnel at the subject facility. Mr. Brown identified the subject property by reference to and reliance upon the fixed assed listing provided by the Sansone Group to the Assessor’s office for 2002 and 2003. He conducted site visits, inspected property, and made judgments as to the condition of the property. Such judgments were based upon his observation and discussions with plant personnel. Id. Both experts agreed that the most reasonably probable exchange would be the exchange of the subject machinery and equipment on an item-by-item basis.

Complainant’s appraiser used the sales comparison approach, where he had sufficient sales to provide an indication of value for the individual pieces of equipment. In all other cases, he used the cost approach to provide an indication of value. In his sales comparison approach, Complainant’s appraiser took steps to ensure the reliability of his data by speaking with dealers and others familiar with the sale or offering under consideration along with utilizing sources that perform their own screening and confirmation. On the items where a cost approach was utilized, Complainant’s appraiser segregated and subtracted installation costs, facility-specific or process-specific engineering costs, sales tax, and freight costs from his cost data, where such costs were included, since he had no market data to indicate that such costs could be commanded in a market exchange for the used equipment on the tax date.

Respondent’s appraiser used the cost approach to provide an indication of value for the individual pieces of equipment. He used the 2002 and 2003 Cost Index and Depreciation Schedules prepared by the North Carolina Department of Revenue, Property Tax Division, for the purpose of determining current market value of business personal property. He performed his cost application by categorizing the equipment into groups, identifying Complainant’s acquisition cost for each item, and applying the indicated percent good factor for that specific category of equipment (based upon its age) indicated in the relevant schedule. Where Mr. Brown’s local data indicated a different life span or depreciation for particular equipment, he modified the percent good factor to bring the application in line with the local data.

Upon review of the testimony and evidence submitted, the opinion evidence offered by Complainant’s appraiser persuades this Hearing Officer. Complainant’s evidence evaluates the marketplace, market supply and demand elements, sales of like or similar equipment, and calculates 98 - 99 percent of the equipment values based upon the most comparable market data. Complainant’s evidence provides a persuasive indication of how and at what price the subject machinery and equipment would sell. Accordingly, this Hearing Officer concludes that Complainant’s evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the assessments determined by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization and is substantial and persuasive in support of Complainant’s proposed market values.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

For appeal 02-32503, the Registrar for St. Charles County is hereby ordered to place upon the assessment roll for that county and for the year 2002 an assessed valuation of $2,299,920.

For appeal 03-32578, the Registrar for St. Charles County is hereby ordered to place upon the assessment roll for that county and for the year 2003 an assessed valuation of $2,371,510.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with these appeals shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Charles County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in these appeals. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

On March 8, 2005, Hearing Officer Aimee L. Smashey entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessments by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization and setting value for personal property (machinery and equipment) in each appeal.

Respondent timely filed his Application for Review of the Decision (April 7, 2005). Complainant timely filed its Response (May 13, 2005).

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515

S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as she may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

Decision of Hearing Officer Affirmed

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

The Commission notes that our Supreme Court in Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., 156 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. 2005) indicated that the “best indicator of value for newer properties where the actual costs of construction are available” is the reproduction cost new. In this application for review process, neither party cited Aztar nor argued that its holdings are applicable in the case at hand. As a consequence, it is not considered in this decision.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent’s Application for Review set forth the following arguments as grounds for Hearing Officer error in the Decision:

1. Respondent’s cross-examination of Nike’s expert demonstrated that Mr. Bealmear’s written direct testimony about his procedures and methods and his appraisal reports and opinions of value were misleading, inaccurate and unreliable.

2. The testimony of Mr. Bealmear and Mr. Liebeno indicated that sales of used equipment (particularly at auction, according to Mr. Bealmear) are substantially discounted based upon removal costs and are therefore unreliable as true comparable sales, however, Nike clearly offered evidence based on such below-market sales as indicative of the fair market value of Nike’s property.

3. The Decision is in error because it contains no finding that the methods of the Assessor in making and defending his assessment and the assessment itself were in any way unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious, and in the absence of such a finding, there is no basis upon which to set aside the determinations of the Assessor and the board of equalization as to assessed value of the subject property and its uniformity with other such assessments of tangible personal property across St. Charles County.

4. The Decision is in error in that it ignored substantial and persuasive evidence on the whole record that Mr. Bealmear’s opinions of value were substantially below market value in that Nike, IHM purchased equipment and other personal property at fair market value, it had made purchases totaling over $7.3 million during 2001 alone, it added those new items from 2001 to its existing assets, and it provided no evidence besides Mr. Bealmear’s opinions to support a total fair market value of the universe of personal property assets in St. Charles County at only $6,900,445.

Respondent’s arguments 1, 2 and 4 are re-arguments of the evidence and assertions that a different conclusion could have been reached by the Hearing Officer. The illustrations and arguments put forth by Respondent in support of these points do not either individually or collectively establish that the appraisal report submitted on behalf of Complainant and relied upon by the Hearing Officer was misleading, inaccurate or unreliable; that the use of auction sales as comparables is unreliable; or that the Hearing Officer ignored any evidence or otherwise failed to properly weigh the evidence and determine the true value in money of the property under appeal. There is no basis upon which the Commission can determine that the Hearing Officer’s Decision should be overturned, based on the arguments advanced. To the contrary, there is substantial and persuasive evidence upon the record that supports the Hearing Officer’s conclusions and determinations with regard to each of the illustrations provided.

As to Respondent’s argument 3 it misstates the standard that is required for a contested case on valuation before the Commission. There is no requirement that the Hearing officer make a specific finding of fact or conclusion of law that the Assessor’s methods of assessment, either in originally valuing property or in defending an assessment, are “substantially flawed.” Counsel for Respondent cites to no case law in support of this line of reasoning. The sole issue in this appeal was whether the subject property was being assessed at one-third of its true value in money (fair market value). Section 137.115.1, RSMo.

Expenses for Mr. Liebeno’s Travel

Respondent at p. 25 of his Application for Review requests a refund of travel expenses paid by the Assessor for Mr. Liebeno’s appearance. The request is denied.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s points are not well founded. There is substantial and persuasive evidence upon this record from which a reasonable mind could have reached the conclusions and decision as determined by the Hearing Officer.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED December 9, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

_____________________________________

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

_____________________________________

Sam D. Leake, Commissioner

_____________________________________

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner

NIKE, IHM,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)	Appeals Number 02-32503 and 03-32578
	)
	)
SCOTT SHIPMAN, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

	Market Value	Assessed Value
Respondent’s Original Valuation	$22,148,493	$7,382,831
Board of Equalization’s Valuation	$22,148,493	$7,382,831
Complainant’s Proposed Valuation	$ 6,900,445	$2,299,920
Respondent’s Proposed Valuation	$19,846,078	$6,614,700

	Market Value	Assessed Value
Respondent’s Original Valuation	$19,436,730	$6,478,910
Board of Equalization’s Valuation	$19,436,730	$6,478,910
Complainant’s Proposed Valuation	$ 7,115,230	$2,371,510
Respondent’s Proposed Valuation	$19,654,727	$6,550,920

Exhibit A-02	2002 Appraisal Report
Exhibit A-03	2003 Appraisal Report
Exhibit B-02	Cost Approach Demonstration/Comparable Sales Demonstration
Exhibit B-03	Cost Approach Demonstration/Comparable Sales Demonstration
Exhibit C-02	Written Direct Testimony of Allen Bealmear
Exhibit C-03	Written Direct Testimony of Allen Bealmear
Rebuttal Exhibit A- (Not admitted)	Visitor’s Register for Nike IHM
Rebuttal Exhibit B- (Not admitted)	Visitor’s Register for Nike IHM

Exhibit 1-02	2002 Appraisal Report
Exhibit 1-03	2003 Appraisal Report
Exhibit 2-02	Written Direct Testimony of Matt Brown
Exhibit 2-03	Written Direct Testimony of Matt Brown
Exhibit 3-03	2002 Personal Property List of Additions
Exhibit 4-03	2003 Commercial Personal Property Declaration
Substitute Exhibit 4	Net Book Value Report 2002
Exhibit 5	Nike, IHM 2001 Acquisition Summary
Exhibit 7	Acquisition Cost Form
Deposition Exhibit 1	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #10
Deposition Exhibit 2	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #185
Deposition Exhibit 5	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #311
Deposition Exhibit 7	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #454
Deposition Exhibit 8	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #364
Deposition Exhibit 9	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #494
Deposition Exhibit 10	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #508
Deposition Exhibit 12	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #292
Deposition Exhibit 13	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #714
Deposition Exhibit 14	Equipment List
Exhibit 9	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #494
Exhibit 10	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #802
Exhibit 11	Assets By Line Report, Line 20
Exhibit 12	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #827
Exhibit 13	Nike Purchase Order - Cabinets
Exhibit 14	Complainant’s Responses to Respondent’s First Set of Interrogatories
Exhibit 15	Initial Research Print – Nike Item #12
Exhibit 16	Nike Purchase Order – Welding Fume Dust Collector

Appeal Number	Market Value	Assessed Value
02-32503	$6,900,445	$2,299,920
03-32578	$7,115,230	$2,371,510