1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant appealed to the State Tax Commission pursuant to 12 CSR 30-3.010(1)(B)1.

2. The parties do not dispute the highest and best use of the subject property.

3. The 2000 Ford Expedition, VIN #1FMPU18L9TLC43237, was purchased in September 2000 for $36,000. Complainant’s Ex. 12. As indicated by the October 2003 NADA book, the Expedition had a trade in value of $17,880 after an adjustment for high mileage. In March, 2004, Complainant traded the Expedition in on a new vehicle and received a $16,000 trade in allowance. Complainant’s Ex. 13. No explanation was given for why Complainant accepted something less than the NADA value for the Expedition.

4. Complainant’s calculation of depreciation for said Expedition is not supported by market derived evidence.

5. The true value in money of the Expedition on January 1, 2004, was $17,880 (assessed value $5,960) as indicated by the 2003 NADA trade in value.

6. The 1998 Honda, VIN # JHLRD1842WC090822, was purchased used in April, 2003 for $8,800. Complainant’s Ex. 16. As indicated by the October 2003 NADA book, the Honda had a trade in value of $7,200 after an adjustment for high mileage. On December 1, 2003, the vehicle was involved in an accident which resulted in $1,934 worth of damage to the vehicle. Complainant’s Exs. 17, 18. The vehicle had not been repaired on the tax day.

7. Complainant did not present evidence which tended to demonstrate that the market would recognize a dollar for dollar loss in value due to the damage sustained by the Honda in the accident. However, it is more reasonable to believe that the market would recognize some loss in value than to believe, as Respondent’s witness suggests, that this type of extensive damage would be captured in a normal condition adjustment under NADA.

8. The true value in money of the Honda on January 1, 2004, was $5,270 (assessed value $1,760) as indicated by the 2003 NADA trade in value less the cost of repairs.

9. The 2004 Cardinal Travel Trailer, Model 28RL, VIN #4X4TCAD214G082852, was purchased new on November 5, 2003 for $22,318. Complainant’s Ex. 9. The travel trailer is 26 feet, six inches long. Respondent’s Ex. 1. Nothing was traded in on the travel trailer and Complainant received no special concessions.

10. Complainant presented no market evidence supporting his depreciation adjustment.

11. Respondent’s value is based upon an NADA listing for a vehicle which has the same model number but a longer length. Respondent’s Ex. 4.

12. The true value in money of the travel trailer on January 1, 2004, was $22,320 (assessed value $7,440), as indicated by Complainant’s purchase price.

True value in money is the fair market value of the property on the valuation date, and is a function of its highest and best use, which is the use of the property which will produce the greatest return in the reasonably near future. Aspenhof Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Mo. App. 1990).

Section 137.115, RSMo requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and purchased by one who is desiring to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

"True value" is never an absolute figure, but is merely an estimate of the fair market value on the valuation date. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W. 2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).

In Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152, Mo. App. E.D. 2003, the court of appeals stated:

There is no longer an automatic presumption regarding the correctness of an assessor's valuation. Section 138.431.3. This statutory change from the previous situation in which the assessor's valuation was presumed to be correct does not mean that there is now a presumption in favor of taxpayer. The taxpayer in a Commission tax appeal still bears the burden of proof and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was improperly classified or valued. Industrial Development Authority of Kansas City v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. App.1991).

In Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375, Mo. App. S.D. 2003, the court of appeals described the taxpayer's burden as follows:

Taxpayers were the moving parties seeking affirmative relief, and as such, they bore the burden of proving the vital elements of their case, i.e., the assessments were "unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary or capricious. Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959); Westwood P'ship v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152, 161[8] (Mo. App. 2003); 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§710, 726. This is true regardless of the existence or non-existence of the challenged presumption. As the Supreme Court of Missouri explained, "even were we to hold that it [the presumption] has been overcome, the burden of proof on the facts and inferences would still remain on petitioner, for it is the moving party seeking affirmative relief. Cupples, 329 S.W.2d at 702[16]. See also 84 C.J.S. Taxation §710, which states: "Even where there is no presumption in favor of the assessor's ruling, if no evidence is offered in support of the complaint, the reviewing board is justified in fixing the valuation complained of in the amount assessed by the assessor."

To prevail, Taxpayers had to "present an opinion of market value and then ... present substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on tax day." Daly v. P.D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Mo. App. 2002).

Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it established them, and from which the Commission can reasonably decide an appeal on the factual issues. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

The assessor of each county and each city not within a county shall use the trade-in value published in the October issue of the National Automobile Dealers’ Association Official Used Car Guide, or its successor publication, as the recommended guide of information for determining the true value of motor vehicles described in such publication. Section 137.115.9, RSMo 2000.

The actual purchase price is not conclusive for tax purposes. Rather, evidence of the consideration paid may be admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence is competent – i.e., a voluntary purchase not too remote in time. St. Joe Minerals Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W. 2d 526 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (citations omitted).

In order to prevail Complainant had to present an opinion of market value and then present substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on tax day.

The most significant different between the Complainant and Respondent involved the value of the travel trailer.

Respondent asserts that Complainant may have gotten a sweetheart deal because he was a police officer. Respondent’s appraiser spoke to two salesmen at the retailer. Those gentlemen indicated that sometimes police officers were given better deals on vehicles. Of course, if Complainant did receive special concessions, his purchase price would not represent an arm’s length transaction. But, no one was able to verify that this had occurred in Complainant’s case.

Nonetheless, we might have been able to accept the premise that Complainant’s purchase price did not represent an arm’s length transaction except for the fact that NADA information Respondent used to value the subject trailer was for a 29 foot, eight inch, trailer while Complainant testified that his trailer was only 26 feet, six inches. Because we cannot find that the trailer Respondent valued is the same trailer Complainant purchased, we find in favor of Complainant and set value at the price paid for the vehicle less than 60 days prior to the tax day. Depreciation is not allowed because Complainant failed to present market data in support of his depreciation adjustment.

Respondent originally valued the Expedition at $18,930 but, at hearing, proposed a value of $17,880 because of high mileage. Complainant, using a formula discussed in Winkler v. Witthar, STC Appeal Number 01-48001, subtracted his trade in value from his purchase price, divided the difference by the number of months he had owned the vehicle, and worked backwards from his trade in value of $16,000 to reach his opinion of $16,952.40 for the Expedition on January 1, 2004.

Complainant argues that his actual trade in value must form the basis of our opinion of value. Actual sales price is not conclusive for tax purposes, especially when other evidence points to the fact that Complainant sold his vehicle for less than the market derived trade in values reported by the National Automobile Dealers’ Association Official Used Car Guide.

Our constitution requires uniformity in taxation. When a taxpayer asserts that his property should be valued less than other substantially similar properties, he bears the burden of establishing why a deviation is warranted.

Respondent originally valued the Honda at $8,221 but, at hearing, reduced that value to $7,200 because of high mileage. Respondent allowed no adjustment for the $1,934 damage done to the vehicle in the December accident. Complainant took his purchase price of $8,800 deducted 7% depreciation and then deducted the cost of repairs to reach his opinion of value of $6,249.

Respondent’s argument that the unrepaired damage to the Honda would not reduce value is not persuasive. The correct value of the Honda on January 1, 2004, was $5,266, say $5,270, representing the NADA value less the cost of repairs. Depreciation from the purchase price is recognized in the NADA value.

The assessed value determined by the Assessor and approved by the Board of Equalization, is SET ASIDE. The Clerk is hereby ordered to place the following values on the books:

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Clay County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 8, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson

Hearing Officer