PAUL A. ARMAN, III,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 04-10005
	)
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization reducing the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax year 2004 to be $45,000, assessed value of $8,550.

Complainant appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine (1) the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2004 (under the economic conditions of January 1, 2003); (2) whether discrimination has occurred in the assessment process; and (3) whether Complainant’s rights under the United States Constitution have been violated.

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, discrimination and violation of the United States Constitution, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $46,000 (assessed value of $8,740, as residential property). The Board reduced the value to $39,000, assessed value of $7,410. Complainant proposed no opinion of value. A hearing was conducted on March 8, 2005, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant testified in his own behalf. Complainant did not state an opinion of the fair market value of the subject property, on the ground it was no one’s business what he thought the property was worth. Complainant questioned as to how the value of the property could have inflated from what he paid for it in 1997 to the value which either the Board determined or the value which the Appraiser determined for tax year 2004.

Complainant’s position was that since the subject property is private property the assessment process is trespassing and an invasion of his privacy. Complainant asserted that there was nothing in the Constitution of the United States that said he had a duty or responsibility to pay taxes and he felt that the property tax was illegal under the Constitution, but that no one had challenged it. Complainant further claimed that taxes can only be collected on money that is earned and since he does not earn any money from the subject property no tax can be collected. Complainant offered into evidence Exhibit A, a copy of a 1997 insurance document which listed the purchase price of the subject property in 1997 at $23,000. Respondent did not object to the exhibit and it was received into evidence.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Ms. Shirley V. Clifton, residential appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to her appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Ms. Clifton was received into evidence. Ms. Clifton arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $45,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing her sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which she deemed to be comparable to the subject property. Ms. Clifton also performed a cost approach which provided an indicated value for the subject property of $48,264. Respondent also offered into evidence Exhibit 2, a listing sheet on the property at 420 Ames Place, showing a listing price of $69,500. Exhibit 2 was received into evidence.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 423 Ames Place, St. Louis County, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 11H510251. The property consists of .16 of an acre lot (50 x 140 feet) improved by a one-story vinyl-sided, single-family structure of fair quality construction. The house was built in 1950 and appears to be in average physical condition. The residence has a total of five rooms, which includes two bedrooms, one full bath, and contains 792 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, an enclosed frame back porch, an open front porch and a one-car detached garage. There was no listing or sale of the property noted within three years prior to the tax date of January 1, 2004. Exhibit 1.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainant’s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money.

5. The cost approach to value performed by Respondent’s appraiser relied upon Marshall-Swift valuation service. The approach was prepared in accordance with what is generally recognized to be appropriate and well accepted standards for performing a cost analysis to arrive at an indicated fair market value. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Ms. Clifton.

6. The properties relied upon by Respondent’s appraiser in performing her appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within one (1) block of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2004. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability.

7. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (424 Ames-same block, across the street) sold in July, 2002 for $46,700. This property consists of a .16 of an acre lot (50 x 140) improved by a one-story vinyl-sided, single-family structure of fair quality construction. The house was built in 1950 and appears to be in good physical condition. The residence has a total of five rooms, which includes two bedrooms, one full bath, and contains 806 square feet of living area. There is a full basement but no garage. There was some remodeling and upgrading of the property in 1995 or 1996.

Comparable 2 (527 Ames-1 block North) sold in October, 2003 for $43,500. This property consists of a .16 of an acre lot (50 x 140) improved by a one-story asbestos-sided single-family structure of fair quality construction. The house was built in 1954 and appears to be in average physical condition. The residence has a total of four rooms, which includes two bedrooms, one full bath, and contains 840 square feet of living area. There is a full basement and no garage.

Comparable 3 (309 Ames-1 block South) sold in August, 2003 for $45,700. This property consists of a .16 of an acre lot (50 x 140) improved by a one-story stucco single-family structure of fair quality construction. The house was built in 1947 and appears to be in average physical condition. The residence has a total of six rooms, which includes two bedrooms, one full bath, and contains 1,019 square feet of living area. There is a partial basement and no garage.

8. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments appear to be appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem.

9. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$1,300 or 2.78% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to +$2,300 or 5.29% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to -$400 or .88% of the sales price.

10. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $45,400, $45,800 and $45,300, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $45,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $56.82 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $57.94, $51.79 and $44.85.

11. Respondent did not have to meet a standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal, under the provisions of Section 137.115, RSMo, as he was not seeking to sustain the original valuation presumed to have been made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.

12. Respondent’s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2004, (under the economic conditions of January 1, 2003) to be $45,000.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor (which is not presumed to be correct by statute, but presumed to be correct by case law), is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

There is no presumption that the assessor’s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo. Notwithstanding the statutory provision of Section 138.431.1, enacted by the legislature in 1992 (SB 630), the Supreme Court of Missouri has held, "A tax assessor’s valuation is presumed correct." Donna Snider v. Casino Aztar/Aztar Missouri Gaming Corp., SC86181, 3/01/2005, citing to Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); and Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959).

The presumption of correct assessment is rebutted when the taxpayer presents substantial and persuasive evidence to establish that the assessor’s or Board’s valuation is erroneous and what the fair market value should have been placed on the property. Snider, Hermel & Cupples Hesse, supra.

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992.

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra.

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965). The owner may not support an opinion of value by reference to comparable sales unless the owner qualifies as an expert. State ex rel. Missouri Hwy. and Tr. Comm’n v. McDonald’s Corp., 872 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994); State ex rel. Missouri Hwy. and Tr. Comm’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

Evidence of the actual sales price of property is admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence involves a voluntary purchase not too remote in time. The actual sale price is a method that may be considered for estimating true value. The actual sales price, between a willing seller who is not obligated to sell and a willing buyer who is not compelled to buy, establishes an outer limit on the value of real property. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526 (App. E.D. 1993).

In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainant must (1) prove the true value in money of his property on January 1, 2003. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1959); and (2) show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of that property at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within the same taxing jurisdiction. Koplar, supra, at 695. Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. Substantial evidence must show that all other property in the same class, generally, is actually undervalued. State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964). The difference in the assessment ratio of the subject property the average assessment ratio in the subject county must be shown to be grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986). No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1958).

Complainant Fails To Prove Overvaluation

Complainant declined to give an opinion of the fair market value of the subject property. Mr. Arman’s justification for this was essentially that it was an invasion of his privacy to have to give his opinion of value, or as Mr. Arman stated, "it was nobody’s business." Just as an owner of property is always permitted to state his or her opinion of the fair market value of the property under appeal, an owner may decline to give an opinion of value. However, when an owner will not give an opinion of value, for whatever reason, he has failed to meet the essential first prong of a prima facie case on value. Since there was no opinion of value given, there was no evidence offered in support of any opinion of value.

The exhibit tendered by Mr. Arman, and his testimony that in 1997 he purchased the property for $23,000 is not probative on the issue of fair market value as of January 1, 2004. The purchase of the property approximately six years before the date for valuation is too remote in time to be relevant to the question of what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as a purchase price on January 1, 2004.

Complainant Fails To Prove Discrimination

Complainant tendered no evidence which would address the necessary elements of establishing that there had been an intentional plan on the part of assessing officials to value the property under appeal at a rate greater than 19% as is required for residential property (Section 137.115.5 RSMo.). Nor was any evidence forthcoming that would establish that residential property on average is being assessed in St. Louis County at a statistically significant level below nineteen percent of fair market value. Therefore, the claim of discrimination fails. The subject property must be assessed at a rate consistent with the statutory assessment ratio of nineteen percent.

Complainant Fails To Prove Violation Of Constitutional Rights

Complainant argued that his rights as a citizen under the United States Constitution were violated by the assessment process. Specifically he asserted that the assessment process constituted trespass, an invasion of his privacy and the imposing of an illegal tax. Complainant cited to no state or federal statute, nor to any case law to establish any of these points.

His arguments essentially were as follows:

(1) His property is private property and assessing it is trespass.

(2) His property is private property and assessing it is an invasion of privacy.

(3) His property is private property and nothing in the Constitution of the United States provides that he has a duty or responsibility to pay tax on private real property from which no money is earned.

Notwithstanding Complainant’s failure to provide an legal basis for his claims, the Hearing Officer will provide a response to each of the arguments raised.

The Complainant’s claim of the assessment process constituting trespass is without merit.

Trespass is defined as "an unlawful act committed against the person or property of another; esp., wrongful entry on another’s real property." Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Ed. 1999. The term has also been used to mean any "direct and forcible injury to person, land or chattels." R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the Law of Torts, 17^th ed. 1977, cited in Black’s). Statutorily, the Missouri criminal code provides for a crime of trespass in the first and second degrees. Sections 569.140 & 569.150, RSMo. In both instances, there must be an unlawful entering upon the real property of another.

In the present case, there is no evidence of any unlawful entering upon Complainant’s real property by the Respondent or other personnel of Respondent’s office. In point of fact, Complainant specifically refused for any interior or on site exterior inspection to be made. Exhibit A, p. 3. In any event, even if a trespass had occurred, which it did not, that does not relieve the taxpayer from having his property assessed and the appropriate ad valorem property taxes levied against the property. The taxing power for counties is specifically set forth in Article X of the Missouri Constitution. Amendment X of the Constitution of the United States provides that powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited by it are reserved to the states. Accordingly, the United States Constitution does not delegate ad valorem taxing power to the federal government, nor is such taxing power prohibited to the states. It is constitutionally proper for the State of Missouri to levy taxes against real property. It is a power reserved to the states, under the federal constitution.

Mr. Arman’s next claim of violation of his rights as a citizen was stated as the assessment process being an invasion of privacy. The taxpayer did not further articulate or elaborate as to exactly how any constitutionally protected right of privacy was being violated or invaded by the determination of the fair market value of the property under appeal. Ownership of real property is a matter of public record. The assessment (applying the appropriate assessment ratio to the fair market value) process is also a matter of public action by the Assessor. The records on the subject property developed and maintained by the Assessor according to applicable statutes are public records.

This claim is without any legal basis or merit in this appeal. No evidence was provided to establish an invasion of privacy under the federal constitution. Even if such evidence had been offered, this appeal would not have been the appropriate forum to hear that a claim. A taxpayer is not relieved from the obligation to pay taxes, based upon a claim of invasion of privacy. In other words, the claim is totally irrelevant and immaterial to this proceeding. It does not address the underlying question of fair market value, nor is it probative on any claim of discrimination.

The final assertion put forth by Mr. Arman under his claim of constitutional violation was that there is nothing in the United States Constitution that imposes upon him any duty or responsibility to pay ad valorem property tax. His claim is that the real property tax is an illegal tax. No citation was provided to any federal case law which has held that an ad valorem property tax on real property, irrespective of whether income is derived from that property, is illegal under the federal constitution. Complainant’s assertion that the tax is an illegal tax, but that no one has ever challenged it as being unconstitutional is of no merit.

As noted above, the right of a state to impose an ad valorem tax on real property is not reserved to the federal government, nor is it prohibited to the individual states. It is a power that is reserved for each state to exercise. The State of Missouri has elected to impose such a tax. It is legal under both the federal and state constitutions. Complainant’s argument provides no basis upon which the Hearing Officer can remove the assessment imposed by the Assessor under applicable statutes. The argument is irrelevant to any determination of fair market value.

Summary

Complainant failed to provide an opinion of value or any relevant evidence to establish fair market value as of January 1, 2004. Complainant’s claims of discrimination and violation of constitutional rights are without any merit in this proceeding, as they have no bearing on the underlying substantive issue before the Commission, i.e. fair market value of the subject property on the January 1, 2004.

Respondent Proves Value

Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2004 (under market conditions for January 1, 2003) to be $45,000 for the subject property. Respondent’s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon established and recognized approaches for the valuation of real property, the cost and sales comparison or market approach. The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single family residences.

The adjustments made the Ms. Clifton were consistent with generally accepted guidelines for the appraisal of property of the subject’s type. The adjustments properly accounted for the various differences between the subject and each comparable. The net adjustments to the sale properties fell within a very narrow range from .88% to 5.29. The sales data clearly established that properties like the subject were selling in a per square foot of living area range from $44.85 to $57.94. Ms. Clifton’s conclusion of value of $45,000, or $56.82 per square foot was solidly within the market range for the subject. The three sales comparables all being on the subject street within a block of the subject provide the best possible sales foundation for an appraisal problem of this nature, short of an actual sale of the subject which might have occurred during the period from January 2002 to January 2004.

Respondent’s evidence of value was supported by a well documented appraisal report. The evidence was substantial and persuasive to establish the fair market value of the subject. By so establishing the fair market of the subject property, any presumption of correct assessment by either the Assessor, at a value of $46,000, or the Board at a value of $39,000, was rebutted.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and reduced by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2004 is set at $8,550.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED March 14, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

ORDER

AFFIRMING HEARING OFFICER DECISION

UPON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

On March 14, 2005, Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessment by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization and setting value for the property under appeal.

Complainant timely filed his Application for Review of the Decision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard Upon Review

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

DECISION

Complainant’s Grounds for Review

Complainant sets forth twelve different grounds for review of the Decision. The Commission summarizes the twelve claims by the Complainant, as follows:

1. Complainant’s property is private property and the Assessor or Collector of St. Louis County have no say concerning the property.

2. The tax on real property is by-and-large for payment of education, it is not Complainant’s responsibility to pay for other people’s children to go to school.

3. It is against the law to blackmail Complainant into paying money under the threat of taking his real property.

4. It is against the law to use the United States Mail to threaten Complainant.

5. People on Section Eight don’t have to pay real estate taxes, but Complainant must pay taxes or lose his home.

6. Real property taxes are in violation of Complainant’s constitutional rights, and in invasion of Complainant’s privacy.

7. The taxing authorities are acting as gangsters and criminals by threatening blackmail and extortion in taking of property if taxes are not paid.

8. The real estate tax collection laws of the State of Missouri are arbitrary, capricious, and unworkable, and discriminate against people who improve their property.

9. Tax collection procedures are in invasion of Complainant’s privacy.

10. Taxation of Complainant’s real property is slavery to the state in violation of article 13 of the United States Constitution.

11. The tax collection procedures are putting Complainant’s property in harms way.

12. No governmental entity has authority or the right to have any say about Complainant’s property.

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Each of the claims made by Complainant taken individually and collectively challenge the constitutionality of the ad valorem real property tax of Missouri. Complainant has provided no citation to any court ruling by a Missouri Court or Federal Court that has found the ad valorem tax to be unconstitutional. The Commission finds the ad valorem real property tax as applied to Complainant’s property to be in accordance with Missouri state statutes, the Missouri and United State Constitutions. Accordingly, the points raised by Complainant are not well taken.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determination of true value in money and the assessed value of Complainant’s property.

ORDER

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED May 24, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Sam D. Leake, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner