WESLEY JENNINGS,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-32095
	)
CATHY RINEHART, ASSESSOR,	)
CLAY COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

HOLDING

The value determined by the Board of Equalization is SET ASIDE. The correct value for the subject property is $102,000 (assessed value $19,380). A hearing was conducted on January 28, 2004, before Hearing Officer Luann Johnson, at the Clay County Administration Building, Courthouse Square, Liberty, Missouri. Complainant appeared pro se. Respondent appeared by counsel, Mark Murphy.

The issue in this case is the true value in money of Complainant=s property on January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004.

The property under appeal is a 15,996 square foot lot improved with a 936 square foot ranch-style home in average to good condition. Respondent originally appraised the property at a market value of $77,800 (assessed value $14,790). The Board of Equalization raised value to $87,500 (assessed value $26,630). Complainant asserts a value of $73,000 (assessed value $13,870). At hearing Respondent presented an appraisal report demonstrating a value under the market approach of $102,000 (assessed value $19,380). The market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003, was $102,000.

Complainant introduced Exhibits A through V which document the drainage problem in his yard and water damage to the basement. Complainant presented no appraisal report. Respondent presented an appraisal report which was identified as Respondent=s Exhibit 1.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Clay County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is a 15,996 square foot parcel improved with a 936 square foot ranch style house over a full, unfinished, basement. The dwelling has three bedrooms, one bath, and a two-car attached garage. The property is identified as parcel number 13-606-00-01-010.00, more commonly known as 7932 North Troost Avenue, Kansas City, Clay County, Missouri.

3. For tax year 2001, the parties reached a stipulated value of $73,000 for the subject property. For tax year 2003, the assessor valued the property at $77,800 and Complainant appealed. The Board of Equalization raised value to $87,500, and Complainant appealed to the Tax Commission. Complainant asserts a value of $73,000. Respondent asserts a value of $102,000.

4. Similar properties are selling for $123,500 to $131,500.

5. The property suffers from on-going drainage and erosion problems. Complainant testified that the cost to cure this problem was $16,800.

6. The basement of the dwelling has also sustained some water damage. Complainant testified that the cost to cure this problem was $11,000.

7. In her appraisal report, Respondent=s appraiser gave Complainant a $10,000 adjustment for the problems mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. Respondent=s appraiser testified that said adjustment was based upon a study of the market impact of similar deficiencies upon properties that had sold in the recent past. She further testified that the $10,000 adjustment was very generous. It is also noted that the subject tract is substantially larger than the comparable properties utilized by Respondent=s appraiser, but Respondent=s appraiser did not make an upward adjustment for the size differential between the subject lot and the comparable lots. Thus, the site adjustment is in excess of $10,000.

8. Complainant presented no market evidence that would support a finding that the market value of the subject property was $73,000.

9. The most likely price the subject property would sell for on the tax day was $102,000.

10. No evidence was presented which suggested that any new construction or property improvements occurred after January 1, 2003. Therefore, the value established for 2003 shall also be the value for tax year 2004.

Section 137.115, RSMo requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and purchased by one desiring to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price which a specified interest in real property is likely to bring under the following conditions:

1. Consummation of a sale occurs as of a specified date;

2. An open and competitive market exists for the property interest appraised;

3. The buyer and seller are each acting prudently and knowledgeably;

4. The price is not affected by undue stimulus;

5. The buyer and seller are typically motivated;

6. Both parties are acting in what they consider their best interest;

7. Marketing efforts were adequate and a reasonable time was allowed for exposure to the open market;

8. Payment was made in cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and

9. The price represents the normal consideration for the property sold, unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale.

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and then must present substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897.

ASubstantial@ evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). APersuasive@ evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact.

The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 27 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975).

The valuation of real property is not an exact science and decisions concerning value can never be more than educated guesses based upon the interpretation of historical data. The best way to establish market value on a residential property is through an appraisal report comparing the subject property to similar properties which have sold in the recent past. In this case, the only market data addressing value was the appraisal report presented by Respondent.

The Complainant presented a well organized argument that his property suffered from erosion and a wet basement, but that evidence tells us nothing about the actual market value of the home, and does not establish that his home would sell for no more than $73,000 on January 1, 2003.

The assessed valuation for the subject property for tax year 2003, as determined by the Board of Equalization, is SET ASIDE. The Clerk is hereby ordered to put a new value of $102,000 (assessed value $19,380) on the property for tax years 2003 and 2004.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of a hearing officer decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific detailed grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial.

If an application for review of a hearing officer decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Clay County as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 20, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Luann Johnson

Hearing Officer

On February 20, 2004, Hearing Officer Luann Johnson entered her Decision and Order (Decision) setting aside the assessment by the Clay County Board of Equalization and setting value for the subject property at $102,000.

Complainant timely filed (March 17, 2004) his Application for Review of the Decision. Respondent timely filed (April 6, 2004) her Response. Complainant filed a Reply to Respondent=s Response with the Commission on April 13, 2004.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer=s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com=n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused her discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Complainant=s Application for Review was essentially an arguing of the conclusions reached by the Hearing Officer. Complainant failed to set forth any legal claim or basis as a ground to find the Hearing Officer had abused her discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Complainant simply had an opinion as to the fair market value of the property different from that determined by the Hearing Officer. The essence of Complainant=s claim centered on two factors. One factor related to the value which the Assessor had set on the subject property for the 2001 assessment cycle. The other factor dealt with the erosion problem on the subject tract and flooding of the subject basement.

As to the value apparently agreed to for the subject property between the Assessor and the Complainant in 2001, that has no relevancy for the valuation of the 2003 assessment cycle. The Hearing Officer properly gave no weight to it in her decision. A negotiated settlement as to value for one assessment cycle is not binding on either party for another assessment cycle.

As to the erosion and basement flooding problem, the evidence on the record proffered through the testimony of Respondent=s appraiser is that she made an adjustment for these factors under her site adjustment. While Complainant disagrees with the Hearing Officer=s conclusion on the overall valuation of the property and the treatment of these factors, the evidence on the record does support the Hearing Officer=s conclusion.

Complainant failed to carry his burden of proof on the issue of the fair market value of the subject property as of January 1, 2003. In the judgment of the Hearing Officer the Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the value of $102,000. Complainant=s disagreement with the conclusions reached by the Hearing Officer does not establish an evidentiary basis upon which the Commission may overturn the Decision and Order entered by the Hearing Officer.

The Hearing Officer did not err in her determinations as challenged by Complainant.

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED May 4, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner