MOHAMMAD HASHEMI,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-11944
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization reducing the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 to be $290,000, assessed value of $55,100.

Complainant appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainant appeals, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $309,900 (assessed value of $58,880, as residential property). The Board reduced the value to $292,800 (assessed value of $55,640). Complainant proposed a value of $225,000 (assessed value of $42,750). A hearing was conducted on May 18, 2004, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Mr. Hashemi testified in his own behalf. He offered his opinion of value for the subject property to be $225,000. The opinion of value was based upon the location of the subject property at the corner of Clayton Road and South Mason Road. Mr. Hashemi testified as to accidents that had occurred in the past in front of the subject property and of the widening of Clayton Road in the 1980's. It was Complainant=s position that the location of the subject property near the Clayton and Mason Road intersection was a negative influence which reduced the value of his property. No documentary evidence was provided to substantiate or demonstrate how the owner arrived at his opinion of value of $225,000.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. John D. Rebsamen, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Rebsamen was received into evidence. Mr. Rebsamen arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $290,00 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property. Exhibit 2 a plat map of the subject property showing the subject lot and its location relative to both Clayton Road and Mason Road and also showing Respondent=s Comparable 1 was received into evidence.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 13504 Clayton Road, Town and Country, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 20P140103. The property consists of a 1.24 acre lot in an irregular shape with dimensions of 303/181 x 302/230 fronting to Clayton Road with a view of other residential homes and commercial retail buildings. The lot is situated to the South of Clayton Road and to the West of Mason Road. The site is relatively level, which appears to afford adequate drainage. There are no known or apparent settlement or related problems, The street is public, and the surface is asphalt. The site is landscaped with grass, shrubs and trees. The site is adequate and typical of those found in the neighborhood. Exhibit 1, p. 5.

3. The subject lot is improved by a single-family one-story masonry house with a full basement, two-car side entry garage. The improvements are considered to be of average quality construction. The year built is 1974 and the improvements appear to be in fair to average physical condition. The residence has a total of eight rooms, which include four bedrooms, two full bath, one half bath, and contains 2,584 square feet of living area. Exhibit 1, p. 5.

4. The existing structure is not the highest and best use of the land as though vacant. The improvements were constructed approximately 30 years ago and contain measurable elements of physical deterioration and functional obsolescence, as do most structures in this age range within the defined neighborhood boundaries. The current improvements have several years of remaining physical life but do not enhance the value of the land, which has a higher use. Exhibit 1, p. 5.

5. The neighborhood trend is the purchase of older existing homes, such as the subject, which are demolished to provide a building site for larger new improvements, as evidenced by the new homes which were construction on the three comparable properties utilized in Respondent=s appraisal. Exhibit 1, pp. 2, 6-7 & 11.

6. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

7. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $225,000.

8. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within less than a half mile of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The sale properties were similar to the subject in site size, zoning density, topography, landscape, dimensions, shape utilities, drainage view, road, traffic, degree of build-up, off site improvements and locational influence. Exhibit 1, pp. 5-9.

9. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (20 Williamsburg Estates - lot adjoining the back of the subject lot tot he Southwest) sold in January 2002 for $325,000. This property consists of a 1.21 acre irregular rectangular lot. The lot dimensions run approximately 226 x 181 x 131 x 361, with a view of other residential homes and commercial retail buildings. The site is relatively level, which appears to afford adequate drainage. The property at the time of sale was improved by a 1957 ranch-style house, which was demolished and the site was improved in 2003 with a custom spot built home.

Comparable 2 (607 Greenwich Green Lane - .45 of a mile Northwest of the subject) sold in July 2002 for $365,000. This property consists of a 1.14 acre irregular rectangular lot. The lot dimensions are 270/290 x 177/179, with a view of other residential homes. The site is relatively level at grade, sloping to the rear, which appears to afford adequate drainage. The property at the time of sale was improved by a 1969 two-story house, which was demolished and the site was improved in 2004 with a custom spot built home.

Comparable 3 (13613 Clayton Road - .35 of a mile Northwest of the subject) sold in December 2000 for $280,000. This property consists of a 1.01 acre irregular rectangular lot. The lot dimensions are 174/195 x 229/247, with a view of other residential homes. The site is relatively level at grade and slopes to the rear, which appears to afford adequate drainage. The property at the time of sale was improved by a 1960 split-level style house, which was demolished and the site was improved in 2001 with a custom spot built home.

10. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments appear to be appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem.

11. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$35,000 or 10.77% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to -$30,600 or 8.74% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to +$11,300 or 4.04% of the sales price.

12. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $290,000, $319,400 and $291,300, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $290,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $5.37 compared with the sales prices per square foot for the comparables of $6.17, $7.35 and $6.36.

13. Respondent did not have to meet a standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal, under the provisions of Section 137.115, RSMo, as he was not seeking to sustain the original valuation presumed to have been made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.

14. Respondent=s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $290,000.

15. Respondent=s appraisal properly valued the subject property as if it were a vacant land site unimproved and attributed no value to the subject improvements.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor (which is not presumed to be correct), is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1, p. 3.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra.

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

Complainant=s argument relative to fair market value centered upon the fact that the subject property is unique because of its location at the Clayton/Mason Road intersection. It was Mr. Hashemi=s contention that since no other property could be found on Clayton Road that had sold which was in close proximity to an intersection with a stop light like the Clayton/Mason Road intersection that there are no proper comparable properties. This line of reasoning is simply wrong.

Every property in the world is unique. No two pieces of land can occupy the same space, therefore, each acre, lot or land site is completely unique. However, that does not mean that an appraiser is not able to use other properties which are sufficiently similar to a property being appraised to arrive at an indicated value. The task of the appraiser is not to find an exact, identical, duplicate piece of land when valuing real property. The task is to find land sales of other properties that are sufficiently similar to the property being appraised. That is what Mr. Rebsamen did in his appraisal. The fact that none of the three sale properties was also located at Clayton and Mason Roads does not detract one bit from the trustworthiness, reliability and persuasiveness of the Respondent=s appraisal.

Mr. Hashemi offers an opinion of value of $225,000 for his property. However, there is no sales data to support that opinion of value. The proposed value of Mr. Hashemi calculates to a per square foot value of only $4.17. There is no evidence on this record from which the Hearing Officer can conclude that the fair market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003 would have only been that amount. The value presented by Complainant is 32.4% to 43.3% less than the per square foot values shown by the only market evidence on this record. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the location factor of the subject property warrants such a level of negative adjustment to the sale comparables in this record.

Mr. Hashemi=s opinion of value was not developed by a sales comparison approach to value. This is the only appropriate approach to appraising the subject property as of the economic conditions of January 2003. The proposed value is nothing more than the owner=s unsupported and undocumented opinion of value. In the absence of sound market data to support the opinion of value, it is not based upon proper elements or a proper foundation. No probative weight or value can be given to the owner=s opinion in this appeal.

There is no dispute that the location of the subject is a factor which must be considered in the appraisal of this property. Respondent=s appraiser clearly recognized this factor. The Hearing Officer recognizes it. However, Complainant cannot meet his burden of proof on this issue by simply stating an unsupported opinion of value. The opinion of value must be derived from an recognized and accepted appraisal methodology. That is it must be based upon actual sales data of similar properties. The owner=s opinion in this case was simply an arbitrary value. Complainant failed to meet his burden of proof.

Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2003, to be $290,000 for the subject. Respondent=s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the sales comparison or market approach. The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single family residences.

The adjustments made the Mr. Rebsamen were consistent with generally accepted guidelines for the appraisal of property of the subject=s type. The adjustments properly accounted for the single most important factors in this appraisal problem - traffic flow and location. Mr. Rebsamen adjusted each of his sales comparables to account for the difference in traffic flow between them and the subject.

The adjustment to Comparables 1 and 2 which are on streets with significantly less traffic than Clayton Road was a -$30,000. The adjustment to Comparable 3 which is located on Clayton Road, like the subject, but a few houses away from the Clayton/Mason Road intersection was a -$10,000. This adjustment accounted for there being less traffic flow impacting this comparable than the subject, which is impacted by traffic from both Clayton and Mason Roads. The Hearing Officer is persuaded that these adjustments are appropriate for this factor. There is no evidence on this record upon which the Hearing Officer can logically and rationally make a different adjustment.

As to the locational influence adjustment to Comparables 1 and 2 of a -$5,000, the Hearing Officer likewise finds this to be appropriate to account for the difference in location between these two comparables and the subject. There is no countervailing evidence which provides a basis for any greater adjustment for the locational factor relative to the subject.

The net adjustments to the sale properties fell within a very narrow range from 4.04% to 10.77%. Even the gross adjustments were in a very acceptable and narrow range from 10.77% to 11.26%. Furthermore, the indicated per square foot value for the subject falls well below the comparables. This gives added support to a sound determination of value.

Comparable 1 is virtually identical to the subject property lying at the back of the subject lot. The only significant difference between Comparable 1 and the subject relates to the subject being on Clayton Road and the Northeast corner of the subject lot being at the Clayton Road/Mason Road intersection. Comparable 1 sold for a $6.17 per square foot price in January, 2002. The indicated value determined by Mr. Rebsamen after the negative adjustments to account for the Comparable=s superior location reflected only a $5.37 per square foot value for the subject.

The other two sale properties both sold for higher per square foot values, $7.35 and $6.36 respectively. It is clear that neighborhood sales of lots for tear down properties are running approximately 15% to 37% higher, on a per square foot value basis, than the value determined by Mr. Rebsamen. This difference between the range of sales prices and the value arrived at by the Rebsamen appraisal is sufficient to account for the location factor of the subject property.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $55,100.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED May 27, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer