MICHAEL & PAMELA WOODS,	)
	)
Complainants,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 04-32500
	)
	)
SCOTT SHIPMAN, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax year 2004 to be $395,000, assessed value of $75,050.

Complainants appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Charissa Mayes, Assistant County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $395,000 (assessed value of $75,050, as residential property). Complainants proposed a value of $300,000 (assessed value of $57,000). A hearing was conducted on November 18, 2004, at the St. Charles County Administration Building, St. Charles, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Michael Woods testified to an opinion of value of $300,000. Complainants offered into evidence the following two exhibits. Exhibit A, a real estate market analysis by Lisa Peabody, opinion an estimated sale price for the subject property as of November 17, 2004 of $365,000 to $370,000. Exhibit B, an analysis prepared by Mr. Woods on the ratio of tax to price on five properties and the subject.

Counsel for Respondent objected to Exhibit A on the grounds of hearsay, wrong valuation date, and no opportunity for cross-examination. The objections were sustained and the exhibit was excluded from evidence.

Counsel for Respondent objected to Exhibit B on the ground of relevancy. The objection was sustained and the exhibit was excluded from evidence.

See, Ruling on Objections, infra.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Steven D. Riney, appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Riney was received into evidence. Mr. Riney arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $395,000 based upon the actual sale of the property in June 2003.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 1520 Hepperman, Wentzville, MO 63385, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 400540149005. The property consists of 3.21-acre lot improved by a one-story single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 2002 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has three bedrooms, three baths, and contains 2,135 square feet of living area. There is a full basement with 1576 square feet of finish and an attached two-car garage. The property sold in June 2003 for $395,000.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainants’ evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $300,000, as proposed.

5. The purchase of the subject by Complainants in June 2003 was an open market, arms-length transaction, which was at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The actual purchase price is substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the true value in money (fair market value) for purpose of real property assessment.

6. Respondent’s evidence met the standard of clear and convincing to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $395,000.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor (which is not presumed to be correct), is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

There is no presumption that the assessor’s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

There is a presumption that the buying and selling of a property is a market transaction. The party offering the sale of a property has the benefit of that presumption. The party challenging a transaction bears the burden of presenting evidence which will rebut the presumption. (Cite to be given)

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children’s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer’s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner’s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965). The owner may not support an opinion of value by reference to comparable sales unless the owner qualifies as an expert. State ex rel. Missouri Hwy. and Tr. Comm’n v. McDonald’s Corp., 872 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994); State ex rel. Missouri Hwy. and Tr. Comm’n v. Pracht, 801 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

Evidence of the actual sales price of property is admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence involves a voluntary purchase not too remote in time. The actual sale price is a method that may be considered for estimating true value. The actual sales price, between a willing seller who is not obligated to sell and a willing buyer who is not compelled to buy, establishes an outer limit on the value of real property. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526 (App. E.D. 1993).

Complainants failed to meet their burden of proof. No evidence was forthcoming from Complainants to establish the proposition that on January 1, 2003 a willing buyer and seller would have only agreed to a sale price of $300,000 for the subject property. In June of 2003 when Complainants purchase the property under appeal, the property had been listed for $425,000. Mrs. Woods is an experienced real estate agent having nearly 20 years of sales experience. Mrs. Woods did here own market analysis before Complainants purchased the subject. She made an examination of what she considered to be comparable sales before Complainants arrived at a final decision on the purchase of the subject. Therefore, Complainants were in a position as knowledgeable buyers which would be somewhat above the ordinary consumer. Complainants' Testimony.

Complainants made an offer of $360,000 to $365,000. The final purchase price of $395,000 was settled on between the parties. The subject had been listed with a realtor, was publicly advertised and had sufficient exposure to the market. There is no evidence of any special financing arrangements which were made available to the Complainants that would not have been available to any other prospective buyer. There is no evidence that financing played any role in the final amount which the sellers or buyers agreed to in the June 2003 transaction.

In short, in June 2003 the subject was bought and sold in a fair market transaction. That transaction set the outer limit of value for the subject. Complainants provided no evidence upon which a determination could be made that the property was actually worth $95,000 less than what they paid for it on January 1, 2003.

Complainants provided testimony relating to a currently pending law suit against the seller for fraud and misrepresentation relating to the boundary lines of the subject property and the location of the septic drain field allegedly being extended onto a neighboring property. The lawsuit was filed in July 2004. Since there was no lawsuit pending on January 1, 2003 this factor has no relevance on what a willing buyer and seller might have agreed to as a price on that date. It certainly does not establish that the property was only worth $300,000 in January 2003.

The unproved allegations in the lawsuit cannot serve as a basis for setting value at $300,000 in this appeal. It would be the height of pure speculation for the Hearing Officer to base his decision on what may be the final result of the lawsuit. What a judge or jury may do in that suit with regard to the dispute on misrepresentation as to the actual area of the lot or the matter of the location of sewer laterals extending onto adjoining property has no probative value in this appeal.

Complainants contend they knew the size of the subject lot was only 3.21 acres, but that they thought they were getting more land. They relied upon the seller who told them how far the property lines extended. It was Complainants' position that there was approximately three fourths of an acre more that was represented to be part of the subject 3.21 acres. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that an experienced real estate agent of nearly 20 years would not be able to discern that a tract of land which she knew to be only 3.21 acres would be the same to her as a tract of land almost 4 acres in size.

The contention relative to the sewer laterals being located or extending onto a neighboring property is just as much speculation and conjecture at this point as the allegation of misrepresentation concerning the land. The Hearing Officer is not in a position to determine what is the truth with regard to this matter. That must be left to the final out come in Complainants' lawsuit.

How the land matter or issue of location of sewer laterals might have effect the sale price in 2003 is quite simply an issue upon which Complainants bore the burden of proof. Complainants raising the two issues does not establish how the sale price between a willing buyer and seller might have been impacted in a hypothetical January, 2003 transaction. In short, the Hearing Officer on these two factors is left in that nebulous twilight of conjecture and speculation which is fatal to Complainants' position. A taxpayer does not meet his burden if evidence on any essential element of his case leaves the Commission "in the nebulous twilight of speculation, conjecture and surmise." See, Rossman v. G.G.C. Corp. of Missouri, 596 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Mo. App. 1980).

Finally, Complainants contended at hearing that the proper method to value the property would have been a valuation based upon sales comparables. It was on this basis that they attacked Mr. Riney’s methodology. However, the burden to make a valuation based upon one particular appraisal method was not on Mr. Riney. He could have elected to utilize a comparable sales approach, however, he decided that since no adjustments were necessary to the June 2003 sale price that this provided the best evidence of fair market value. There is no evidence to establish that Mr. Riney’s judgment in this regard was in error. There certainly is no evidence upon which the Hearing Officer can determine a value of $300,000 as proffered by Complainants.

Complainants elected to offer two exhibits to establish a fair market value as of November 2004 of $365,000 to $370,000. Neither exhibit purports to be an approach to value that is recognized for the appraisal of real estate by the courts or by the Commission. When a taxpayer elects to utilize an innovative methodology to support an opinion of value, the taxpayer bears the burden to establish that the methodology is generally recognized in the appraisal field and has general acceptance in the field. That was not done in this instance. Thus any opinion of value based upon either or both exhibits would not rest upon proper elements or a proper foundation.

Exhibit A was the Certified Market Analysis by Lisa Peabody. Ms. Peabody is represented to be a Realtor with ReMax. She has the designations as a realtor of CRS, and RRES. There is no evidence in Exhibit A which supports that Ms. Peabody would have been qualified as an expert in the appraisal of real property for purposes of this case. There are a variety of problems with Exhibit A in having probative value in the present appeal.

First, there was no showing that a real estate market analysis is generally recognized as an appropriate method for the valuation of real property in ad valorem tax appeals. The Hearing Officer knows of no court case that has approved this method of valuation. It has never been recognized before the Commission.

Second, the valuation date presented in Exhibit A was not the relevant tax date of January 1, 2003. The valuation date of November 17, 2004 was used by Ms. Peabody. There was no showing that the estimated sale price reflected in the report would need to be adjusted upward or downward for a valuation as of January 1, 2003. Nor did the Exhibit show that the estimated sale price on November 17, 2004 would be the same as fair market value on January 1, 2003.

Third, there is nothing to establish that an "estimate sale price" is the same as fair market value (or true value in money). The term is simply not defined in Exhibit A. There was no showing that the term is a term of art, which can properly be applied in an appeal before the Commission to equate to fair market value.

Fourth, the preparer of the analysis was not present to testify. The fact that Ms. Peabody's signature appears on the next to last page of the document and that the final page is a notarization of the signature is not sufficient to overcome what is clear hearsay. Ms. Woods was advised at the prehearing conference that if an appraiser was to do an appraisal on the subject property, that the appraiser would have to be present to testify. It appears, that Complainants decided that they could avoid that requirement if they simply had a real estate agent prepare an analysis. However, without Ms. Peabody present to testify, the most basic foundation for getting the document received into evidence cannot be met. Respondent had a right to cross-examine Ms. Peabody on her analysis.

Accordingly, Exhibit A could not be received into evidence. Since it is not a part of the evidentiary record on the issue of fair market value, there is no probative value to the document on the issue of fair market value as of January 1, 2003.

Mr. Woods prepared Exhibit B to demonstrate that the average ratio of tax to price for five different properties referenced in Exhibit A was below the ratio of tax to price for the subject property. From this Mr. Woods determined that the proper method of valuation of the subject was to utilize his ratio methodology. This produced a value of $370,000 as of November 2004.

This exhibit was excluded from evidence upon Counsel for Respondent’s objection because it simply is not relevant to what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as a purchase price on January 1, 2003. There is no showing that this methodology of averaging the ratio of taxes to sale price is recognized in the appraisal industry, by the courts or by the Commission. This exercise in math is not recognized in any form or fashion for the valuation of real property. The math is not in error, just the underlying theory that averaging ratios provides any sort of sound, reasonable or logical basis to establish what the market is actually doing with regard to the value of real estate.

Complainants presented no admissible documentation based upon a recognized approach to appraisal of property which would support their opinion of value of $300,000 for the subject property on January 1, 2003. The only evidence of fair market value for the subject of $300,000 was the testimony of Mr. Woods that his opinion of value was that amount. However, nothing further was offered to substantiate that opinion in any manner. Not even the excluded exhibits proffered by Complainants supported an opinion of value of $300,000.

Complainants failed to meet their burden of proof. Therefore, the presumption of correct assessment by the Board was not rebutted.

Respondent presented substantial and persuasive evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2003 to be $395,000 for the subject. Respondent’s appraiser elected to rely upon the actual sale of the subject in June 2003 to establish value. The fact that Mr. Riney did not choose to also present a sales comparison approach to value does not diminish in any manner the weight or persuasiveness of his opinion of value in this particular appeal. The only evidence properly addressing the issue of fair market value in this appeal was the evidence of the sale of the subject.

Respondent was not required to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain the valuation of $395,000, under the provisions of Section 137.115.1 RSMo. The presumption that the value was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program does not exist in this appeal. The valuation of $395,000 establishes prima facie the valuation was derived from the actual sale and not any computer valuation methodology.

Furthermore, while by statute there is no presumption the assessor’s value is correct, there is a presumption at law that the sale transaction in June 2003 of the subject was a market transaction, that is the sale price was freely fixed and not under compulsion, i.e. willing buyer and seller. Phoenix Redevelopment Corporation v. Walker, 812 S.W.2d 881, 883-4 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). That presumption was not rebutted in any manner by Complainants. Therefore, the presumption that the 2003 sale was a market transaction and the presumption of correct assessment based upon the June 2003 sale both remain in the present appeal. The actual sale price in this appeal does clearly and convincingly establish fair market value. That evidence instantly tilted the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind was left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true. Matter of O’Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Charles County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax year 2004 is set at $75,050.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 2000.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Charles County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED December 1, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

On December 1, 2004, Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessment by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization.

Complainants timely filed their Application for Review of the Decision.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert’s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen’s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer’s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Complainants’ letter setting forth their Application for Review requested that the valuation of their home be reviewed and assessed "using the Market or Sales Comparison approach." A review of the record shows that the valuation of the subject property was based on the actual sale of the subject property at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. This is an accepted methodology for the valuation of a property under Missouri Court cases, and Commission rules. It is clearly a market valuation of the property.

Respondent elected to only present evidence of the actual sale of the subject property in June, 2003 and not develop an appraisal utilizing a sales comparison approach. This was not error. There is no requirement that the Respondent value a property using a sales comparison methodology when there is an actual sale of the property being valued. An appraisal utilizing a sales comparison analysis may give added support to the value established by an actual open market sale of the property under appeal. However, failure of the Respondent to offer evidence of value based on a sales comparison method in no way detracts from the opinion of value based on the subject’s actual sale.

The actual sale price constituted substantial and persuasive evidence of fair market value. The fact that Mrs. Woods is an experienced real estate agent with nearly 20 years of sales experience and the fact that the property was listed at a much higher initial value which was negotiated down to the actual purchase price, runs counter to Complainants’ claim they "knowingly paid more than fair market value" for the property. The June, 2003 transaction was a market transaction and clearly established the upper limit of the subject’s fair market value.

Complainants could have elected to present an appraisal relying on a sales comparison approach into evidence. They elected to not do so. A review of the Hearing Officer’s ruling excluding a market analysis and Mr. Woods’ ratio of tax to price analysis (Decision, pp. 12-14) leads the Commission to conclude that the Hearing Officer properly applied rules of evidence in sustaining the objections of Counsel for Respondent relative to Complainants’ proffered exhibits.

Complainants failed to set forth any legal claim or basis as a ground to find the Hearing Officer had abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. In other words, Complainants failed to state specific grounds upon which it was claimed the decision was erroneous. In the absence of specific facts of error or specific errors in applying the law, the Application for Review must be summarily denied.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determination as to fair market value.

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED February 10, 2005.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Bruce E. Davis, Chairman

Sam D. Leake, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner