JOYCE KELLY,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-32575
	)
SCOTT SHIPMAN, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 set at $79,720, assessed value of $15,150.

Complainant appeared pro se.

Respondent represented by Counsel, Charissa Mayes, Assistant County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainant appeals the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $79,720 (assessed value of $15,150, as residential property). Complainant did not proposed a value on the Complaint for Review of Assessment. Evidentiary hearing was set for February 3, 2004, at the St. Charles County Administration Building, St. Charles, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant did not appear at the evidentiary hearing due to illness and road conditions in her neighborhood. She was contacted by phone on the morning of February 3, 2004, and advised that the Hearing Officer would permit her to submit the case on documents to be mailed to the Commission. Ms. Kelly was also advised that an Order would be issued setting forth that the case would be submitted on her documents and the appraisal report offered by Respondent. An Order to that effect was issued by the Hearing Officer on February 5, 2004, giving Complainant until and including February 13, 2004, to mail the documents which wished the Hearing Officer to consider in rendering a decision on the fair market value of the subject property.

Complainant submitted the following documents by mail on February 13, 2004, which the Hearing Officer marked as exhibits for the purpose of identification. Said Exhibits are received into evidence.

Exhibit A Three (3) handwritten 3 x 5 note pads setting forth the basis for Complainant=s appeal and explaining what is depicted in the photographs contained in Exhibit D.

Exhibit B A copy of a document showing a listing of condominium units sold in Forest Hills from January 2003 to January 2004.

Exhibit C A copy of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization Decision Letter, with handwritten notes by Complainant giving the taxes on her property for 2001, 2002 and 2003.

Exhibit D Seven (7) photographs of the subject property showing the following conditions relative to Complainant=s property:

(1) water standing on the subject patio/porch;

(2) water standing, water damage and drywall deterioration in subject garage;

(3) photographs of the exterior of the garages in the subject development.

Discussion as to relevance and weight to be given each exhibits is set forth in DECISION, infra.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Steven D. Riney, appraiser for St. Charles County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Riney was received into evidence. Mr. Riney arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $83,500 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of five properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property. Mr. Riney also submitted a cost approach analysis which established a value of $79,720 for the subject property.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Charles County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 802 King Drive, St. Charles, Missouri. It is identified by map number 6-010D-6350-31-1B and parcel number A89000006. The property is further identified a Forest Hills Condos Phase 1, Stage 5, Building 31 Unit 1B, First Floor. The property consists of a one-story brick and frame lower unit condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1987. The condo has three rooms, with one bedroom and one bath, with 940 square feet of living area. There is an open porch and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be less than $79,720.

5. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within the subject condominium development. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. Each sale property was similar to the subject in location, quality of construction, age, condition, type of exterior walls, design and appeal, living area, room count and other amenities.

6. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (815 King Dr. - same building as subject) sold in July 2002 for $83,000. This property consists a one-story brick and frame upper level condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1987. The condo has three rooms, with one bedroom and one bath, with 932 square feet of living area. There is a deck and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

Comparable 2 (111 King Dr. - 1 block from subject) sold in November 2002 for $85,000. This property consists of a one-story brick and frame lower level condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1986. The condo has four rooms, with one bedroom and two baths, with 970 square feet of living area. There is a deck and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

Comparable 3 (1013 King Dr. - 1 block from subject) sold in October 2002 for $84,900. This property consists of a one-story brick and frame upper level condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1987. The condo has four rooms, with two bedrooms and one bath, with 932 square feet of living area. There is a deck and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

Comparable 4 (1104 King Dr. - 1 block from subject) sold in May 2002 for $84,000. This property consists of a one-story brick and frame lower level condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1986. The condo has four rooms, with two bedroom and two baths, with 982 square feet of living area. There is a porch and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

Comparable 5 (804 King Dr. - same building as subject) sold in for $. This property consists of a one-story brick and frame lower level condominium with a slab foundation, asphalt shingles, gabled roof, carpet and vinyl flooring, built in 1987. The condo has three rooms, with one bedroom and one bath, with 932 square feet of living area. There is a porch and a one-car garage ancillary to the condo.

7. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. Due to the fact that the sale properties were virtually identical to the subject, the appraiser was only required to adjust for date of sale, bathroom count on two properties and the existence of a fireplace in one comparable. The adjustments were reasonable and appropriate to account for the differences between subject and comparables.

8. No adjustments was made to Comparable 1. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to -$2,010 or 2.4% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to +$980 or 1.2% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 4 amounted to +$1,880 or 2.3% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 5 amounted to +$6,270 or 8.1% of the sales price.

9. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $83,000, $82,990, $85,880, $85,880 and $84,170, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $83,500 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $88.83 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $89.06, $87.63, $91.09, $85.54 and $83,58.

10. Respondent=s evidence met the standard of clear and convincing to sustain the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $79,720, as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary. Exhibit 1, p. 4.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $79,720, appraised value, Respondent=s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1) The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof. As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

(a) Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used. Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.

Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved. It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence. Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974). The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167. AFor evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder=s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.@ Matter of O=Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

In order to prevail, Complainant must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

In any case in St. Charles County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor=s or board=s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal. Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

The Complainant as the moving party has the burden to present substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the value proposed as the fair market value. The exhibits which were received into evidence on behalf of Complainant fail to establish a fair market value less than the $79,720 originally set by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization.

Exhibit A is the handwritten statement of Ms. Kelly on her property. Ms. Kelly asserts four basic condition problems relative to her condo unit. These are (1) water problems relative standing water on her unit=s patio and porch; (2) possible deterioration under ground; (3) water problems with garages due to runoff of water and possible contamination in garages; and (4) existence of dumpster (located at end of row of garages) and wooded areas behind garages not being maintained and ridded of rodents.

Ms. Kelly did not provide any bids or estimates of repair relative to addressing the matter of standing water on the patio/porch. Nor were any estimates or documentation provided which would confirm that there was any underground damage or settlement that was impacting the building in which her unit is located. The water problems with the garages which service Ms. Kelly=s unit, as well as other units in her building or adjoining buildings on King Drive, were also not substantiated as to any cost to repair estimates. The matters of the location of the dumpster and the wooded area would impact on all other units in the subject building, as well as units located in the building that is located next to the subject building.

As to the problem of standing water at the subject unit, the Hearing Officer notes that Mr. Riney utilized the sales of three other first floor units on King Drive. A review of the photographs in Mr. Riney=s appraisal of these three comparables shows that each has the same type of patio/porch as the subject. Each such patio/porch is a slab on the ground just like the subject. It is reasonable that these properties would also experience from time to time some standing water on their patios. Therefore, they essentially have the same general condition issue as the subject.

The handwritten statement of Ms. Kelly does not provide an opinion of value by the owner. Nor did Ms. Kelly put down an opinion of the fair market value of her property on her Complaint for Review of Assessment. Therefore, the Hearing Officer does not even have an owner=s opinion of value upon which to base a decision, let alone any documentation which will give support to an opinion of value. The condition problems which Ms. Kelly addresses in Exhibit A are factors affecting value, however, without some opinion of value and some information as to costs of repairs or cost to remedy the condition problems there is simply no basis upon which a decision can be made to lower the fair market value below $79,720.

Exhibit A failed to provide an owner=s opinion of value supported by proper elements and a proper foundation. Accordingly, no probative value can be accorded it in order to arrive at a fair market value of less than $79,720.

The listing of sales during 2003 presented by Ms. Kelly show two sales, which are underlined in red, on King Drive of one bedroom, one bathroom units like her condo. No other address is given for these two units. One was listed for $83,900 and sold for that amount after being on the market for 66 days. The other unit was listed for $85,000 and sold for that amount after being on the market for 49 days. The unit at 1002 King Drive, which is a one bedroom, one bathroom unit was shown with a list price of $82,900.

No explanation was provided by Ms. Kelly for this exhibit. However, the most that can be said for utilization of the sales and listing data on this exhibit is that as to these three properties they simply support an unadjusted value for the subject condo from $82,900 to $85,000. The only adjustment which would be required would be for a time of sale, which would be a slight negative adjustment to adjust the sale price back to the date of January 1, 2003, from the date of sale. Since no dates of sale are provided the Hearing Office is unable to make any such adjustment.

Exhibit B is given some weight to support the utilization of the sales occurring in 2001 and 2002 by Mr. Riney in his appraisal and to establish that condo units like the subject are selling in a range above the $79,720 value established by the Assessor.

Exhibit C is actually a part of the record in this appeal since it is the BOE Decision letter. However, the handwritten notes relative to the real estate taxes on the subject property for 2001, 2002 and 2003 are not a part of the Decision letter as filed with the Commission with Complainant=s Complaint for Review of Assessment. The amount of taxes on a given property either in the year for which the appeal is filed or for other tax years is not relevant to the issue of fair market value.

The issue before the Commission in an appeal on overvaluation is simply the fair market value of the property under appeal. The amount of taxes or the amount that the taxes may have increased over the past 1, 2 or more years is not relevant. Real estate taxes are simply the function of the tax levy as set the taxing jurisdiction applied to the assessed value of the property. The assessed value of residential real property is determined by taking 19% times the fair market value. This establishes the assessed value. In the present case, the assessed value of Ms. Kelly=s property for 2003 is $15,150 ($79,720 x .19 = 15,146,80, rounded to $15,150). The assessed value is then divided by 100, because the tax levy in all counties in Missouri is on every $100 of assessed valuation. In the case of Ms. Kelly=s property this establishes a base of 151.50 to which the tax levy is applied to arrive at the amount of taxes due. The amount of taxes can change without any change in the fair market value of the property because the tax levy may be increased even when the fair market value of the property remains the same.

Exhibit C simply does not provide any information that would support a finding of fair market value of less than $79,720.

The photographs in Exhibit D are certainly helpful to the extend that they demonstrate the condition problems which Ms. Kelly addressed in Exhibit A. However, photographs do not by themselves establish fair market value. In point of fact, they do not provide a basis upon which a valuation can be made to a property. Photographs may assist the appraiser in making some adjustment if he feels it is warranted. Of course, a personal inspection of the property is always preferred by the appraiser. It is understood that Ms. Kelly permitted the appraiser to inspect the property in this instance to be aware of the condition issues.

Exhibit D does not have any probative value as to setting the fair market value of the subject property at less than $79,720.

The failure of Complainant to present an owner=s opinion of value substantiated and supported by a recognized methodology of appraisal valuation provides no basis for a reduction in the value of the subject property for that determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization.

The evidence presented by the Respondent=s appraiser constituted clear and convincing evidence that in an arms length transaction for the sale and purchase of this property on January 1, 2003 buyer and seller could be expected to agree on a price of at least $79,720. Mr. Riney had sales data which clearly establishes that condo units virtually identical to the subject sold in a range of $77,900 (October, 2001) to $85,000 (November 2002). The two sales which occurred within three months of tax date, after adjustment, reflected values of $82,990 and $85,880.

The evidence on this record supports a determination that the fair market value of the subject condominium as of January 1, 2003, was at least $79,720.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Charles County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $15,150.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Charles County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section

139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED February 27, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

On February 27, 2004, Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessment by the St. Charles County Board of Equalization, which had sustained the Assessor=s valuation of the subject property.

Complainant wrote to the Commission on March 27, 2004, advising she would like to continue her appeal. By Order of the Chief Counsel dated March 31, 2004, Complainant was given until and including April 16, 2004, to submit in writing specific reasons as to why she felt the Hearing Officer=s Decision was in error and should be reversed or modified. By letter dated April 16, 2004, Complainant reviewed the information and material which she had previously provided to the Hearing Officer.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer=s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com=n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

A review of the Decision clearly shows that the Hearing Officer took into account each of the exhibits presented by Complainant. The Hearing Officer went into great detail addressing each of the exhibits and setting forth why a valuation of the property could not be arrived at simply from the exhibits. See, Decision, pp. 13-17. Specifically, Exhibit B offered by Complainant clearly established that condo=s like her=s were selling for $82,900 to $85,000.

The more serious flaw in Complainant=s case was the simple fact that she never provided an opinion of value for her property. No opinion of value was given in the Complaint for Review of Assessment and none was provided in any of the various exhibits which she offered. In short, Complainant=s own evidence showed properties in the subject development selling for approximately $3,000 to $5,000 more than the subject.

Complainant=s letter (April 16, 2004) setting forth her Application for Review was essentially an arguing of the conclusions reached by the Hearing Officer. Complainant failed to set forth any legal claim or basis as a ground to find the Hearing Officer had abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. In other words, Complainant failed to state specific grounds upon which it was claimed the decision was erroneous. In the absence of specific facts of error or specific errors in applying the law, the Application for Review must be summarily denied.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations as challenged by Complainant.

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED May 4, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner

Jennifer Tidwell, Commissioner