C. HARVEY & DONNA KASSEBAUM,	)
	)
Complainants,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-12105
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 set at $197,300, assessed value of $37,490.

Complainant, Donna Kassebaum, appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $197,300 (assessed value of $37,490, as residential property). Complainant proposed a value of $169,000 (assessed value of $32,110) on the Complaint for Review of Assessment.

Case was called for hearing on May 18, 2004, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri. Ms. Kassebaum was not prepared to take up the case and agreed to submit it on documents to be filed by June 1.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainants offered into evidence a series of documents which the Hearing Officer has marked as exhibits for the purpose of identification. Each exhibit is discussed infra, under the DECISION portion of this Decision and Order. Complainant also submitted a letter (received June 15, 2004) along with a copy of a letter dated June 9, 2004 to the Hearing Officer from Counsel for Respondent, with commentary on photographs previously submitted by Complainant, and further photographs addressing the traffic flow on the subject street.

Respondent placed into evidence the Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Arthur R. Froeckmann, Missouri State Certified Residential Real Estate Appraiser. The appraiser arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $227,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. Case was set for evidentiary hearing by Order dated April 30, 2004, for May 18, 2004. Parties had previously been advised in an earlier Order (January 13, 2004) to be prepared to present their case at the evidentiary hearing and to bring two copies of exhibits to the evidentiary hearing, one copy for he Commission and one copy for the opposing party. At the time case was called for evidentiary hearing, Ms. Kassebaum was not prepared with her exhibits and was not prepared to move forward with the appeal. The Hearing Officer suggested that if Ms. Kassebaum desired to waive the evidentiary hearing she would be permitted to submit documents and a written statement in support of her opinion of value of $169,000 and that the Respondent=s appraisal (which had all ready been provided to Complainant prior to the case being called for hearing) would also be received on behalf of Respondent. Ms. Kassebaum agreed to this and Ms. Lemerman agreed to this on behalf of Respondent. Hearing Officer issued an Order on May 19, 2004 to this effect.

3. The subject property is located at 609 East Essex, Kirkwood, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 23 M 610585. The property consists of .29 of an acre lot improved by a one-story single-family structure of average quality construction. The house was built in 1942 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has a total of eight rooms, which includes three bedrooms, two full and one half baths, and contains 1838 square feet of living area, which includes a finished attic area. There is a 1300 square foot basement with 470 square feet of finished area. The house has a small open front porch, an enclosed frame rear porch, paved walkways, a single-wide paved driveway and an attached oversize one car garage. There was no listing or sale of the property noted within three years prior to the tax date of January 1, 2003. There is no apparent evidence of any significant deferred maintenance or structural problems. Exhibit 1, p. 5.

4. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

5. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $169,000, as proposed.

6. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within one mile of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability. Exhibit 1, pp. 6-9.

7. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (442 E. Essex Ave. - 3/10 of a mile West on the subject street) sold in March 2002 for $235,000. This property consists of a .19 of an acre lot improved by a one-story brick single-family structure of average quality construction. The house was built in 1951 and appears to be in good condition. The residence has a total of 7 rooms, which includes 4 bedrooms, 2 full baths, and contains 1,638 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has 1,160 square feet of recreation area. There is an attached one-car garage.

Comparable 2 (701 Club Lane - 5/10 of a mile Northwest of the subject) sold in January 2002 for $230,000. This property consists of a .21 of an acre lot improved by a one-story brick single-family structure of average quality construction. The house was built in 1948 and appears to be in good condition. The residence has a total of 9 rooms, which includes 3 bedrooms, 2 full baths, and contains 1,655 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has 720 square feet of recreation area. There is an attached one-car garage.

Comparable 3 (433 Bogey Lane - 4/10 of a mile Northwest of the subject) sold in December 2002 for $219,000. This property consists of a .18 of an acre lot improved by a one-story brick single-family structure of average quality construction. The house was built in 1941 and appears to be in good condition. The residence has a total of 8 rooms, which includes 4 bedrooms, 2 full baths, and contains 1,924 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has 1,002 square feet of recreation area. There is an attached one-car garage.

8. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments appear to be appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem. Exhibit 1, p. 8.

9. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$3,100 or 1.3% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to -$3,200 or 1.4% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to +$8,400 or 3.8% of the sales price. Exhibit 1, p. 8.

10. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $231,900, $226,800 and $227,400, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $227,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $123.50 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $143.47, $138.97 and $113.83. Exhibit 1, p. 8.

11. Respondent=s evidence met a standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal, under the provisions of Section 137.115, RSMo, to sustain the original valuation of $197,300, presumed to have been made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization.

12. Respondent=s appraisal was accepted only to sustain the original assessment made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1, p. 3.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $197,300, appraised value, Respondent=s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1) The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof. As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

(a) Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used. Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.

Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved. It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence. Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974). The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167. AFor evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder=s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.@ Matter of O=Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor=s or board=s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal. Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

The evidence presented by Complainants in the form of the documents which are described and discussed below did not constitute substantial and persuasive evidence of the fair market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. The documents submitted do not establish a valuation that is based upon any recognized approach to the appraisal of real property that is recognized by either the Courts of this state or the Commission. There is, in short, nothing to be drawn from the Complainants= exhibits whereby it is possible to determine the basis and foundation for the opinion of value proffered in the Complaint for Review of Assessment. The opinion of value offered was not demonstrated to be based upon proper elements and a proper foundation. Therefore, it has no probative value in the present case.

The documents offered into evidence by Complainants were marked for purposes of identification by the Hearing Officer. They are discussed below as to their lack of relevance and persuasive impact on the issue of fair market value in this appeal. Individually or collectively the Complainants= exhibits do not present any sort of methodology whereby it is possible to determine how their opinion of value was established. Nor do the exhibits, individually or collectively address the issue of the fair market value of the property at 609 E. Essex.

Exhibit A has no relevance in the present appeal. There is no dispute that the Assessor set the value for 2003 at $197,300, based upon the computer assisted comparable sales mass appraisal method. The amount of increase from the 2001 assessment cycle shown on the notice is likewise irrelevant, since there is no presumption under law that either valuation was correct. There is nothing in this exhibit that addresses the only issue which Complainants must address, i.e. fair market value of the property under appeal as of January 1, 2003.

Exhibit B has no relevance in the present appeal. The document shows that on 3/20/03 at 12:45 p.m., a member of the Assessor=s staff was at 609 E. Essex Avenue for the purpose of inspecting the property since there had been an increase in its valuation since 2001 of more than 15%. This is not at issue in this appeal.

Exhibit C has no relevance in the present appeal. This document lists the assessed values for the property under appeal for the years 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. It also lists the tax rate and the amount of taxes. Neither the tax rate or the amount of taxes for any given year have anything to do with what the fair market value of the subject property in any given year was. Likewise, the assessed values set for prior tax years, is not probative on the fair market value for tax year 2003, which is the only issue pending before the Commission.

Exhibit D has no relevance in the present appeal. The only issue is fair market value of the subject property. Exhibit D only shows the assessment data on the subject property. No issue was raised in the appeal to which this record from the Assessor=s files would be relevant. Property Record Cards (PRC) on the property under appeal are often offered and received into evidence. However, unless there is some material issue which can be addressed by the PRC they are generally of no probative value. Such is the case in this instance.

Exhibit E consists of a series of nineteen photographs on four pages. These photographs have notes of explanation under each photograph. The sixteen photographs are presented to depict traffic flow at the intersection of Dickson and East Essex. The remaining three photographs show the intersection at Longview and Club Lane (location near Respondent=s Comparable 2).

Ms. Kassebaum, in her written statement (Exhibit Y) discusses at length traffic flow on the subject street. The issue of traffic flow has some level of relevance in the appeal. However, this is an issue that Complainant has raised. Respondent=s appraiser considered each of the comparables which he utilized to be in similar locations as the subject. Mr. Froeckmann made no specific adjustment for traffic flow apparently not considering an adjustment to be warranted. There is no evidence from which the Hearing Officer is persuaded that any adjustment need be made for this factor.

The Complainant having raised the issue bears the burden of moving forward and presenting substantial and persuasive evidence as to how the issue of traffic flow might impact, if it does, the value of the subject property. See, Westwood, Daly & Reeves, supra. Simply putting forth an opinion that there is a different flow of traffic at one intersection than another is not sufficient. The owner=s opinion on this point does not rebut or even call into question the conclusion reached by Respondent=s appraiser. It only voices an unsupported opinion. Complainant=s opinion and photographs do not establish if in fact the market would recognized this factor.

If the market would, in fact, recognize the alleged higher traffic flow on Essex, Complainant=s evidence completely fails to establish to what extend the factor would be so recognized. In other words, there is no way in which determine from the photographs whether this element would reduce the value of the subject property of $10 or $1000. Accordingly, the photographs and Ms. Kassebaum=s written statement on the matter do not possess sufficient information to establish a foundation to support the relevance of these photographs, beyond simply providing a view of the subject street.

Exhibit F possesses very limited relevance. The documents contained in this Exhibit provide basic information from two real estate listings and three photographs of the property at 433 Bogey Lane. This property was Comparable 3 in Respondent=s appraisal. The fundamental facts relative to the sale of this property are contained in Mr. Froeckmann=s appraisal. There is nothing in Exhibit F from which once can conclude that this was not an appropriate property to be used as a sale comparable.

In point of fact, Exhibit F only provides substantiation that this was an appropriate property to be used in appraising the subject. There is no information in Exhibit F from which the Hearing Officer and reasonably and logically conclude that based upon this sale that the fair market value of the subject property should only be $169,000, as advocated by Complainants.

Exhibits G, H, I & J consist of the PRC=s on the property at 433 Bogey Lane for tax years, 2003, 2002, 2001 and 2000, respectively. They have no relevance as to the fair market of the subject property on January 1, 2003. The appraised or assessed values on the Bogey Lane property for the four years given are not at issue in this appeal. There is nothing in these documents which support the opinion of value on the subject property offered by Complainants.

As discussed above concerning Exhibit F, Exhibit K has no real probative benefit or value to support the Complainants= point of view that the fair market value of their property as of January 1, 2003 should be only $169,000. Here again, like Exhibit F, Exhibit K only provides substantiation of basic information which supports the use of this sale as a comparable property for the appraisal of the Complainants= property.

Exhibits L, M & N consist of the PRC=s on the property at 422 E. Essex for tax years 2003, 2001 and 1999, respectively. As addressed in relation to Exhibits G, H, I & J, Exhibits L, M & N suffer from the same lack of probative value on the issue of fair market value of Complainants= property. They have no relevance as to the fair market of the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Exhibit O - Real Estate Listing Information on 701 Club Lane

Exhibit O is real estate listing information on the property used in Mr. Froeckmann=s appraisal for his comparable sale 2. As with Exhibits F & K, Exhibit O has no real probative benefit. It does not establish the fair market value of the subject to be $169,000. Nor does this Exhibit demonstrate that this was not a proper comparable.

Exhibits P, Q and R consist of the PRC=s on Respondent=s Comparable 3 for tax years 2003, 2001 and 1999, respectively. Their lack of any probative value has been previously addressed above in reference to Exhibits G, H, I, J, L, M & N. Like those prior PRC=s these have no relevance to advance Complainants= position as to fair market value.

Exhibit S consists of the PRC and a photograph of the property at 621 E. Essex. This property is reported to be on the same side of the street and next door to the Complainant=s house. Complainant in a note attached to these documents questions as to why the valuation of this property wend down from the 2001 assessment cycle to the 2003 cycle, while the subject property=s value was increased. The Hearing Officer=s simple answer based upon his knowledge and experience of more than twelve years of hearing appeals form St. Louis County is that the computer-assisted sales comparison method made the change for both properties.

Since there is no presumption that the Assessor=s valuations on the 621 E. Essex property for 2001 or 2003 are correct, the PRC has no probative value to establish the fair market value of the subject property. There is no recent sale of this property which could be used in an appraisal. It appears, Complainant is attempting to make some type of comparative assessment argument with this Exhibit. As has been stated time and time again, in decision after decision, comparative assessment is not a methodology for appraisal of real estate that is recognized in the appraisal field, by the Courts of this state, or by the Commission.

A comparative assessment has no probative value in an appeal before the Commission. It does not establish fair market value. Exhibit S is not relevant in this appeal.

Exhibit T consists of a document which gives the assessed value on the property at 603 Essex for 2002 and 2003 and the tax rates and total taxes for those two years on the property. Exhibit T, like Exhibit S, has no probative value in this appeal. Complainant is demonstrating that the computer assisted appraisal system reduced the appraised value of the 603 property. As addressed above concerning Exhibit S, this comparative assessment argument does not establish fair market value.

Exhibits U & V consist of a summary document showing the assessed values, tax rates and tax amount for 2001, 2002 and 2003 on the property at 613 Essex (Exhibit U), as well as the PRC on the property for tax years 2002 (Exhibit U) and 2003 (Exhibit V), and a photograph of this home (Exhibit V). As previously discussed above (Exhibits S & T) this is another attempt to make a comparative assessment argument. It is neither persuasive, nor relevant.

Exhibit W consists of the following documents on the property under appeal: copies of 1989 tax bill and payment, 1992 tax bill, 1993 tax bill, 1995 tax bill, 1995 Change of Assessment Notice, 2000 tax bill, 2001 tax bill and payment, and 2003 tax bill. These documents have no probative value on the issue of the fair market value of the subject property. They neither prove the value advocated by Complainants. Nor do they disprove the value determined by the Assessor. They are irrelevant in this appeal.

Exhibit X provides an interior view of one of the bathrooms, the living room and a bedroom on the first floor in the subject house. The photographs show the particular rooms photographed, however, there is nothing further that helps to establish value. While photographs of the interior and exterior of homes being appealed to the Commission are relevant, their overall impact as to probative benefit to establish fair market value is very limited. In the present case, the photographs demonstrate what the particular rooms look like. They do not demonstrate that the home should be valued at only $169,000, nor do they show that the valuation made by Mr. Froeckmann is not properly established under his sales comparison approach.

Exhibit Y is a handwritten statement prepared by Ms. Kassebaum. The exhibit contains her discussion relative to various matters. Included in the discussion is the matter of traffic flow on Essex and Club Lane, the size of bedrooms in the subject house, the general floor plan of the house, its overall condition, and the comparable properties used by Mr. Froeckmann. However,

there is absolutely nothing in Ms. Kassebaum=s statement that provides a single bit of information as to how she arrived at the proposed fair market value of $169,000.

There is nothing in the form of any actual sales information of comparable homes that would establish that homes of similar age, living area, style, and condition, in the subject neighborhood were selling during 2001 and 2002 for prices reflective of the $169,000 value being advocated. There is no sales data to establish that homes comparable to the subject were selling for approximately $92 per square foot of living area, the value as proposed by Ms. Kassebaum. The only sales statistics in this record (Exhibit 1) establish that homes like the subject were selling for values from $113.83 to $143.47 per square foot of living area. After adjustments for differences between the sale properties and the subject, these sales indicate a per square foot value range for the subject from $123.40 to $126.17, with an average of $124.43.

The letter submitted by Ms. Kassebaum on June 15, 2004, along with the various attachments was reviewed by the Hearing Officer. Nothing contained therein constitutes substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the fair market value of the subject property. Complainant=s assertions and arguments relating to traffic flow have been sufficiently addressed in Exhibit E - Photographs, supra.

Complainants= evidence, on the whole, lacks the essential qualities of being either substantial or persuasive on the issue of fair market value. The collection of exhibits put forth by Complainants falls far short of offering to the Hearing Officer any semblance of evidence which could be considered relevant to establishing what a willing buyer and seller would have agreed to as the purchase price for the property at 609 E. Essex on January 1, 2003. Complainants did not meet their burden of proof to establish the value proposed.

Respondent presented clear and convincing evidence to establish a fair market value as of January 1, 2003 to be $197,300 for the property under appeal. Respondent=s appraiser developed an opinion of value relying upon an established and recognized approach for the valuation of real property, the sales comparison or market approach. The sales comparison approach is generally recognized to be the most reliable methodology to be utilized in the valuation of single-family residences.

The adjustments made the Mr. Froeckmann were consistent with generally accepted guidelines for the appraisal of property of the subject=s type. The adjustments properly accounted for the various differences between the subject and each comparable. The net adjustments to the sale properties fell within a very narrow range from 1.3% to 3.8%. Even the gross adjustments were in a very acceptable range from 4.7% to 8%.

The total adjustments required to be made to account for differences between the comparables and the subject ranged from only six adjustments to Comparable 3 to only eight adjustments to Comparable 1. The major adjustment to Comparables 1 and 2 was for generally superior condition due to some updating in these homes. The three comparables presented were in a very close range of living area size to the subject. Comparable 3 was only 86 square feet larger than the subject in living area. Comparable 1 was only 200 square feet smaller in living area than the subject. All of the comparable houses were very similar in age to the subject, all being within one to nine years of the Complainants= home.

The comparable sales established that homes very similar to the subject were selling in the year prior to the 2003 tax date in a range of $113.83 to $143.47 per square foot of living area, with an average of $132.09. Respondent=s appraisal clearly and convincingly establishes a per square foot value of $123.50. The true value in money originally established by the Assessor and sustained by this Decision and Order is a per square foot value of $107.35. There is no evidence on this record which would establish a value only $169,000 or only $91.95 per square foot of living area, as proposed by Complainant.

Complainants failed to met their burden of proof on the issue of the fair market value of the subject property. No relevant evidence of value was forthcoming from Complainants to establish a fair market value of only $169,000. Respondent met his burden of proof to present clear and convincing evidence to sustain the value of $197,300. Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Equalization sustaining the Assessor=s original valuation must be affirmed.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $37,490.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED June 18, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor, Hearing Officer