FRANK HOLZUM,	)
	)
Complainant,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-10165
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization reducing the assessment made by the Assessor, SET ASIDE, Hearing Officer finds true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 to be $425,000, assessed value of $80,750.

Complainant and his wife Donna J. Holzum appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which reduced the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $427,500 (assessed value of $81,230, as residential property). The Board reduced the value to $398,000 (assessed value of $75,620). Complainant proposed a value of $360,000 (assessed value of $68,400). A hearing was conducted on May 6, 2004, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainants both testified at the evidentiary hearing. The following exhibits were offered into evidence by Complainants.

Exhibit A, A valuation statement consisting of copies of three handwritten letters written by Complainants which set out their arguments on the issue of fair market value. Also including in Exhibit A is a copy of the BOE decision of June 13, 2003.

Exhibit B, A copy of the May 15, 2001 Change of Assessment Notice which shows an increase in assessed value from $64,600 in 2001 to $77,300 in 2003 or a 19.7% increase in assessed value.

Exhibit C, A copy of a single page from a December 7, 1992 appraisal report on the subject property showing an indicated value of $345,000 and the living area for the subject house of 3,769.

Exhibit D, A copy of the settlement statement on the purchase of the subject property in July, 1993 at a value of $353,800, with a handwritten note indicating purchase price of $312,000. There is a duplicate copy of the settlement statement, without the handwritten note, that is a part of this exhibit.

Exhibits A and B were received into evidence. Counsel for Respondent objected to Exhibits C and D, on the grounds of hearsay and relevancy. Objections were sustained and Exhibits C and D were excluded from evidence.

Mr. Holzum offered his opinion of value for the subject to be $360,000 based upon the arguments put forth in Exhibit A.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Craig Whyman, appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Whyman was received into evidence. Mr. Whyman arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $425,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 602 Princeton Gate, Chesterfield, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 21S240537. The property consists of .57 of an acre lot improved by a one and a half story masonry and frame single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1993 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has a total of ten rooms, which includes four bedrooms, three and a half baths, and contains 3,823 square feet of living area. There is a full basement with no finish and an attached three-car garage. The subject property is on the corner of Clayton Road and also adjoins a nursing home in the back. Exhibit 1, p.5; Testimony of Complainants.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $360,000.

5. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within a quarter mile of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability. Exhibit 1, pp. 5-8.

6. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (609 Princeton Gate - next door to the subject) sold in July 2002 for $455,000. This property consists of a .45 of an acre lot improved by a one and a half story masonry and frame single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1990 and appears to be in above average condition. The residence has a total of ten rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two full and two half baths, and contains 3,775 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has lower level finish and a full bath. There is an attached three-car garage. This property adjoins a nursing home in the back. The home was painted and new carpeting added prior to its sale date.

Comparable 2 (542 Claymont Place Drive - a quarter of a mile East of the subject) sold in April 2002 for $447,000. This property consists of a .39 of an acre lot improved by a one and a half story frame, vinyl sided single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1998 and appears to be in above average condition. The residence has a total of nine rooms, which includes four bedrooms, three and a half baths, and contains 4,204 square feet of living area. There is a full basement with no finish. There is an attached three-car garage.

Comparable 3 (549 Claymont Place Dr. - a quarter of a mile East of the subject) sold in September 2001 for $475,000. This property consists of a .38 of an acre lot improved by a two-story masonry and frame single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 2000 and appears to be in good condition. The residence has a total of ten rooms, which includes four bedrooms, three and a half baths, and contains 3,729 square feet of living area. There is a full basement. There is an attached three-car garage.

7. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments appear to be appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem. An adjustment was made to all three comparables to account for the inferior traffic location of the subject. An adjustment was made to Comparables 2 and 3 to account for the subject backing up to a nursing home.

8. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$28,500 or 6.3% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to -$34,800 or 7.8% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to -$47,000 or 9.9% of the sales price.

9. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $426,500, $412,200 and $428,000, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $425,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $111.17 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $120.53, $106.33 and $127.38.

10. Respondent did not have to meet a standard of clear, convincing and cogent evidence in this appeal, under the provisions of Section 137.115, RSMo, as he was not seeking to sustain the original valuation presumed to have been made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program.

11. Respondent=s evidence met the standard of substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization and establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $425,000.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

The presumption in favor of the Board is not evidence. A presumption simply accepts something as true without any substantial proof to the contrary. In an evidentiary hearing before the Commission, the valuation determined by the Board, even if simply to sustain the value made by the Assessor (which is not presumed to be correct), is accepted as true only until and so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

Respondent, when advocating a value different from that determined by the original valuation or a valuation made by the Board of Equalization, must meet the same burden of proof to present substantial and persuasive evidence of the value advocated as required of the Complainant under the principles established by case law. Hermel, Cupples-Hesse, Brooks, supra.

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

Evidence of the actual sales price of property is admissible to establish value at the time of an assessment, provided that such evidence involves a voluntary purchase not too remote in time. The actual sale price is a method that may be considered for estimating true value. The actual sales price, between a willing seller who is not obligated to sell and a willing buyer who is not compelled to buy, establishes an outer limit on the value of real property. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526 (App. E.D. 1993).

Complainants set out a number of items in three different letters submitted during their appeal process before the Board of Equalization and the Commission (Exhibit A). The Hearing Officer has reviewed all of the arguments put forth in these letters. None of them rest upon any recognized and accepted methodology of appraisal practice. None of the various arguments individually or collectively provide a substantial and persuasive basis upon which a value of $360,000 can be concluded.

Complainants= opinion of value was not demonstrated to be based upon proper elements or a proper foundation. Without so establishing proper appraisal elements and a proper appraisal foundation there is no probative value in the owner=s opinion. Accordingly, Complainants failed to satisfy their burden of proof to establish value. The arguments which Complainants put forth will be addressed individually.

Complainants assert an error in the square footage of living space for the subject house. Apparently the property record card at some point had shown 4,358 square feet. However, the appraisal of Mr. Whyman based upon a remeasurement of the subject house provided a living area square footage of 3,823. Complainants asserted 3,769 as the square footage area. The difference in 54 square feet is di minimis for purposes of the Whyman appraisal. In any event, the difference in square footage does not establish the value presented by Complainants, as there is no evidence from which market value can be derived based on a dispute in the living area.

Since the appraiser did not use 4,358 square feet of living area in his appraisal this issue has been rendered moot.

This argument has reference to certain representations apparently on the original survey of the property. What someone did or did not assert relative to the original survey is irrelevant for the valuation of the property in 2003. The asserted original survey information simply is not relevant for a 2003 valuation of the property. Mr. Whyman accounted for the fact that the subject, as a corner lot, is located on a busy street (Clayton Road) which carried more traffic than goes by the three comparables. He adjusted for it. Complainants presented no evidence which would rebut the adjustment made by Mr. Whyman or bring it into question as being improper.

The argument relating to a taking by MoDOT does not establish the fair market value of the subject property as it existed on January 1, 2003. Complainants agreed to a settlement for a 35 foot strip of the subject sideyard at $76,800. This information simply does not establish that the subject lot as improved on January 1, 2003, after the MoDOT taking, had a fair market value of only $360,000. There is simply no correlation made by Complainants from the $76,800 settlement upon which their proposed value can be derived. The MoDOT taking simply is irrelevant for the 2003 valuation.

Complainants raise the issue of their home being a one and a half story and not a two story house. Mr. Whyman valued the house as being a one and a half story home. Therefore, this argument is moot. It does not establish fair market value. Nor does it establish any error in the appraisal performed by Mr. Whyman.

Complainants argue that the increase in the value of their property from the 2001 to the 2003 assessment was 19.7% (See, Exhibit B). This fact is of no probative value in arriving at fair market value. It is irrelevant. It simply does not establish the fair market value of the subject property as of January 1, 2003 was $360,000 as claimed by Complainants. Contrary to the belief of many taxpayers, there is no statutory limit of a percentage increase which a property can go up from one assessment cycle to the next.

Any argument based upon the percentage of increase from one assessment cycle to the next is flawed from the beginning. Such an argument assumes that the appraised value from the prior cycle did in fact represent the fair market value for that assessment date. By statute no such assumption can be made, since there is no presumption the Assessor=s valuation is correct. Therefore, without establishing that the value for the prior assessment cycle was in fact the fair market value the percentage calculation means absolutely nothing as far as determining the fair market value for the following assessment cycle. Even if the prior appraised value was actually proven to accurately represent fair market value, the percentage of increase still does not establish that the appraised value for the following cycle should be lowered.

Complainants assert that there was some agreement with a representative of the Assessor=s office and Complainants at the hearing before the Board of Equalization to a value for the subject property of $380,000. The June 13, 2003 BOE Decision does establish that at the hearing before the Board the Assessor=s representative, Tom Hill, amended the value for the subject property to $380,000. However, the Board was not bound by that value. Offers of settlement are not evidence of value before the Commission, nor is the Commission bound by such adjustments to value or offers of settlement. The Board set the value at $398,000 based upon all of the information which it had at the hearing. It is obvious that it was persuaded that the reduction in value to $380,000 was not appropriate.

Nevertheless, what occurred at the Board hearing and what action the Board took in setting value is irrelevant in this appeal. Appeals before the Commission are de novo. That is the Commission is not reviewing either the original assessment, or the action of the Board. The Commission is starting with a clean slate. The Commission receives evidence on the issue of fair market value. Information relating to offers of settlement before the Board do not establish fair market value. Such information has absolutely no probative value, therefore no weight is given to it. Furthermore, the information provided by Complainants does not establish a fair market value of $360,000 as they have asserted. It would at best provide some support for a value of $380,000, however, the evidence on this record (Whyman Appraisal) rebuts any indication of value of $380,000 for the subject property.

This argument presented by Complainants is an expansion of their corner lot argument addressed above. Complainants assert that there should be a 12.5% discount off of their appraised value due to their property being a corner lot at Princeton Gate and Clayton Road and a nursing home being located behind the Complainant=s home. Here again, this asserted methodology is improper.

This argument is assuming that the Assessor=s original appraised value represents fair market value, but does not properly account for the subject=s location. Since it cannot be presumed that the Assessor=s appraised value is correct, it is necessary for the Complainants to utilize a proper appraisal approach to establish fair market value and in so doing account for any location adjustment that needs to be made. Mr. Whyman made a negative $20,000 adjustment for the fact that the subject is located on the corner of Clayton Road and Princeton Gate. He made a further negative $10,000 adjustment to the two comparables that did not have the nursing home influence on the properties. This properly accounted for these factors. This is the only relevant, and therefore only persuasive evidence, on the appropriate adjustment for the location issue.

Exhibit C was excluded because it is a hearsay document and it has no relevancy to the 2003 valuation of the property under appeal. The exhibit is one page of a Freddie Mac Form 70. On this page a cost approach to value of $345,000 and a sales comparison approach to value of $345,000 are determined. The appraisal date is December 7, 1992. The complete appraisal was not offered, nor was the appraiser who performed the appraisal present to testify. The document is simply too outdated to be of any relevance in determining fair market value. However, the document offers no substantial and persuasive evidence that the fair market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003 was only $360,000.

Complainants offered the document in part to establish the living area to be 3,769 square feet. As addressed above, this is a moot issue. Furthermore, the claim as to the square footage cannot be supported by a document that is more than 10 years old and for which the appraiser was not present to testify. The credible evidence on the record as to the square footage of living area is the testimony and appraisal of Mr. Whyman.

Taxpayers appearing before the Commission are advised that if they are going to have an appraisal report introduced into evidence, for whatever purpose, it will be necessary for the appraiser to be present to testify and be cross-examined. If the appraiser is not present at the Evidentiary Hearing, the appraisal report cannot be received into evidence. Property Tax Appeals Before The State Tax Commission, Revised April 1999, pp. 8-9. The Property Appeal pamphlet is provided to each taxpayer along with the instructions for completing and filing their Complaint for Review of Assessment.

Exhibit D, the settlement statement on the purchase of the subject property dated 7-30-93 was excluded from evidence on the grounds of relevancy. The 1993 purchase of the property by Complainants is too dated of a sale to have any probative value for the 2003 appeal of valuation. Furthermore, any other information on the 1993 Settlement Statement has no probative value for determining fair market value on January 1, 2003. The document is not signed by either the buyers or sellers. It is an incomplete settlement statement, as it only provides Summary of Borrowers Transaction and does not have the Summary of Seller=s Transaction. Furthermore, it provides no basis to establish the fair market value of the subject property to be only $360,000 in 2003, when in 1993 the property was purchased for $353,800.

Complainants assert that the contract sales price of $353,800 shown on Exhibit D was not the correct purchase price. Instead they assert that the purchase price was only $312,000, as written on the margin of one page of Exhibit D and as testified to during the Evidentiary Hearing. However, Exhibit A (letter of June 1, 2003) is in conflict with the assertion made both on Exhibit D and by Complainants= testimony. The June 1, 2003 letter asserts that Complainant=s paid $308,350 for the property. The conflict between Exhibit D, Exhibit A and the Complainants= testimony fails to establish the actual 1993 purchase price. A copy of the actual Certificate of Value which would be signed by either the Buyers or the Sellers or both, would have been sufficient to establish the actual purchase price in 1993. However, it would have still been irrelevant to the determination of the issue before the Hearing Officer.

It is the claim of Complainants that the lower price was paid because of the location of the subject property (corner lot and nursing home in the back). They assert that there was a deduction of $36,650 from the 1992 appraisal value because of the location of the property. This however is not supported by the appraisal document (Exhibit C). That document clearly shows that the appraiser had all ready made an adjustment to each sale comparable to account for the subject=s location and still arrived at a $345,000 value. To take an additional $36,650 would have been more than a double dip for the corner lot and nursing home influence. It is also noted that under the cost approach a 7% external depreciation adjustment was made to account for the subject=s location. Clearly, the appraised value ($345,000) determined in December 1992 had all ready made allowance for the external factors of the corner lot and nursing home. Therefore, the contract sale price of $353,800 in July 1993, would need no further adjustment for this.

Complainants go on to assert that the closing statement has a 12.5% deduction for Closing Cost Credits, which was deducted from the Gross Amount Due from Borrower of $359,992.25. The Settlement Statement does have a Closing Cost Credits item in the amount of $45,450. However there is nothing to indicate that this credit amount is for the subject=s location. In point of fact, 12.5% of $359,992.25 does not equal $45,450 ($359,992.25 x .125 = $44,999.03. Nor does 12.5% of the contract sales price of $353,800 equal $45,450 ($353,800 x .125 = $44,225). Exactly what the Closing Cost Credits were in 1993 is not demonstrated by the Settlement Statement. The testimony of Complainants notwithstanding, it has not been established that the Credits item had anything to do with a discount for the subject=s location.

In summary, Exhibit D simply does not establish any adjustment for the subject=s location. It does establish that the Contract Sales Price was $353,800 and the gross amount due from the Borrower (Complainants) was $359,992.25. It further establishes that the gross amount due from the Complainants was $359,992.25 and that the Complainants had already paid $145,162.72, leaving a balance due from Complainants of $214,829.53. Complainants were either misinformed or misunderstood the Closing Cost Credit item as it being a deduction for location. Irrespective of all of this, there is no information that has any relevance from the settlement statement for the issue presently before the Commission.

Complainants failed to meet their burden of proof. The evidence presented by Complainants was not substantial and persuasive to establish a fair market value of $360,000 as of January 1, 2003. There was not demonstrated an appropriate appraisal methodology upon which the Hearing Officer could properly make a finding of fair market value.

The evidence presented on behalf of the Respondent constituted substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the fair market value of the subject property to be $425,000. The appraisal report by Mr. Whyman arrived an opinion of value relying upon one of the three recognized approaches to the valuation of real property. The sales comparison or market approach to value provides a very good indicator of the value of a given property in the absence of the actual sale of the property at a time relevant, usually within a year or two of the tax date.

Mr. Whyman was able to utilize the sale of three properties which were within a quarter mile of the subject. One of the properties was on the subject=s street and had the same location influence from the nursing home at the back of the property as the subject. Mr. Whyman correctly recognized that the subject suffers from additional traffic that the three comparables does not. He accounted for this with an appropriate adjustment.

The range of gross adjustments required to account for the differences between the subject and the comparables was quite small, being from 6.9% to only 10.5%. The net adjustments fell within an even tighter range of only 6.3% to 9.9%. The cost per square foot indicated by Mr. Whyman=s opinion of value fell within the range of unadjusted per square foot sale values of the comparables and at the lower end of that range.

The appraisal presented on behalf of the Respondent was based upon very good and sufficient sales data with proper adjustments to establish a fair market value of the subject property by substantial and persuasive evidence of $425,000 as of January 1, 2003.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is SET ASIDE.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $80,750.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED May 14, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer