ELIZABETH & DONALD JACOBSMEYER,	)
	)
Complainants,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-10107
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 set at $300,000, assessed value of $57,000.

Complainant Donald J. Jacobsmeyer appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainants appeal, on the ground of overvaluation, the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $300,000 (assessed value of $57,000, as residential property). Complainant proposed a value of $264,000 (assessed value of $50,160). A hearing was conducted on April 27, 2004, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Mr. Jacobsmeyer testified in his own behalf. He stated an opinion of value of $264,000 for the subject property. This opinion of value was apparently based on the appraised value determined by the Assessor for the 2001 assessment cycle. Mr. Jacobsmeyer offered into evidence the following exhibits.

Exhibit A, A prepared statement of Mr. Jacobsmeyer in which he compares the prior assessment to the 2003 assessment and calculates the percentage increase in land, improvement and overall value for the subject property. The prepared statement also makes comments as to the computerized comparable sales analysis report for tax year 2003 on the subject property. That document and a part of the property record card are included in this exhibit.

Exhibit B, An appraisal report dated 7/2/98.

Objection was made to Exhibit B on the grounds that it is a dated appraisal report and that the appraiser was not present to be subject to cross-examination. The objection was sustained. Exhibit B was excluded from evidence. Exhibit A was received into evidence.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Craig Whyman, appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Whyman was received into evidence. Mr. Whyman arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $354,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainant timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 15895 Kettington Road, Clarkson Valley, Missouri. The property is identified by locator number 21T330392 . The property consists of .77 of an acre lot improved by a one-story brick ranch single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1973 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has a total of eight rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two and a half baths, and contains 2,453 square feet of living area. There is a full basement with a some finished living area and a full basement. There is an attached four-car garage. Exhibit 1, p. 5 & 7.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $264,000, as proposed.

5. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within less than a mile of the subject, all within the same subdivision. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The sale properties were similar to the subject in style, quality of construction, age, condition, room, bedroom and bathroom count, living area, location, site size and other amenities of comparability. Exhibit 1, p. 6 & 7.

6. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (2351 Richborough Rd. - same subdivision as subject approximately a block southeast) sold in September 2002 for $355,000. This property consists of a .87 of an acre lot improved by a one-story brick single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1973 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has a total of nine rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two full and one half baths, and contains 2,514 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has finished recreation area. There is an attached two-car garage.

Comparable 2 (15941 Kettington Rd. - same subdivision as subject approximately a block west) sold in October 2002 for $400,000. This property consists of a 1.64 acre lot improved by a one-story brick single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1970 and appears to be in average condition. The residence has a total of nine rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two full and two half baths, and contains 2,673 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, which has finished recreation area. There is an attached three-car garage.

Comparable 3 (15877 Richborough Rd. - same subdivision as subject approximately two blocks southeast) sold in May 2001 for $370,000. This property consists of a .50 of an acre lot improved by a one and a half-story brick single-family structure of good quality construction. The house was built in 1975 and appears to be in good condition. The residence has a total of eight rooms, which includes four bedrooms, two and one-half baths, and contains 2,903 square feet of living area. There is a full basement, but no finished recreation area. There is an attached two-car garage.

7. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. All adjustments appear to be appropriate to bring the comparables in line with the subject for purposes of the appraisal problem. An appropriate adjustment for the superior condition of the comparables was made.

8. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$1,000 or 0.3% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to -$44,900 or 11.2% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to -$18,800 or 5.1% of the sales price.

9. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $354,000, $355,100 and $351,200, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $354,000 value which calculated to a value per square foot of $144.31 compared with the sales prices per square foot of living area for the comparables of $141.21, $149.64 and $127.45.

10. Respondent=s evidence met the standard of clear and convincing to sustain the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $300,000, as originally determined by the Assessor and affirmed by the Board.

11. Respondent=s appraisal was accepted only to sustain the original assessment made by the Assessor and not for the purpose of raising the assessment above that value.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1, p. 3.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $300,000, appraised value, Respondent=s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1) The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof. As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

(a) Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used. Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.

Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved. It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence. Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974). The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167. AFor evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder=s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.@ Matter of O=Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor=s or board=s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal. Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

The taxpayer in an appeal before the Commission has the burden of proof to come forward with substantial and persuasive evidence to establish the fair market value of the subject property. In order for evidence to be substantial and persuasive and the owner=s opinion be given any evidentiary weight in an appeal, it must be demonstrated that the opinion offered is based upon proper elements and a proper foundation. In the absence of demonstrating the proper elements and foundation for an opinion of value, that opinion can be given no probative value. Such is the case in this appeal.

Exhibit A possesses no probative value in the present appeal on the issue of fair market value. Mr. Jacobsmeyer took exception to the fact that the land value of his property had been increased by the Assessor=s 2003 mass appraisal to $84,400 as opposed to the land value of $60,300 in the prior assessment cycle. The percentage increases for land or improvements made in the Assessor=s mass appraisal from cycle to cycle are irrelevant in hearings before the Commisison.

The Commission does not review the Assessor=s mass appraisal system in appeals. The Commission hears each appeal de novo, that is it starts from the position of receiving relevant evidence on the issue of fair market value from each party. What the Assessor or the Board may have done relative to finding fair market value is not the issue. The issue is simply what a willing buyer and seller would have agree to as the sale price for the subject as of January of the relevant tax year.

Complainant also questioned the over all increase from the 2001 assessment cycle to the 2003 cycle of 14% on the subject property. It was his contention that the overall increase in housing in St. Louis was 7% for Athis year.@ No documentation was presented which would have established that the overall increase for housing in St. Louis was 7% for 2002 or whatever year Complainant was referencing. Even if such evidence had been presented it would not have been relevant. Applying some percentage increase to the valuation made by the Assessor in a prior assessment cycle is not a recognized and accpeted appraisal practice. Nor is it a methodology that has been recognized by the courts of the state or by the Commission.

Taxpayers often want to calculate the various percentages of increase on land, improvements and overall value of their property from the Assessor=s records. Sometimes taxpayers go a few steps further and make such calculations for neighboring properties, properties on their street or properties in their subdivision as shown in the Assessor=s records. Ordinarily when such theories of valuation have been presented before the Hearing Officer the taxpayer is arguing for the property under appeal to only be increased in value by the average percentage which has been calculated. Such an approach and the diverse variations that have been presented over the years come under the general title of Acomparative assessment.@

This type of valuation methodology is quite simple and very appealing to many taxpayers, because it is grounded in a very basic mathematical calculation. It is usually asserted that the figures are correct and therefore the value derived from such an arithmatical exercise must be correct. However, such a procedure (comparative assessment) is fatally flawed as it is based upon an incorrect assumption.

Any form of comparative assessment theory starts with the presumption that the Assessor properly valued the subject property in the prior assessment cycle or the present cycle. This is in error. By statute there is no presumption that the Assessor has correctly valued the subject property in any assessment cycle. In like manner there is no presumption that the Assessor has correctly value the other properties being used in the comparative assessment. Therefore, any calculations made from such comparisons are of no probative value.

While the calculations may be correct, all they demonstrate is the perecentage difference between one assessment cycle and the following cycle. They do not establish that in point of fact the fair market value of the property was what the Assessor set in the 2001 or the 2003 cycle. That is the critical issue.

In the present case, Mr. Jacobsmeyer while asserting that there was a 7% increase in the value of housing in St. Louis for Athis year,@ doesn=t even apply that figure to the prior assessment value. The opinion of value stated by Mr. Jacobsmeyer is simply the value determined by the Assessor for the 2001-02 assessment cycle. Under Missouri law (Section 137.115 RSMo) real property is assessed in each odd numbered year and that valuation, unless there is new construction and improvement to the property, remains as the value for the following even numbered year, irrespective of whether the property increases in value due to the ordinary economic workings of the real estate market.

In other words, if the 7% figure asserted by Mr. Jacobsmeyer, but not used by him, had been applied to the 2001 appraised value of the Assessor ($264,000) then the indicated value for January 2003 would be $302,250 ($264,000 x .07 = $18,480; $264,000 + $18,480 = $282,480 - 2002 value; $282,480 x .07 = $19,774; $282,480 + $19,774 = $302,254, rounded to $302,250 - 2003 value). If the Hearing Officer were in fact to apply the methodology suggested, but not used by Complainant, then the indicated value at a 7% per year increase over the 2001 Assessor=s value would be $302,250.

Complainant offered into evidence a copy of the 2003 Sales Analysis Report (Report) on the subject property. This report is the computer assisted mass appraisal of the subject property. It is not presumed to be correct. Such a document has never, in the twelve years the Hearing Officer has been hearing appeals from St. Louis County, been offered into evidence by the Assessor in an attempt to establish the fair market value determined by the mass appraisal methodology.

Mr. Jacobsmeyer offers varous comments relative to each of the five comparables listed on the Report and asserts that the Report Afurther substantiates the current value of $264,000.@ The current value, that is the 2003 value for the subject property, was not $264,000. Only two of the five sale properties in the Report were utilized by the Respondent=s appraiser as comparables. Furthermore, the indicated market value given for the subject under the cost analysis of the Report is $361,200, while the market value is $329,500. Neither amount supports the owner=s opinion of value of $264,000.

The comments made relative to the comparables at 15941 Kettington (Whyman=s Comparable 2) and 15877 Richborough (Whyman=s Comparable 3) do not disqualify either of these properties as comparables. The difference in living area and lot size for the Kettington property were properly accounted for by appropriate adjustments in the Whyman appraisal. The Richborough house is a story and a half, not a two story as asserted by Mr. Jacobsmeyer. Mr. Whyman adjusted for the remodeling and updating of this property and its pool. No specific adjustment is noted for the location of the comparable on the lake, however, there is no evidence presented by Complainant to establish what if any value the market would give for this factor. In any event, nothing contained in the Report supports the owner=s opinion of value. Furthermore, nothing in the Report renders the Whyman appraisal as nonpersuasive on the issue of fair market value.

An appraisal opining a market value for the appropriate tax date made by a state certified appraiser is admissible into evidence provided the appraiser is present to testify as to his or her appraisal and be cross-examined and the appraisal is performed at a time relevent to the valuation date of January of the given tax year. The appraisal report proffered by Mr. Jacobsmeyer was excluded on two grounds. First, the appraisal report was outdated. It gave an opinion of value as of July, 1998. The fact that the appraisal did not offer an opinion of value as of January, 2003 or at least a time more relevant than four and half years prior to the effective tax date renders the opinion of value asserted by the appraiser as totally irrelevant and unreliable for a 2003 valuation.

The appraisal report is clearly hearsay, as it is offered to prove the true of what it asserts and the declarant (appraiser) of the statement of value was not present to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Without the appraiser present to testify as to the appraisal it must be excluded from evidence upon the objection of Respondent=s Counsel. The requirement that an appraiser must appear to testify and be subject to cross-examination is a requirement that is made known to taxpayers during the appeal process before the Commission.

Each taxpayer appealing to the Commission is provided a pamphlet of instructions relative to the appeal process - Property Tax Appeals Before The State Tax Commission of Misosuri, Revised April, 1999 (Appeal Pamphlet). On page 8 and 9 of the Appeal Pamphlet taxpayers are clearly instructed as follows:

AIf you wish to have an appraisal report introduced into evidence it will be necessary for the appraiser to be present to testify and be cross-examined. If the appraiser is not present at the Evidentiary Hearing, the appraisal report cannot be received into evidence.@

Furthermore, it is the practice of the Hearing Officer during the prehearing conference to remind taxpayers of this requirement, especially if the Hearing Officer has information that the taxpayer has an appraisal report or will be obtaining an appraisal report. In the present case, Mr. Jacobsmeyer had filed with his Complaint for Review of Assessment a copy of Exhibit B. At the prehearing conference that was held on December 11, 2003, the Hearing Officer recalls reminding the Complainant of the requirement of having the appraiser present to testify.

Counsel for Respondent=s objection was sustained on the grounds of relevancy, hearsay, and failure to present the appraiser for cross-examination.

The evidence presented on behalf of the Respondent met the standard of clear and convincing to sustain the original valuation made by the Assessor which the Board had affirmed. Mr. Whyman developed a sales comparison approach to arrive at the indicated value of $354,000. The sales comparison methodology is widely recognized and accepted as a reliable technique for the valuation of single family residential property. The sale properties selected possessed the important elements of comparability that an appraiser looks for when selecting properties to use in an appraisal problem.

Each of the properties was located in the subject subdivision within no more than approximately two blocks away. Each of the comparable homes were similar to the subject in the quality of construction, age and other important elements of comparability. Mr. Whyman=s first comparable only required a gross adjustment of 2.5% ($9,000), while the net adjustment only amounted to $1,000 (0.3% - net adjustment). This comparable was the sale upon which most weight was properly placed by the appraiser.

Although the two other properties required a number of adjustments for various items of difference, the gross adjustments were only 12.5% and 17.2%, both well within the generally accepted range for gross adjustments for properties of the size, age and location of the comparables and subject. As in any appraisal problem, it is the responsibility of the appraiser to make dollar amount adjustments to account for the various differences that may exist between the sale properties and the subject. The fact that such adjustments have to be made does not render such sales as incomparable properties. Quite to the contrary, appraiser adjustments bring the similar, comparable sale properties more in line with the subject for purposes of valuation. This is well recognized appraisal practice. It was properly followed by Mr. Whyman in this instance.

Complainants failed to present substantial and persuasive evidence to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the value proposed, because the owner=s opinion of value was simply based upon the value which the Assessor had set in the prior assessment cycle. Respondent presented evidence of value based on a well recognized and accepted appraisal methodology to clearly and convincingly establish a fair market value of $300,000 for the subject property as of January 1, 2003.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $57,000.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED May 11, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer