CHESTER & EDITH TESSON,	)
	)
Complainants,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-10237
	)
PHILIP MUEHLHEAUSLER, ASSESSOR,	)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 set at $29,700, assessed value of $5,640.

Complainants appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared by Counsel, Paula J. Lemerman, Associate County Counselor.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine (1) the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003; and (2) if there was an intentional plan by assessing officials to assess the subject property at a ratio greater than the average assessment ratio for residential property within St. Louis County.

SUMMARY

Complainants appeal the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which sustained the valuation of the subject property, on the grounds of overvaluation and discrimination. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $29,700 (assessed value of $5,640, as residential property). Complainants proposed no value either on the Complaint for Review of Assessment or at the evidentiary hearing. A hearing was conducted on April 15, 2004, at the St. Louis County Government Center, Clayton, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant Chester Tesson testified on behalf of Complainants. Complainants offered no opinion of value for the subject property. The following exhibits were offered into evidence on behalf of Complainants:

Exhibit A 2 aerial photographs of the subject property.

Exhibit B Assessor=s Data Sheet on property at 3432 Douglas Rd.

Exhibit C Assessor=s Data Sheet on property at 3321 Douglas Rd.

Exhibit D Board of Equalization Decision on property at 3300 Douglas Rd.

Exhibit E Copy of BOE Decision, dated June 27, 2003.

Exhibits B, C and D were objected to by Counsel for Respondent. Objection as to Exhibits C and D were sustained, objection to Exhibit B was overruled. See, DECISION, infra. Exhibits A, B and E were received into evidence.

Respondent placed into evidence the testimony of Mr. Craig Whyman, appraiser for St. Louis County. The appraiser testified as to his appraisal of the subject property. The Appraisal Report, Exhibit 1, of Mr. Whyman was received into evidence. Mr. Whyman arrived at an opinion of value for the subject property of $39,000 based upon a sales comparison approach to value. In performing his sales comparison analysis, the appraiser relied upon the sales of three properties which he deemed to be comparable to the subject property.

Also received into evidence on behalf of Respondent were the following exhibits:

Exhibit 2 BOE Appeal Form for subject.

Exhibit 3 BOE Attendance Sheet for 6/27/03 on subject appeal.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the St. Louis County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 3299 Douglas Road, St. Louis County, Missouri. The property is identified by parcel number 03J320025. The property consists of 3.71 acres. The tract is vacant with a level topography and dense growth of woods and shrubbery. Drainage is considered adequate. Electric service is the only utility to the property. The property fronts on a paved road. Exhibit 1, p. 5.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2004.

4. Complainants= evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish any true value in money for the property.

5. Complainants= evidence failed to establish that the assessment ratio applied to the property of 19% was not the average assessment ratio for residential property in St. Louis County.

6. The properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser in performing his appraisal were comparable to the subject property for the purpose of making a determination of value of the subject property. The properties were located within 1 to 3.5 miles of the subject. Each sale property sold at a time relevant to the tax date of January 1, 2003. The properties were similar in size to the subject.

7. The comparables were described as follows:

Comparable 1 (909 Carrico Road - 1.3 miles east of the subject) sold in July 2001 for $59,000. This property consists of a 4.26 acre unimproved tract. The topography is level with a slight slope to the rear, with adequate drainage. The property had both electric and water service, but no waste system. The property fronts on a paved road. Exhibit 1, p. 6.

Comparable 2 (3803 Pointe Forest - 1 mile south of the subject) sold in April 2001 for $35,000. This property consists of a 3 acre unimproved tract. The topography is fair due to the sloping uneven grade. Drainage is fair to poor due to a large culvert on the west portion of the land. The property fronts on a paved road and has water and electric available at the street. Exhibit 1, p. 6.

Comparable 3 (17312 Old Jamestown Rd. - 3.5 miles east of the subject) sold in August 1998 for $43,900. This property consists of a 3.8 acre unimproved tract. The topography is level with a gradual slope at the front, with adequate drainage. The property had both electric and water service, but no waste system. The property fronts on a paved road. Exhibit 1, p. 6.

8. The appraiser made various adjustments to the comparable properties for differences which existed between the subject and each comparable. The adjustments were appropriate to bring the comparable properties in line with the subject property for the purpose of arriving at an indicated fair market value.

9. The net adjustments for Comparable 1 amounted to -$18,000 or 30% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 2 amounted to +$3,800 or 10.9% of the sales price. The net adjustments for Comparable 3 amounted to -$4,000 or 9.1% of the sales price.

10. The adjusted sales prices for the comparables calculated to $41,000, $38,800 and $39,900, respectively. The appraiser concluded on a $39,000 value which calculated to a value per acre of $10,500 compared with the sales prices per acre for the comparables of $13,850, $11,670 and $11,550.

11. Respondent=s evidence met the standard of clear and convincing to establish the value of the subject, as of January 1, 2003, to be $29,700, as originally determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary; Exhibit 1, p. 3.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert on that subject, by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto.

The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reliable, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Section 490.065, RSMo; Courtroom Handbook on Missouri Evidence, Wm. A. Schroeder, Sections 702-505, pp. 325-350; Wulfing v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).

The Respondent has imposed upon him by the provisions of Section 137.115.1, RSMo, the burden of proof to present clear, convincing and cogent evidence to sustain a valuation on residential property which is made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There is a presumption in this appeal that the original valuation, which was sustained by the Board of Equalization, was made by a computer, computer-assisted method or a computer program. There was no evidence to rebut the presumption, therefore, in order to sustain the valuation of the subject property at $29,700, appraised value, Respondent=s evidence must come within the guidelines established by the legislature and must clearly and convincingly persuade the Hearing Officer as to the value sought to be sustained.

The statutory guidelines for evidence to meet the standard of clear, convincing and cogent include the following:

(1) The findings of the assessor based on an appraisal of the property by generally accepted appraisal techniques; and

(2) The purchase prices from sales of at least three comparable properties and the address or location thereof. As used in this paragraph, the word comparable means that:

(a) Such sale was closed at a date relevant to the property valuation; and

(b) Such properties are not more than one mile from the site of the disputed property, except where no similar properties exist within one mile of the disputed property, the nearest comparable property shall be used. Such property shall be within five hundred square feet in size of the disputed property, and resemble the disputed property in age, floor plan, number of rooms, and other relevant characteristics.

Section 137.115.1(1) & (2).

Clear, cogent and convincing evidence is that evidence which clearly convinces the trier of fact of the affirmative proposition to be proved. It does not mean that there may not be contrary evidence. Grissum v. Reesman, 505 S.W.2d 81, 85, 86 (Mo. Div. 2, 1974). The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing must be more than a mere preponderance but does not require beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 AmJur2d. 345-346, Evidence section 1167. AFor evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder=s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.@ Matter of O=Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1980).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003)

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

In any case in St. Louis County where the assessor presents evidence which indicates a valuation higher than the value finally determined by the assessor or the value determined by the board of equalization, whichever is higher, for that assessment period, such evidence will only be received for the purpose of sustaining the assessor=s or board=s valuation, and not for increasing the valuation of the property under appeal. Section 138.060, RSMo; 12 CSR 30-3.075.

Discrimination

In order to obtain a reduction in assessed value based upon discrimination, the Complainants must (1) prove the true value in money of their property on January 1, 2003. Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. 1959); and (2) show an intentional plan of discrimination by the assessing officials resulting in an assessment of that property at a greater percentage of value than other property, generally, within the same class within the same taxing jurisdiction. Koplar, supra, at 695.

Complainants must first establish the market value of their property in order to determine the percentage of true value at which it is being assessed. Next, they must establish the true value of the other properties generally which they claim are assessed at a lower percentage of true value. Evidence of value and assessments of a few properties does not prove discrimination. Substantial evidence must show that all other property in the same class, generally, is actually undervalued. State ex rel. Plantz v. State Tax Commission, 384 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1964). Then they must compare the ratio of assessed value to true value for both their property and the comparable properties to establish that their property is being assessed at a higher percentage of value. This difference in ratios must be shown to be grossly excessive. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986). No other methodology is sufficient to establish discrimination. Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1958).

The first obligation of taxpayers in appeals before the Commission challenging the value of property is to offer an opinion of value. That opinion of value must then be supported by an appropriate methodology that is recognized by the courts of this state and the Commission. Generally, either the sales price of a recent open market sale of the property under appeal or an appraisal under an appropriate approach to value. In the present instance, since this subject property is a vacant, unimproved tract of land the only appraisal methodology that is appropriate to establish value is the sales comparison approach.

Complainants failed to even offer an opinion of value. For the taxpayer to testify that they do not know what their property is worth or that they have no idea what it would sell for is basically an admission that they do not have any basis to raise a claim of overvaluation. Complainants had no information as to the original purchase price for the tract of land. It had been bought in the mid-1990's with another tract of land. According to Exhibit 2 the property was acquired in 1994, but no information as to purchase price was provided on the BOE appeal form.

Complainants must provide an opinion of value and then a basis for that opinion in order to establish their claim of overvaluation. Complainants in this appeal assert that they property is overvalued because of alleged variance in values of property on the subject street. However, the only information offered was the assessor=s data sheet for two other properties and the BOE decision on an improved tract of land across the road from the subject.

The one data sheet (Exhibit B) was received into evidence over the objection of Respondent=s counsel. This exhibit only establishes that a three acre tract of vacant land at 3432 Douglas Road was valued by the Assessor for 2003 at $11,200 or $3,733 per acre, as residential property. Since by law there is no presumption that the Assessor=s value is correct, the valuation of this one tract of land cannot reasonably establish the fair market value of the subject property. Complainants desired to attempt to use this methodology to establish that their land was overvalued. The exhibit has no real probative value and was only received to illustrate the basis for Complainants= claim.

Exhibit C was excluded from evidence upon the objection of Respondent=s Counsel. This data sheet was for a 24.54 acre tract of land which is classified as agricultural property. Due to it being more than six times larger than the subject and the fact that it is classified as agricultural land and not residential, it is not relevant to ascertaining a value for the subject property.

Exhibit D is the property on which Complainants have their residence. This is a 7.8 acre tract of land. This exhibit provides no relevant evidence for the valuation of a 3 acre unimproved tract of land. Complainants wanted to rely upon an allocation that was made by the BOE and the Assessor as to land value on the overall assessment. However, this is not a recognized and accepted methodology for arriving at fair market value.

Complainants failed to either offer an opinion of fair market value, or to present relevant evidence from which a determination of a fair market value of less than that established by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of $29,700 could be made.

Where there is a claim of discrimination based upon a lack of valuation consistency, Complainants have the burden to prove the market value of the subject property and then dividing the market value into the assessed value of the property as determined by the assessor to arrive at the level of assessment or the ratio of assessment for the subject property in 2003. Specifically, in the case of the subject property, the assessor had placed an assessed value on the subject property of $5,640 and an appraised fair market value of $29,700. This equates to a ratio of 19%. This is the ratio establish by law for residential property. Complainants did not establish that the ratio of assessment on the subject property was greater than 19%.

The next requirement for the Complainants to establish discrimination on the part of the Assessor or the BOE is to determine the market value of a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County. This Complainants did not do. Had Complainants done this, it would have been necessary for a determination to have been made as to the assessed value that was placed on each of the sample properties for the 2003 assessment year. This Complainants did not do.

If market values and assessed values would have been established on a representative sample of residential properties in St. Louis County, then it would have been possible to have divided the assessed value by the market value to determine the level of assessment for each property in the sample. This was not possible to do, since Complainants did not establish the necessary data for this to be accomplished. Had this been done it would have been possible to determine the mean and median of the results.

If then the difference between the actual assessment level of the subject property and the average level of assessment for all residential property, taken from a sufficient representative sample in St. Louis County demonstrated a disparity that was grossly excessive, it would have been possible to have assessed Complainants= property at the average residential assessment ratio. Savage v. State Tax Commission of Missouri, 722 S.W.2d 72, 79 (Mo. banc 1986). However, since the appropriate data for performing a ratio study was not presented on this record by Complainants their discrimination claim fails. A claim of discrimination cannot be established based upon the assessment of simply a few properties on the subject street or even in the same neighborhood of the property under appeal.

Because Complainants failed to establish the market value of their property and failed to establish that the subject property was assessed at a higher percentage of market value than a statistically significant number of other properties in St. Louis County, they have failed to establish discrimination.

Respondent presented evidence to establish that the fair market value of the subject property was at least $29,700 or $8,000 per acre. The evidence from sales of three other unimproved tracts of land established a fair market value of $10,500 per acre or $39,000. By state statute and Commission rule the Commission may not increase the value above the value determined by the Assessor and that was sustained by the Board.

The appraiser made appropriate adjustments to each of the sale comparables to account for the various differences between each comparable and the subject. The comparables established that tracts of land of 3 to 4 acres in the subject neighborhood have been selling for $11,000 to approximately $14,000 per acre. Complainants assertion that the three properties relied upon by Respondent are not comparable due to the subject not having county water and the comparables having water is not sufficient to disallow the use of these comparables. The appraiser adjusted for this factor. Even if he had taken an even larger adjustment of an additional $5,000 or even $10,000 for this factor, the appraisal would still have supported a value of $29,700 for the subject.

Complainants failed to present either an opinion of value or evidence to establish fair market value. The only evidence on this record that was probative of fair market value was that presented by Respondent. The valuation made by the Assessor and sustained by the Board must be affirmed.

Complainants= Exhibit E and Respondent=s Exhibits 2 and 3 were received into evidence. Complainants had asserted that there had been a reduction at the BOE on the value of the property. This was based on the Decision signed by the Board on June 27, 2003 (Exhibit E). That document sets out that the Assessor indicated a value for the property of $24,700, and that the Board found that value. However, this is not consistent with the information contained on the back of the BOE Appeal Form (Exhibit 2). The only value shown on in the Hearing Officer=s notes and that set by the BOE and signed off by all three board members is the value of $29,700. The Board Decision Letter filed with the Complaint for Review of Assessment gives an assessed value of $5,640, which calculates to a fair market value of $29,700. Even if the Board had reduced the value to $24,700, the evidence on the record would have supported increasing the value back to the Assessor=s original value of $29,700.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for St. Louis County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $5,640.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of St. Louis County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED April 21, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer

On April 21, 2004, Hearing Officer W. B. Tichenor entered his Decision and Order (Decision) affirming the assessment by the St. Louis County Board of Equalization, which had sustained the assessment made by the Assessor.

Complainants timely filed (May 18, 2004) an Application for Review of the Decision.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of an expert witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of experts who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the expert=s testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

The Commission will not lightly interfere with the Hearing Officer=s Decision and substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer as the trier of fact. Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Lowe v. Lombardi, 957 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); Forms World, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com=n, 935 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); Evangelical Retirement Homes v. STC, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980); St. Louis County v. STC, 562 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1978); St. Louis County v. STC, 406 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1966).

A review of the record in the present appeal provides support for the determinations made by the Hearing Officer. There is competent and substantial evidence to establish a sufficient foundation for the Decision of the Hearing Officer. A reasonable mind could have conscientiously reached the same result based on a review of the entire record. The Commission finds no basis to support a determination that the Hearing Officer acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner or abused his discretion as the trier of fact and concluder of law in this appeal. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1978); Black v. Lombardi, 970 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); Holt v. Clarke, 965 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Smith v. Morton, 890 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). Phelps v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 598 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980).

Complainants= letter setting forth their Application for Review is an attempt to introduce new evidence into the record. Such is not permitted at this stage of the appeal process. The evidentiary record was closed at the end of the evidentiary hearing. Neither party is permitted to now introduce additional evidence.

A review of Complainants= letter only provides information at to the original purchase of a 7.76 acre tract, from which 4.05 acres and a house were sold off in 2000 leaving the 3.71 acres that was appealed. Complainants make a calculation as to their purchase price of the original tract and repairs made to the house which was sold to arrive at a value for the subject tract. The Complainants did not even offer an opinion of value at the evidentiary hearing. The opinion of value now sought to be offered is not based upon any recognized and accepted appraisal methodology. Even if these new calculations had been offered at the evidentiary hearing they would have been irrelevant as they do not demonstrate a proper appraisal technique. The opinion of value now calculated is not based upon proper elements or a proper foundation. Therefore it has no probative value.

Complainants assert that they are presently selling trees from the subject property and would like the subclass changed from residential to agricultural. Complainants did not assert as a ground for appeal in their Complaint for Review of Assessment misclassification. The only two issues raised were overvaluation and discrimination. Both issues were carefully and adequately addressed in the Hearing Officer=s Decision. There was no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing that would support a classification of the subject property as agricultural land. No such evidence can be introduced at this stage.

The introduction of the claim for agricultural classification is an attempt to amend the grounds for appeal. Amendment of pleadings before the Commission is not permitted.

In Daly v. State Tax Commission, 120 S.W.3d 262 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003), the Court found that since the taxpayer=s Complaint for Review of Assessment did not specify Amisclassification@ for the relevant year, such issue Awas not properly before the Commission.@ Daly, at 271. Following the holding in the Daly decision, supra, the Commission is without authority to amend the grounds alleged in the Complaint to include an additional ground for appeal. Lewis and Clark State Bank, et al., v. Muehlheausler, STC Appeals No. 01-11402 et al., Order, dated 3/04/04.

Complainants only real argument relative to the Hearing Officer=s Decision is that the sale properties relied upon by Respondent=s appraiser were not comparable to the subject property. This is an issue of fact for the Hearing Officer to decide. The Hearing Officer found the properties to be comparable. The owner=s disagreement with that Finding of Fact does not establish that the Hearing Officer erred in this determination.

Each of the land sales were located within an acceptable proximity to the subject tract of land, from 1 to 3 and a half miles. This is a very acceptable general location for tracts of land of the subject size and general area of St. Louis County. Each of the land sales were very similar in size to the subject. Comparable 1 was only 23,958 square feet larger than the subject. Comparable 2 was only 30,927.60 square feet smaller than the subject. Comparable 3 was only 3,920 square feet larger than the subject. The appraiser properly adjusted the various factors of difference between each sale property and the subject. The evidence on the record provides more than sufficient basis for the Hearing Officer=s conclusion that the three sale properties were sufficiently similar to the subject to be used in a sales comparison approach to arrive at value.

Complainants failed to set forth any legal claim or basis as a ground to find the Hearing Officer had abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. In other words, Complainants failed to state specific legal grounds upon which it was claimed the decision was erroneous. In the absence of specific facts of error or specific errors in applying the law, the Application for Review must be summarily denied.

The Hearing Officer did not err in his determinations as challenged by Complainant.

The Commission upon review of the record and Decision in this appeal, finds no grounds upon which the Decision of the Hearing Officer should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, the Decision is affirmed.

Judicial review of this Order may be had in the manner provided in Sections 138.432 and 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo within thirty days of the date of the mailing of this Order.

SO ORDERED June 18, 2004.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Sam D. Leake, Chairman

Bruce E. Davis, Commissioner