CHARLES W. & NANCY R. ROBINSON,	)
	)
Complainants,	)
	)
v.	)		Appeal Number 03-70504
	)
DON STEEN, ASSESSOR,	)
MILLER COUNTY, MISSOURI,	)
	)
Respondent.	)

Decision of the Miller County Board of Equalization sustaining the assessment made by the Assessor, AFFIRMED, true value in money for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 set at $96,500, assessed value of $18,340.

Complainants appeared pro se.

Respondent appeared pro se.

Case heard and decided by Hearing Officer, W. B. Tichenor.

The Commission takes this appeal to determine the true value in money for the subject property on January 1, 2003.

Complainants appeal the decision of the Miller County Board of Equalization which sustained the valuation of the subject property. The Assessor determined an appraised value of $96,500 (assessed value of $18,340, as residential property). Complainant proposed a value of $94,070 (assessed value of $17,875). A hearing was conducted on December 16, 2003, at the Miller County Courthouse, Tuscumbia, Missouri.

The Hearing Officer, having considered all of the competent evidence upon the whole record, enters the following Decision and Order.

Complainant, Charles W. Robinson, testified on behalf of Complainants. Exhibit A was received into evidence on behalf of Complainants. Exhibit A consists of the following documents:

Exhibit A1    Typed statement of Mr. Robinson on the valuation of the older boat dock on the subject property.

Exhibit A2    Copy of letter from TriCo Dock Center (Gary Rekowski) opining a value for Complainants= one-slip boat dock of $0 - $500.

Exhibit A3    Copy of newspaper add listing docks for sale as of 10/10/03 and a copy of a photograph of the boat dock in question.

Complainants only challenged the valuation of the one-slip boat dock by the Assessor. They did not challenge the value of the remainder of the subject property, that is the land and other improvements (house, retaining wall, ramp, two-slip boat dock, ramp, and swimming platform).

Respondent testified in his own behalf and offered into evidence Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 consists of the Property Record Card on the subject property, five photographs of the subject house and boat docks, a copy of the Sales Ratio Analysis Summary by Neighborhood for Miller County, Sale Years 2000-2003, copy of sales letter on the property next door to the subject and the property record card for the next door property. Exhibit 1 was received into evidence.

1. Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Complainants timely appealed to the State Tax Commission from the decision of the Miller County Board of Equalization.

2. The subject property is located at 60 Raven Road, Lake Ozark, Missouri. It is identified by parcel number 611361142003014. The property consists of a lake lot improved by a house, retaining wall, ramp, a two-slip boat dock with a swimming platform, and a one-slip boat dock with a swimming platform.

3. There was no evidence of new construction and improvement from January 1, 2003, to the date of hearing, therefore the valuation for tax year 2003 will remain as the valuation for tax year 2004, in the absence of new construction and improvment between December 16 and December 31, 2003.

4. Complainant=s evidence was not substantial and persuasive to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board and establish the true value in money as of January 1, 2003, to be $94,070, as proposed.

5. The fair market value of the subject property as of January 1, 2003, is $96,500.

The Commission has jurisdiction to hear this appeal and correct any assessment which is shown to be unlawful, unfair, arbitrary or capricious. Article X, section 14, Mo. Const. of 1945; Sections 138.430, 138.431, RSMo. The hearing officer shall issue a decision and order affirming, modifying or reversing the determination of the board of equalization, and correcting any assessment which is unlawful, unfair, improper, arbitrary, or capricious. Section 138.431.4, RSMo.

There is a presumption of validity, good faith and correctness of assessment by the County Board of Equalization. Hermel, Inc. v. STC, 564 S.W.2d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 1978); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. 1968); May Department Stores Co. v. STC, 308 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Mo. 1958).

There is no presumption that the assessor=s valuation is correct. Section 138.431.3, RSMo.

Section 137.115, RSMo 1994, requires that property be assessed based upon its true value in money which is defined as the price a property would bring when offered for sale by one willing or desirous to sell and bought by one who is willing or desirous to purchase but who is not compelled to do so. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Missouri Baptist Children=s Home v. State Tax Commission, 867 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). It is the fair market value of the subject property on the valuation date. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Mo. banc 1978).

Market value is the most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeable and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus.

Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specific date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:

1. Buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2. Both parties are well informed and well advised, and each acting in what they consider their own best interests.

3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4. Payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5. Financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the Community at the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale.

6. The price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Revised Edition, 1984; See also, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, J. D. Eaton, M.A.I., American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 1982, pp. 4-5; Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration, International Association of Assessing Officers, 1990, pp. 79-80; Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Glossary.

In order to investigate appeals filed with the Commission, the Hearing Officer has the duty to inquire of the owner of the property or of any other party to the appeal regarding any matter or issue relevant to the valuation, subclassification or assessment of the property. The Hearing Officer=s decision regarding the assessment or valuation of the property may be based solely upon its inquiry and any evidence presented by the parties, or based solely upon evidence presented by the parties. Section 138.430.2, RSMo.

The Hearing Officer is not bound by any single formula, rule or method in determining true value in money, but is free to consider all pertinent facts and estimates and give them such weight as reasonably they may be deemed entitled. The relative weight to be accorded any relevant factor in a particular case is for the Hearing Officer to decide. St. Louis County v. Security Bonhomme, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. banc 1977); St. Louis County v. STC, 515 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo. 1974); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. STC, 436 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1968).

The Hearing Officer as the trier of fact may consider the testimony of a witness and give it as much weight and credit as he may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all other circumstances. The Hearing Officer is not bound by the opinions of the owner or the assessor who testify on the issue of reasonable value, but may believe all or none of the testimony and accept it in part or reject it in part. St. Louis County v. Boatmen=s Trust Co., 857 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Vincent by Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Mo. 1992); Beardsley v. Beardsley, 819 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. App. 1991); Curnow v. Sloan, 625 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo. banc 1981).

In order to prevail, Complainants must present an opinion of market value and substantial and persuasive evidence that the proposed value is indicative of the market value of the subject property on January 1, 2003. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888, at 897. Substantial evidence can be defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 329 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Mo. 1959). Persuasive evidence is that evidence which has sufficient weight and probative value to convince the trier of fact. The persuasiveness of evidence does not depend on the quantity or amount thereof but on its effect in inducing belief. Brooks v. General Motors Assembly Division, 527 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Westwood Partnership v. Gogarty, 103 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Daly v. P. D. George Co., 77 S.W.3d 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002); Reeves v. Snider, 115 S.W.3d 375 (Mo.App. S.D. 2003)

The owner of property is generally held competent to testify to its reasonable market value. Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 95 (Sup. 1970). The owner=s opinion is without probative value however, where it is shown to have been based upon improper elements or an improper foundation. Shelby County R-4 School District v. Hermann, 392 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Sup. 1965).

Missouri courts have approved the comparable sales or market approach, the cost approach (replacement or construction) and the income approach as recognized methods of arriving at fair market value. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. STC, 854 S.W.2d 526, 529 (App. E.D. 1993); Aspenhof Corp. v. STC, 789 S.W.2d 867, 869 (App. E.D. 1990); Quincy Soybean Company, Inc., v. Lowe, 773 S.W.2d 503, 504 (App. E.D. 1989), citing Del-Mar Redevelopment Corp v. Associated Garages, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 866, 869 (App. E.D. 1987); and State ex rel. State Highway Comm=n v. Southern Dev. Co., 509 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. Div. 2 1974).

The old saying, AIt=s not the money, it=s the principle of the thing,@ may properly apply to the present case. Based upon the 2002 tax rate, the actual dollars and cents that are in dispute in this appeal amounts to only about $18.45. The difference in fair market value between that determined by the Assessor and that proposed by Complainants is only $2,430 ($96,500 - $94,070 = $2,430). This difference relates totally to the valuation of a a one slip boat dock.

Complainants= challenge the value determined by the Assessor under the mass appraisal cost system utilized to arrive at fair market value for the subject property as it relates only to a 18 x 20 foot boat dock, with a 10 x 16 foot slip. Complainants did not actually challenge the fair market value of the real property as a whole. The Assessor valued the one-slip boat dock, along with the two-slip boat dock and swimming platforms, as part of the real property. The combined boat docks and swimming platforms were actually valued under the cost approach as a single structural unit. The Assessor arrived at a replacement cost new of $14,674 and applied a 20% depreciation factor (80% good) to establish an indicated value of $11,740 for the entirety of the docks and swimming platforms.

Complainants= theory of value is essentially that the one-slip boat dock should be valued as personal property and valued based upon what boat docks sell for separate and apart from real property. Respondent values all boat docks with the lot to which they are attached or connected. In this way the Assessor is valuing boat docks in a uniform and consistent manner. In other words, Respondent values boat docks as an improvement to the real property. The challenge, by Complainants, that another county may treat boat docks as personal property and assess and value them as such does not establish that Respondent is not properly assessing the subject property.

The property under appeal is the entirety of the real property, with its various improvements including the boat docks and swimming platforms. The only evidence even offered as to the subject=s fair market value on January 1, 2003, is the mass appraisal made by the Assessor. Complainant=s offered no evidence that as of January 1, 2003, the subject property=s fair market value would be only $94,070, instead of the $96,500 determined by the Assessor. Complainants simply claim that the one-slip boat dock should be valued at $1,000.

If the only evidence available was that boat docks sell separate and apart from real property, then there would be a basis to determine value based upon such sales activity. However, boat docks sell in the active real estate market as part and parcel of the lake lots and residences bought and sold at the Lake of the Ozark. This is evidenced by the fact that when Complainants purchased the subject property in July, 2000 the one-slip boat dock was a part of the sales transaction. In such sales, the sale price is for the property as a whole, not separate prices for land, house, decks, walkways, docks, ramps, retaining walls, etc.

Although Complainants seek to characterize the issue in the present appeal as being whether the one-slip boat dock was worth $3,430 or $1,000 on January 1, 2003, the issue is the fair market value of the entire property. This is not unlike a case where the Assessor has valued a residence at $96,500 and placed a land value on the property of $3,400 and the homeowner believes the land is worth only $1,000. It doesn=t really matter if the land has a value of $1,000, $2,000, or $3,000, if the fair market value of the property is $96,500, then the value assigned to the land is irrelevant. A similar case would also be where a property has been valued at $96,500 and included in that value the Assessor assigned $3,000 to a detached car-port, which the taxpayer asserts to be worth only $1,000. The question is really not whether the car-port has a value of $3,000 or $1,000. The issue is the fair market value of the property under appeal in its entirety.

Complainants have failed to establish that the fair market value of the property as of January 1, 2003, was $94,070. No approach to value for the real property that is recognized by the Courts in Missouri or the Commission was advanced by Complainants which would establish that value. The Respondent=s policy of valuing the subject=s boat dock as part of the reality is a uniform policy applied to all lake property with docks. In this regard, Complainants are being treated in the same manner as all other property owners with boat docks in Miller County.

If the Hearing Officer were to follow the theory advanced by Complainants, it would actually be necessary to treat the entirety of the boat dock structure, both the two-slip, one-slip and swimming platforms as personal property. This would mean that $11,740 in value would be deducted from the real property. Thus the real property value for the subject would be $84,760, assessed value of $16,105. The docks would have a value of $9,310, assuming the one-slip to be valued at $1,000 as proposed by Complainants, or an assessed value as personal property of $3,100.

Using the 2002 tax rate (the Hearing Officer does not have the 2003 tax rate available for this calculation) , the real estate taxes would be $637.84 ($16,105/100 = 161.05 x 3.9605 = $637.84) and the personal property taxes would be $122.78 ($3,100/100 = 31 x 3.9605 = $122.78). This would result in a total tax bill for real and personal property to Complainants of $760.62 ($637.84 + $122.78 = $760.62). Applying the 2002 tax rate to the present assessed value of the a subject property results in a tax bill of only $726.36 ($18,340/100 = 183.4 x 3.9605 = $726.36). In other words, to find for the Complainants would require the issuing of both a real and personal property tax bill which would total approximately $34.26 more than what would be paid assessing the property only as real property.

However, this would result in Complainants having their property assessed in a manner that is different from the manner in which all other lake property with docks is assessed. This would not be proper. The policy of Respondent treating boat docks as part of the real property results in a uniform policy which does not require the issuing of two separate assessments and therefore two separate tax bills. It has not been established by the record in this appeal that Complainants= real property has been overvalued by Respondent. The only evidence to establish fair market value of the subject property as it sat on January 1, 2003, is the mass cost valuation performed by the Assessor. In the absence of market data to the contrary for lake front properties comparable to the subject, this evidentiary record does not provide a basis upon which the Hearing officer can find the true value in money for the subject property to be $94,070 as proposed by Complainants. Evidence of what boat docks are selling for is insufficient to rebut the presumption of correct assessment by the Board of Equalization in this instance.

The assessed valuation for the subject property as determined by the Assessor and sustained by the Board of Equalization for Miller County for the subject tax day is AFFIRMED.

The assessed value for the subject property for tax years 2003 and 2004 is set at $18,340.

A party may file with the Commission an application for review of this decision within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such decision. The application shall contain specific grounds upon which it is claimed the decision is erroneous. Failure to state specific facts or law upon which the appeal is based will result in summary denial. Section 138.432, RSMo 1994.

If an application for review of this decision is made to the Commission, any protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accordance with this appeal shall be held pending the final decision of the Commission. If no application for review is received by the Commission within thirty (30) days, this decision and order is deemed final and the Collector of Miller County, as well as the collectors of all affected political subdivisions therein, shall disburse the protested taxes presently in an escrow account in accord with the decision on the underlying assessment in this appeal. If any or all protested taxes have been disbursed pursuant to Section 139.031(8), RSMo, either party may apply to the circuit court having jurisdiction of the cause for disposition of the protested taxes held by the taxing authority.

Any Finding of Fact which is a Conclusion of Law or Decision shall be so deemed. Any Decision which is a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law shall be so deemed.

SO ORDERED December 19, 2003.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

W. B. Tichenor

Hearing Officer